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Western State Hospital is a mental hospital in Steilacoom, Washington. In 1951, 
on the order of the Washington State Legislature, Western State Hospital began 
accepting sex offenders as inpatients. In 1958, a treatment program was developed. The 
program used an iconoclastic form of group therapy, wherein the offenders led their 
own group sessions without staff present. The program considered sexual offense the 
most prominent symptom of the offender’s social maladjustment and self-isolation. 
Therapy sought to have the offenders “teach” each other interpersonal skills, as well as 
to elucidate individual problems. Under the leadership of Dr. George MacDonald and 
Robinson Williams, M.S.W., the program developed to a multi-component modality 
that included work release and couples’ therapy. The program received an increasingly 
large percentage of the state’s sex offenders through 1975, with little corresponding 
oversight from the state or the wider academic world. The professional field shifted 
rapidly toward conditioning therapies in the late 1970’s. The program adopted these 
new methods slowly. Treatment costs ballooned as staff levels increased to handle the 
large patient population and the new methods. The public’s fears of escapes, despite 
their rarity, led to numerous demands that the program be closed to protect the local 
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community. The state eventually sided with the public as costs continued to rise, and the 
program was formally ended in 1986. Washington replaced the program with the 
strictest sex-offender laws in the nation.  
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Introduction 
The public does not like to think about rapists and pedophiles. Spectacular 
murderers, skilled thieves, and desperate robbers taking hostages can attract a sort of 
grudging empathy, or even admiration. Serial rapists earn total scorn and are largely 
absent from entertainment media. The lack of public discussion is not because the crime 
is rare. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s official estimate of the number of rapes 
reported in the United States for 2017 was 135,755. That same year, police made an 
estimated total of 18,289 arrests on charges of rape.1 Sexual crimes against children in 
the United States have historically been severely punished, with public approval. The 
public’s disdain of sexual offenders and love of strong sentences, however, has not 
stopped attempts at treating them, both in the past and today. One in five defendants 
convicted of rape charge entered a treatment program as part of their sentence.2 This is 
only a portion of the number of offenders who go through treatment, as the majority of 
rehabilitation is undertaken as part of an offender’s probation or parole.3 In 2008, the 
Safer Society, a group devoted to sex offender treatment policy research and outreach, 
conducted their most recent survey of the over 2,200 known sexual offender 
rehabilitation programs in the United States. 1,307, or 57%, of the programs responded, 
                                                        
1 Crime Statistics Management Unit, “Summary Reporting System Estimates 1995-2017”, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/downloads-and-docs. “Rape” here 
means all sexual offenses committed without the other person’s consent or with someone unable to given 
consent. Child sexual abuse and child molestation are tallied under this definition. The figure is an 
“estimate” because it includes averages and approximations from police departments that did not keep a 
full year’s records. 
2 Matthew Durose, Donald Farole, Jr., and Sean Rosenmerkel, “Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 – 
Statistical Tables”, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, NCJ 226846 (December 
2009), 2. 
3 Marcus Nieto, “Community Treatment and Supervision of Sex Offenders: How It’s Done Across the 
Country and in California”, California Research Bureau, California State Library, Sacramento, CA 
(2004), 3, 11-14, 46-49. 
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and reported they collectively gave treatment to 53,811 offenders over the 2008 
calendar year. 81.6% of these programs were community-based, outpatient programs 
who overwhelmingly serve offenders released from prison.4 Sexual offender 
rehabilitation has become a major facet of the criminal justice system.  
The adoption of rehabilitation for sex offenders in the American justice system 
happened slowly, over decades. The initial effort was by and large abortive. In the 
1930’s, a wave of “sexual psychopath" laws were created in response to a wave of fear 
of "sexual deviants" from the public. These laws allowed the indefinite confinement of 
certain sexual offenders in mental hospitals. They justified themselves on the premise 
that these offenses were due to an underlying psychological disorder, which, if not 
treated, would lead to recidivism. The goals of the program, therefore, were to advance 
public safety as well as provide more humane treatment.  If successful, the program 
would benefit the state with a lower recidivism rate and give its “patients” a pathway to 
reintegration into society. In practice, these goals were not seriously attempted in most 
states. Few treatment programs were created of any size or duration. Rehabilitation for 
sexual offenders instead began on different grounds in the middle of the 1970’s, 
building slowly in size and prevalence through the end of the century. 
Washington, however, took a different course. The legislature passed a sexual 
psychopath law in 1947, but in contrast to other states, Washington’s justice system 
steadily committed offenders to the state mental hospitals for a decade. After some 
hesitation, one of those hospitals, Western State Hospital in Steilacoom, established a 
                                                        
4 R.J. McGrath et. al., Current Practices and Emerging Trends in Sexual Abuser Management: The Safer 
Society 2009 North American Survey, Safer Society Press, Brandon, VT (2010), vii, 15, 23-25. This is the 
most recent such survey available. 
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treatment program in 1958.  For the majority of its lifespan, the state and the program 
held different but nonconflicting goals. The program staff focused on developing its 
treatment model, while the state focused on cost containment. The program earned 
increasing support from the justice system and the legislature. In 1966, the hospital was 
designated the state’s official Treatment Center for Sex Offenders, and the program’s 
population increased massively. By the middle of the 1970’s, the program evaluated 
80% of all sexual offenders convicted of an offense in Washington.5 Costs remained 
low, so the state let the program continue with little oversight. Only the public outcry 
caused by major failures, such as the 1974 escape of a rapist who then killed two girls in 
Seattle, brought any attempt by the state to monitor the effectiveness of the program. 
The state was satisfied so long as the program kept cost low and didn’t raise hell. 
As the 1970’s wore on, the state’s expectation of low cost was increasingly 
joined by demands for higher security. The treatment model that the program had 
developed was predicated on a degree of freedom for the offender. Significant change 
from this principle was not possible without changing the program entirely. The 
program and government were increasingly at odds. Meanwhile, the crimes of child 
molestation and rape became a source of greater public concern and disdain, putting 
pressure on the government to enforce its security demands. The conflict between the 
two was eventually irreconcilable. As sex offenders became increasingly vilified, the 
program’s existence and policy became dependent on local headlines and public 
opinion, rather than medical science or measurable efficacy. By 1985, the state was no 
                                                        
5 R.V. Denenberg, “Sex Offenders Treat Themselves”, Corrections Magazine 1 no. 2 
(November/December 1974), 55. 
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longer interested in a treatment program, no matter the cost, no matter its success. The 
escape of a nationally infamous rapist that same year was the last straw. Politicians 
listened to a furious public and closed the program to admissions the next year. The 
Washington Department of Corrections has received custody of all legally competent 
sex offenders since.  
The Western State program was unique for both its long life and for its 
iconoclastic approach to the offender’s role in his treatment. The program’s first 
incarnation, established by Dr. Giulio di Furia in 1958, was heavily influenced by 
milieu therapy and by the group techniques developed in Alcoholics Anonymous. Its 
approach was predicated on offenders intervening in and correcting the mindset and 
behavior of their fellows. The offender was thought to be self-isolating and unable to 
interact with others. Group sessions centered on constant, full disclosure of present 
feelings to develop honesty and socialization skills. The program’s residents lived on 
the same ward and met in a therapeutic “group” throughout the week. They led 
themselves in their therapy, which they conducted on their own. Staff supervised their 
progress but allowed them to “manage” themselves, which included setting certain 
restrictions for individuals and establishing a group code. Under the direction of 
residents who had been appointed leaders, the offenders analyzed each other’s behavior 
and gave updates on their individual progress. It was like no other sex offender 
treatment program at the time. 
With the arrival of Dr. George MacDonald in 1965, the “therapeutic group” 
became increasingly prominent in and of itself. The ward was hypothesized to be a 
miniature community. In the program, the offender had the opportunity not only to seek 
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help from his group, but to help his fellows and contribute to the therapeutic 
environment. The groups became more “democratic” to encourage broad participation. 
Simultaneously, they became more structured to make individual leaders less “distinct” 
from the general group population. MacDonald, working with Robinson Williams, 
dramatically expanded the program’s practices and services. They sought to effect a 
wide-ranging change in the life of the offender that would help them transition from the 
institution to everyday life, and from offender to law-abiding citizen. Their initiative 
earned the program professional acclaim, and other hospitals across the country, most 
notably Oregon State Hospital in Salem, adopted the approach for themselves.6 Their 
changes, however, began to rack up major increases in per-capita costs. The staff wrote 
reports on their method, but rarely engaged with the wider academic literature and were 
less than scientific in their self-analysis. The program’s methodology seemed 
increasingly a response to the program’s high resident population, rather than a 
modality justified by reduction of sexual misconduct. 
As the program maintained course, it fell out of step with developments in the 
field. di Furia and MacDonald had broken with the psychiatric majority in their 
disinterest in treating subconscious motivating factors and by giving the group so much 
control. By the start of the 1980’s, however, the “self-guided group” approach was seen 
as “old fashioned” by other professionals. A new model of the sexual offender had 
surfaced that took sexual offense to be deeper-rooted in an individualistic sexual 
                                                        
6 Edward M. Brecher, Treatment Programs for Sex Offenders, Department of Justice, Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. (1978), 5; Robert Krell, 
Sex Offender Programs at Western and Eastern State Hospitals (Department of Social and Health 
Services): A Report to the Washington State Legislature, No. 85-16, Legislative Budget Committee, 
Olympia, WA (1985), 13. 
  
6 
 
attitude, rather than a response to a low self-perception. Assorted conditioning methods, 
combined with cognitive-behavioral therapy, became the new standard in an attempt o 
stamp out this toxic desire directly. At the program’s closure, it was one of the last 
using the method it had pioneered. 
When the last residents left in 1992, the program and its model disappeared from 
the secondary literature. In a few short years, it had effectively never existed. Today, it 
only has a handful of mentions in scattered documents describing past approaches to 
sexual offender rehabilitation. A slightly larger clutch of contemporary evaluations 
exist, rarely cited. Little of this material is readily accessible. The overwhelming 
majority of information on the program only exists in the Washington State Archives. 
To the contemporary observer, this program never existed. This paper seeks to remedy 
this absence. 
The Western State Hospital Sexual Offender Treatment program was a 
pioneering program in sex offender treatment. It emerged out of a hospital in crisis 
adopting a new psychiatric philosophy that emphasized group therapy, with little 
research into its efforts. With time, staff developed its understanding of sexual offenders 
beyond these original principles to a much more coherent and practical 
conceptualization. The residents led their own groups, which resulted in a highly 
combative form of group therapy to emerge. Residents were engaged, but rapid growth 
threatened the program’s ability to maintain this participation. High confidence among 
the staff and the program’s reliance on the offenders to lead therapy meant the program 
was able to maintain course, even as the number of offenders it saw reached near two 
hundred. The program attracted little notice outside of the immediate area from any 
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observer. As time wore on, the program proved more successful in remaining stable 
than in remaining effective. The field of ex offender treatment changed around the 
program, not only in method but in principle, and staff struggled to keep up. A decline 
in funding and in experienced staff resulted in decay of the therapeutic environment. 
However, these concerns were of little interest to the public, who were instead fearful of 
the program’s relatively rare escapes, and it was this fear that signed the program’s 
death warrant in 1986. To put the program in a wider context, its history will be 
contrasted with the history two nearby residential programs, one in Oregon State 
Hospital, the other in California’s Atascadero State Hospital, and compared to national 
developments in sex offender treatment as necessary.  
Background: The Prehistory of the Sexual Psychopath 
 In 1947, Washington legislators passed the state’s first sexual psychopath law. 
However, the Western State program did not officially begin until 1958. This gap 
between the commitment of sexual offenders and the creation of a treatment program 
for them formed because the two efforts were carried out by different groups with much 
different objectives. This “prehistory” will attempt to summarize the national movement 
of sexual psychopath legislation, then show the path Western State took as it created a 
coherent treatment program meet the law’s expectation.  
The sexual psychopath laws were born in a confluence of public fear, 
professional confidence, and legislative interest.7 The first factor was born of a 
                                                        
7 Estelle B. Freedman, "“Uncontrolled Desires”: The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960", 
The Journal of American History 74, no. 1 (1987): 85-92; Joanna Bourke, Rape: Sex, Violence, History, 
Shoemaker & Hoard, Emeryville, CA (2007); Philip Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the 
Child Molester in Modern America, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT (1998);, Simon A. Cole, 
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combination of increasing availability of information and wider societal upheaval. The 
public was made aware of the phenomenon of sexual murder with the proliferation of 
the sensational press. Starting at the beginning of the century, newspapers printed more 
and more “shocking” stories and photographs to gain the attention of the public. Crime, 
particularly gruesome or bizarre sex murders, became a mainstay.8 Newspaper teams, 
particularly in smaller states, such as Vermont began publishing about horrible crimes 
outside their own locale to attract readers.9 In short order, a serial killer of children went 
from a local horror to national news. This coverage dramatically increased at the end of 
the 1920’s, and the increasing number of child murderers in the press suggested to the 
public that sexual crime was on the rise.10 One woman was based in the crisis and 
change society was undergoing in the Great Depression. The wage-earning father in the 
city could no longer find work and feed his family, and the government seemed unable 
to meet the needs of the people.11 The Great Migration of African-Americans to the 
North and the Midwest was met with fear by the white majority, due to a number of old 
prejudices.12 These fears resulted, however, in little long-term action by citizens. 
Instead, law enforcement and legislatures received public approbation and some 
pressure to enact stronger and more expensive measures against sexual crime.13  
                                                        
"From the Sexual Psychopath Statute to "Megan's Law": Psychiatric Knowledge in the Diagnosis, 
Treatment, and Adjudication of Sex Criminals in New Jersey, 1949–1999”, Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences 55 no. 3 (2000): 292-314.  
8 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 89-90; Jenkins, Moral Panic, 36-37, 55. 
9 Galliher and Tyree, “Edwin Sutherland’s Research”, 106-107. 
10 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 92-93. 
11 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 89; 
12 John F. Galliher and Cheryl Tyree, "Edwin Sutherland's Research on the Origins of Sexual Psychopath 
Laws: An Early Case Study of the Medicalization of Deviance", Social Problems 33 no. 2 (1985), 109-
110. The 22 states with the most new black residents all passed sexual psychopath laws. 
13 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 94, 96; Jenkins, Moral Panic, 72-73; Galliher and Tyree, “Edwin 
Sutherland’s Research”, 106-107 Simon A. Cole, "From the Sexual Psychopath Statute to "Megan's 
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This demand surfaced shortly after psychology had established itself as a 
legitimate field of study in America. Analysis promised a greater understanding of the 
unconscious drives that were postulated to be the seat of the compulsion. By 
determining what kind of criminals were frequent recidivists, their psychological 
characteristics and behavioral habits could be checked for patterns. With time, diagnosis 
could be replaced with treatment, and society could truly be safe. Psychologists began 
their efforts to analyze the sexual offender before the first panic got underway. By the 
time the panic broke, professionals had several observations they were happy to share 
with the press.14 In aggregate, they distinguished between certain sex offenders and the 
“common criminal”. Criminal offenders acted out of an intent to harm a specific party, 
or due to a sexual concern of a different nature, instead. The “different”, “psychopathic” 
offender suffered from problems of attachment that emerged from childhood trauma 
and resulted in a number of personality deficits. While everyone had unacceptable 
fantasies, in the sexual psychopath, their internal fantasies made up the primary element 
of their offenses. These fantasies came from disrupted psychosexual development that 
stunted their emotional and social growth and left them alienated from adult society.15  
This internal conflict was chalked up, almost always, to an overbearing mother and an 
absent father.16 The end result was the offender was unable to address their emotional 
                                                        
Law": Psychiatric Knowledge in the Diagnosis, Treatment, and Adjudication of Sex Criminals in New 
Jersey, 1949–1999", Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 55 no. 3 (2000), 298-299. 
14 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 89-90. 
15 Karl M. Bowman and Bernice Engle, “Sexual Psychopath Laws”, in Sexual Behavior and the Law, ed. 
Ralph Slovenko, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Ill (1965), 769; Cole, “From The Sexual Psychopath 
Statute to “Megan’s Law””, 298-299; Kittrie, Right To Be Different, 182; John Pratt, et. al, "The Rise and 
Fall of Homophobia and Sexual Psychopath Legislation in Postwar Society", Psychology, Public Policy, 
and Law 4 no. 1-2 (1998), 26-27. 
16 Pratt, et. al, "The Rise and Fall of Homophobia”, 36. 
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needs in a healthy way, leading them to isolate themselves even more. The spiral 
continued until they offended, relieving the pressure.17 Symptomatically, the condition 
of sexual psychopathy was described as a sexual deviance that was not accompanied by 
or a symptom of a grander psychopathic illness, such as severe bipolar disorder or 
schizophrenia. The term “psychopathy” applied loosely. The man in question was 
“sane”, insofar as he knew what was and wasn’t reality, could articulate his thoughts, 
and look after himself.18 His “psychopathy”, in the analyst’s view, was specified, and 
lay in his inability to control his sexual desires despite its obvious negative effects on 
others.19 The group “suitable for diagnosis” was fairly large, and included 
exhibitionists, serial rapists, child molesters, and sexually abusive parents among other 
“paraphiliacs”.20 Joanna Bourke sums up the condition as it appeared to the analyst: 
“…[Sexual] Psychopaths realized ‘only too well the implications of their various acts’ 
but were ‘impelled… by a desire or passion against which they struggle[d] in vain’”.21 
                                                        
17 Karpman, “The Sexual Psychopath”, 185, 191; Larry Hendricks, Some Effective Change Inducing 
Mechanisms in Operation in the Specialized Treatment Program for the Sex Offender, Dept. of Social and 
Health Services, Olympia, WA (April 1973), 1-2, 8. 
18 Patients with developmental disabilities were considered “sexual psychopaths” in a majority of cases, 
but if their disability was severe enough to impede basic speech or personal attention, their offenses were 
attributed to the disability rather than a different illness.  
This essay genders the sexual psychopath as a “he” intentionally, to mirror the language of the sources. 
Women were, with a handful of exceptions, excluded from the classification. While women rapists were 
occasionally mentioned, with the exception of mother-son incest they were never discussed. 
Paul H Gebhard et. al., Sex Offenders: An Analysis of Types, Harper & Row, New York (1965). 
19 George, “The Harmless Psychopath”, 232-233; Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Psychiatry 
and Sex Psychopath Legislation, the 30s to the 80s, Group… Publication No. 98, New York (1977), 855-
859. 
20 Cole, “From the Sexual Psychopath Statue”, 298; George, "The Harmless Psychopath”, 231-232; 
Karpman, “The Sexual Psychopath”, 187-188, 190. 
21 Joanna Bourke, Rape: Sex, Violence, History, Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard (2007), 278. 
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Professionals gave a number of reasons why sexual psychopaths should be 
committed rather than imprisoned.22  Firstly, sexual psychopaths were a questionable 
moral target of punitive control.23 A person internally compelled to do something they 
abhorred should not be subjected to the same consequences the state brought against 
willing criminals.24 As well as ethically proper, the offender was thought likely to 
reoffend until their internal problems were properly addressed. It was “responsible” to 
establish commitment based upon cure, rather than time served, for both the offender 
and their community. Their mental problem necessitated treatment for both their own 
sake and for society’s safety.25 Individual practitioners differed on the method of cure, 
but the possibility of meaningful treatment of the sexual psychopath by some 
psychiatric or therapeutic avenue was accepted by a vocal portion of the profession.26 
The assertion by mental health professionals that they understood sexual offenders and 
their crimes was accepted and disseminated by the popular press. Newspaper articles 
featured interviews with psychiatrists and government bureaucrats, while fictional 
media spun narratives about sex murderers whose motivations and actions matched the 
theories the professionals postulated.27   
Whether legislatures truly accepted the validity of psychoanalysis or not, about 
half of the states in the Union decided to delegate the handling of the “psychopaths” to 
                                                        
22 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 91, 96; Jenkins, Moral Panic, 45, 59; Kittrie, Right To Be Different, 
183. 
23 Kittrie, Right To Be Different, 183; Tappan, "The Sexual Psychopath”, 371; California Department of 
Mental Hygiene and Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute, Final Report, 21-22, 42-43. 
24 Jenkins, Moral Panic, 21. 
25 Frym and Hacker, “The Sexual Psychopath Act”, 766-767; Bourke, Rape, 188, 193-194. 
26 Cole, “From the Sexual Psychopath Statue”, 293-294; Jenkins, Moral Panic, 61, 73, 89-90; Bourke, 
Rape, 280, 284-285. 
27 Jenkins, Moral Panic, 54-56, 60, 62-63. 
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its practitioners. In some cases, the laws were joined with a dedication of funds to 
“research” at a particular institution, or in a few instances, toward the construction of a 
new psychiatric facility.28 For legislators, these bills killed two birds with one stone. 
The offender was not leaving the institution for quite some time, and while inside, 
people with training and interest could provide him treatment that might stop his 
negative behavior for good.29 The handoff was accomplished with a series of highly 
formulaic “sexual psychopath” laws. These laws established the “sexual psychopath” as 
a separate class of sex offender, definable by the criterion of uncontrollable impulses 
that emerged from internal psychological problems. These offenders were to be 
committed to a mental institution indefinitely.30 While the general character and intent 
of the law was remarkably consistent from state to state, the hearing's conditions and 
process varied greatly.31 Washington’s law fell into what was termed the 
“preconviction” type of statue, a type it shared with Iowa, California and many others.32 
The law allowed the indefinite commitment of a “sexual psychopath” in a civil hearing, 
without a corresponding criminal conviction. These laws were not amended to previous 
insanity clauses, on the grounds that they described a fundamentally new condition to 
the court. The gray area that psychologists proposed of “uncontrollable urges”, whether 
in this specific instance of sexual conduct or of another crime, lay between legal sanity 
                                                        
28 Freedman, “Uncontrolled Desires”, 98-99; Jenkins, Moral Panic, 83-84. 
29 Bourke, Rape, 285-286. 
30 Jenkins, Moral Panic, 79-80, 83. 
31 California Department of Mental Hygiene and Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute, Final Report, 
16-20. 
32 Slovenko, Sexual Behavior, 758. 
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and insanity as previously defined.33 This legally justified a new form of civil 
commitment that otherwise bordered on detention without trial. 
By 1935, the sexual psychopath had been “identified”, the alarm had been 
raised, and a particular legal niche had been dug. However, the follow-through by 
legislatures took time. A first wave of sexual psychopath laws passed in a burst from 
1937 to 1941. The start of World War II diverted public and legislative interest in crime 
at home. At the war’s end, legislators in a number of states, including Washington, 
returned to drafting laws combating and committing the “sexual psychopath”, as a 
“second panic” regarding child molestation kicked up.34 This wave ran from around 
1948 to the “mid-fifties”. By that time, twenty-four states had passed sexual psychopath 
statues, a number that would eventually reach twenty-eight.35  
The sex psychopath statues had been passed, ostensibly, to target dangerous sex 
offenders. In many states, however, it was primarily homosexual men and lesser 
offenders, such as voyeurs, who were committed under them. 36 From state to state, the 
crimes which were covered under commitment varied. Often they were not listed 
explicitly, and it was the perceived “dangerousness” of the offense that made someone 
eligible for commitment.37 The 1951 Washington statue was one of these, which stated 
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that “any person who is affected in a form of psychoneurosis or in a form of 
psychopathic personality which… predisposes such person to the commission of sexual 
offenses in a degree constituting him a menace….” could be committed.38 In contrast, 
the “sexual psychopath” statue in New Jersey, passed in 1949, defined sexual 
psychopathy as “abnormal mental illness resulting in commission of enumerated sexual 
offenses”, which included possession of “obscene literature or pictures”, 
“homosexuality”, “indecent exposure” and “indecent communications to females”, 
among many others which were decidedly nonviolent.39 The result of this was that some 
states, such as Iowa, used their statue almost exclusively to round up gay men. One 
panic in Sioux City resulted in twenty-one men being committed to a ward set aside for 
them alone in the Mount Pleasant Hospital.40 The majority of California’s commitments 
to Atascadero in the 1950’s were gay men and gay prostitutes, earning it the nickname 
“Gay Dachau.”41 Dangerous offenders continued to be sent to jail, as before. 
Mental health at this time was predicated on institutional care, in the form of 
large inpatient mental hospitals. When legislators sought a psychiatric answer for the 
problem of “sexual psychopaths”, they sought an institutional treatment situation. 
Outpatient care for most patients was not given much consideration. In Washington, this 
mainstream of institutional care was centered in Western State Hospital, often 
abbreviated to Western State. Western State Hospital was the state’s oldest mental 
                                                        
38 Kenneth H. Kato and James H. Hardisty, The Sexual Psychopath and the Incompetent to Stand Trial: 
Peas in a Pod?, Student Papers, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle (1975), 18.  
39 P W. Tappan, "The Sexual Psychopath; a Civic-social Responsibility", Journal of Social Hygiene 35 
no. 8 (1949), 371.  
40 Neil Miller, Sex-Crime Panic: A Journey to the Paranoid Heart of the 1950s, Alyson Books, Los 
Angeles (2002): 82-84, 121-123. 
41 Jackson, “Dachau for Queers”, 42-50. 
  
15 
 
health facility, and its largest. It was established in 1871 on the ruins of old Fort 
Steilacoom. It was the primary mental hospital for the Pacific Northwest from its 
founding through the period under discussion. It grew massively in size over the 
decades, and bought a large portion of nearby land for patients to farm as occupational 
therapy and to lower costs.42  By 1950, two additional hospitals had been built in the 
state: Eastern State Hospital in Medicine Lake, near Spokane, and Northern State 
Hospital in Sedro-Wooley, about an hour north of Seattle. Western State remained the 
“most advanced” of the facilities, boasting the first geriatric care facility in the nation in 
1945.43 A few other mental health facilities existed, most notably at the University of 
Washington, but the three state hospitals provided the clear majority of psychiatric care 
at this time. It was almost certain that any sexual psychopath statue in Washington 
would send its commitments to one of the three. 
Washington stepped into this environment in 1947 when passed its first sexual 
psychopath law. Like the other countries began its efforts at sexual offender treatment. 
The real goal of this legislation, however, was the creation of a legal means of indefinite 
incarceration. Portions of the psychiatric field strongly advocated that, on both ethical 
and practical grounds, the care of sex offenders be shifted to the mental hospital. States 
were eager for a simple response to the public fear of sexual crime. Making mental 
hospitals into jails that offenders had no right to leave was perfect in their eyes. If 
treatment proved effective, then all the better, but assisting institutions in making 
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effective treatment was not a serious consideration.  The state accordingly created the 
category of the “sexual psychopath”, whose defining psychological trouble was an 
inability to conform to the dictates of society, and whose treatment had to be conducted 
while incarcerated. 
The Sexual Psychopath in Washington, 1947-1957 
Washington was a part of the “second wave” of sexual psychopath legislation. 
The three laws that passed muster suggested the legislature was primarily concerned 
with the legal procedure, seeking to balance power between the court and the hospital. 
The sessions sped to unanimous votes. However, a deeper conflict of understanding and 
interest between law enforcement and mental health institutions led to halfhearted 
treatment attempts. When Western State Hospital began receiving commitments from 
these laws in 1949, the staff did not know what to do with them. The psychiatric 
profession’s brief fiery passion for reforming criminal minds with civilian methods had 
cooled rapidly over the 1930’s. The profession accordingly allowed the subject to fade 
from the literature, leaving little besides a flurry of theoretical arguments and rebuttals 
on the amenability of sex offenders to treatment. Once in the care of the psychiatric 
hospital, however, the staff’s belief in their ability to help was a moot point. 
Washington state’s courts, unlike many other states, continued sentencing offenders to 
Western State Hospital. It had to house them, and live with them, somehow. Being 
forced to deal with the offenders for the better part of a decade, however, was not 
enough to push the hospital to focus its efforts or cohere its approach. Public and 
legislative disinterest meant that the sorry state of affairs was given little attention or 
criticism. Western State Hospital’s first ten years of sex offender rehabilitation saw the 
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institution of a handful of initiatives predicated around group therapy for sex offenders, 
combined with what was effectively incarceration on locked wards, with little focus, 
theorization, progress or success. It was not until a cascade of events in 1957-1958 that 
sex offender rehabilitation achieved any meaningful progress at Western State. 
 Washington States first piece of legislation regarding sexual psychopaths was 
Senate Bill 179. It defined the sexual psychopath as anyone who was "convicted at least 
once as a sexual offender", was suffering from a mental illness, and was "not insane or 
feeble-minded" as a "criminal sexual psychopathic person".44 The defendant, on the 
petition of the prosecuting attorney, would be made the subject of a "sexual 
psychopath" hearing following their conviction.45 The hearing would accept or deny this 
classification. If the offender was found a "sexual psychopath", two major changes to 
their sentence occurred. During their prison term, the offender was entitled to care by a 
psychiatrist within their institution.46 Then, following either the end of their sentence or 
their release on parole, the offender was subject to a second hearing for their discharge 
"as a criminal sexual psychopath".47 If they were found "unsafe to be at large" in this 
hearing, they would be committed to an institution which offered treatment for sexual 
psychopaths until found “safe to be at large” by the institution’s administration.48 The 
offender deemed "unsafe to be at large" could file for discharge from their institution 
once a year, which would be reviewed by the committing Court.49 While this was the 
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first proposed law of its kind in Washington State, the bill received minimal discussion, 
and was only amended in one instance to clarify all psychiatrists and physicians needed 
to be licensed.50 It was passed near-unanimously by both houses, and signed into law by 
the Governor on March 21st, 1947.51  
This law was significantly altered by State Senate Bill 87, introduced and passed 
in 1949. This bill was concerned with the "care and treatment of the mentally ill" 
broadly.52  Sections 25 through 39 amended the "sexual psychopath" procedure 
specifically. Two or three psychiatrists were now required to examine the defendant.53 
If the defendant was found to be a sexual psychopath, the offender's criminal 
proceedings could be suspended at the court's discretion. The offender was committed 
to "a state hospital...according to the provisions for the commitment of the mentally 
ill."54 They no longer had to be convicted to be classified a sexual psychopath, and their 
time in prison could be effectively replaced by a hospital stay. The committed offenders 
could no longer file for discharge. Their release was at the discretion of the hospital 
superintendent and the committing court.55 The bill was signed into law by the 
Governor on March 19th, 1949. In a strange choice, all commitments were ordered to 
Eastern State Hospital.56 Why Eastern State was specified is unclear. This point was 
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seemingly disregarded, as Western State Hospital received its first sexual psychopath 
commitments following the bill’s passage.57 
In 1951, House Bill 436, a significant expansion and refinement of the 1949 bill, 
again revised "sexual psychopath" commitment. It proved satisfactory, and its general 
approach would stand for the rest of the law’s life. The law added a new chapter to Title 
71 of the Revised Code of Washington and repealed the previous statue.58 The primary 
change was the addition of an observation period. Following the primary hearing and 
the classification of the offender as a sexual psychopath, the offender was confined at 
"the nearest state hospital" for a period "not to exceed ninety days".59 The hospital 
superintendent was then to report to the committing court the hospital’s opinion on the 
condition of the offender. Another hearing would follow.60 If the court affirmed the 
classification, the sexual psychopath was "retained by the superintendent of the 
institution" until they were deemed "safe to be large" by the superintendent. When 
certified “safe to be at large”, those who had been convicted of a crime took a different 
path than those who had not. Those offenders who had not been convicted would be 
returned to their committing court, who could press the charge or set terms of release, at 
their preference.61 A convicted offender had their sentence suspended while they were 
committed to the institution. Upon the offender’s certification as "safe to be at large", 
two things could happen. If they had been committed in the hospital for a period less 
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than the length of their sentence, they would be referred to the parole board to negotiate 
the remaining length of their bid or the terms of their release. If they had completed the 
length of the sentence in the hospital, then the parole board was irrelevant, and the 
hospital superintendent decided release terms.62 The only other significant change to the 
law was in Section 25, which eliminated the designation of Eastern State as the sole 
provider of Sexual Psychopath treatment. Instead, it opened any institution to accept 
sexual psychopath commitments, so long as they "provide[d] psychiatric care and 
treatment" in some capacity.63 Again, the debate on the bill was minimal. It was 
introduced, read, and referred to committee in the House, amended for clarity and a 
more precise definition of "psychopathy", and passed with none opposed.64 It was read 
two days later in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Institutions.65 The next 
day, it was recommended to pass without amendment, and the day after it passed 
without debate, and with only two of forty-six senators opposed.66 It was signed into 
law eleven days later.67   
Legislators had greeted the opportunity of institutionalizing sexual offenders 
with enthusiasm. The majority of the bills received unanimous support, with only a 
handful of no votes in the state Senate. They ran through the legislature quickly. The 
1949 bill was passed by both the House and the Senate in the same day.68 The term 
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"debate ensued" was absent from the Record for both the 1949 and the 1951 bills, which 
in this context means the bills me with no questioning or discussion of import. The 
legislature, having enabled the justice system and the state hospitals to pursue an 
alternative to prison, took no further action. They did not monitor sexual psychopath 
commitment in any serious capacity for two decades. Later, they would modify what 
the actors in the process could do, most notably in 1967, but the process itself was 
changed little. The Washington justice system seemed satisfied with their conclusions. 
The 1951 law buffeted a number challenges in Washington courts, including State V. 
Wilmoth in 1979.69 The new system of civil commitment for sexual offenders lasted 
almost forty years.  
The enthusiasm shown by the legislature was not initially met by Washington's 
mental hospitals. This disinterest was grounded in a larger decline of psychiatric interest 
in treating criminals. In the 1930’s, the psychiatric profession and its institutions had 
attempted to treat the new “sexual psychopath” commitments with the same therapies it 
used with the “civilian” population. The institutional staff found their methods had less 
effect on the sexual offender than they had hoped.70  As professionals attempted to 
engineer new methods, they investigated the offender to try and determine what about 
them exactly was different from others.  Psychologists were doubtful whether the 
classification of “sexual psychopath” meant anything.71 Their primary objection was the 
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use of the term “psychopathic”: while the offender’s crimes were greatly upsetting to 
most, this was not proof of a classifiable mental illness or a reality-distorting 
psychosis.72 An 1949 article by Paul Tappan, enthusiastic about the possibilities of 
treatment, debated the term’s meaning of the term for three pages. He argued that the 
term’s definition differed widely. As doctors could not agree on what symptoms besides 
a criminal sexual impulse existed, it was effectively a criminal charge masquerading as 
a medical diagnosis. The offender likely had personality problems, but not a distinct 
disease from other maladjusted, antisocial people, and not a distinct ailment from other 
criminals.73 With time, even longstanding advocates bowed to the pressure. Dr. 
Karpman, a tireless devotee to “psychopath” as a label, capitulated in a 1954 paper and 
stated, “the terms ‘sexual psychopath’ and ‘sexual psychopathy’ have no legitimate 
place in psychiatric nosology or dynamic classification.” He stated that the illegality of 
their behavior was, effectively, the reason for the “psychopath’s” distinction, which 
wasn’t evidence of a psychological difference.74 The disease that the laws had sought to 
“treat” was now widely discredited as an overspecification of a complicated problem. 
The term soon disappeared from clinical usage altogether. In most of the Western State 
documents, and almost all academic works written after 1965, the term itself was not 
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used at all. The authors couched it in quotation marks, to show they are referring to the 
offender’s legal classification, then shift to a term they find more appropriate.75 
In the first decade of the panic, psychiatrists had asked state legislatures for 
funds for research. A handful had gotten funding to either for research or build another 
hospital. The majority of mental health institutions got no additional funding and were 
expected by their state legislatures to educate themselves on the cutting edge of sex 
offender diagnosis and treatment. At the same time, mental hospital populations were 
rapidly increasing across the country, “from 160,000 in 1910 to 270,000 by 
1930…[peaking at] about 550,000 in the mid-1950’s, a rate of growth far higher than 
that of the population at large”.76 All of these new patients demanded the hospital’s 
attention and resources. Unsurprisingly, most hospitals did little to nothing to “treat” the 
sex offenders who came alongside the new patients. Those hospitals that did attempt to 
find treatment methods found literature on the topic sparse. What little existed was 
predicated on critique or praise of legal statues. Accordingly, the establishment of a 
“proper” procedure for sex offender treatment by the mental health profession, the 
logical second step of sexual psychopath laws, never came to pass. To prevent escapes, 
the majority hospitals simply locked up commitments as best they could, most often in 
their highest security ward. The superintendent discharged them whenever the it was 
thought appropriate, or if the patient population was getting too high.77 The hospital’s 
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inaction was not challenged by judicial insistence. Before 1968, no involuntary 
commitment statue – sexual psychopath or otherwise – was successfully challenged in 
court because the hospital had failed to provide treatment.78 This was partially because 
the problem of sexual psychopath commitments proved “temporary”. Many of the 
sexual psychopath laws arrived stillborn, seeing little use. Minnesota passed its law in 
1939, but commitments trickled down to roughly ten a year by 1950. Illinois 
“committed only sixteen” sexual psychopaths through the decade of the 1940’s.79 
Indiana, through the ’50’s and 60’s, annually committed a number Dr. Gebhard said 
“[you could count] with the fingers of one hand.”80  Without a legal challenge, and with 
no pressure from the public or legislature, there was no impetus for mental hospitals to 
attempt treatment on a tiny portion of their patients. 
Western State Hospital, however, faced a steady, if small, commitment of 
offenders as ‘sexual psychopaths” through the first decade of the law’s passage. The 
first court commitments as of suspected sexual psychopaths began after the second law's 
passage in 1949.81 Commitments continued steadily for a decade. The hospital accepted 
for treatment a little under half of the offenders referred by the courts. For example, 
between July 1952 and June 1954, 56 people were admitted to Western State for 
observation as sexual psychopaths. Of these, 20 were certified sexual psychopaths and 
retained for treatment.82  The Division of Mental Health report for 1957 stated that over 
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the year, 68 people were admitted under observation for sexual psychopathy and 31 
were committed.83 All told, there were a total of 222 "referrals" and over 100 
commitments by the courts from 1949 to 1957.84 The number of these committed 
offenders who were later successfully discharged as "safe to be at large" was very small. 
From July 1952 and June 1954, only five residents were "returned to society…on a five-
year parole".85 In 1957, only four more had been returned to the parole board for 
release. Putting the two intervals together, this made a total of only nine graduates for 
the same interval’s fifty-one commitments, a graduation rate of just over 17.6%. The 
sexual psychopath was a constant, difficult-to-discharge presence at Western State 
Hospital through the 1950’s. Even after eight years of minimal “treatment”, there was 
no sign that the justice system would stop referring offenders. 
Washington’s sexual psychopaths were not homosexual men. As previously 
discussed, in most states, sexual psychopath law became a means of institutionalizing 
gay men convicted of a minor charge. Washington’s law itself had the same language 
and provisions as most others had. Consensual homosexual intercourse of any kind was 
explicitly defined as a crime, falling under a wider “Sodomy” charge. “Sodomy” was 
one of the charges which “qualified” an offender as sufficiently dangerous for a “sexual 
psychopath” classification.86 However, review of the hospital’s letters to the court 
showed that, in at least two instances, Western State did not classify a man sent to them 
on charges of sodomy a “sexual psychopath.” The first, [Richards], was a prostitute who 
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only engaged with male clients. His homosexuality was noted dismissively, as an aspect 
of his immature, depressive personality. While the superintendent, Shovlain, considered 
[Richards] mentally ill, this illness was not sexual psychopathy. [Richards] was not 
perceived as a threat to the public at large, and his “problems” of same-sex attraction 
did not in his opinion demand institutionalization.87 The second, [Brown], was in “the 
opinion of the majority of the staff… a homosexual.” He was not “neurotic”, could tell 
right from wrong, and “has adjusted in this way of life without any apparent difficulty”.  
The last paragraph stated, again, that he was a “homosexual”, not a sexual psychopath, 
and was best processed through the justice system.88 “Homosexual” was referred to in a 
general sense, as a classification, and the last paragraph explicitly stated that the 
homosexual and the sexual psychopath were distinct classifications. To the staff of 
Western State, homosexuality was not in and of itself sexual psychopathy.  
The treatment of sexual psychopaths was attested by the program founders to 
have begun only with Dr. di Furia’s arrival in 1958. In his 1968 historical overview and 
report, Dr. MacDonald stated that no coherent treatment plan for sexual psychopaths 
was followed, and the majority of those committed were placed on locked or heavily 
restricted wards.89  The new "offender-patients" were vastly different than the sort of 
patients that hospital staff had been trained to treat. Ward attendants believed they 
posed a serious risk to those inside and outside the facility. For security, the 
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“psychopaths” were placed on maximum-security locked wards. Some of them were 
distributed among the solitary-cell unit housing uncontrollable psychotics.90 This 
"punitive over-control" lead to “outbursts” of poor behavior and an average of twenty 
escape attempts a year.91  Western State Hospital writ large was overcrowded and 
"badly understaffed", worsening matters.92 A public outcry over the high escape rate 
was, according to di Furia, what ultimately pushed him to start the program.93 
MacDonald summarized the situation: "...for seven years following [the law's] 
passage... the mental hospitals treated sex offenders in essentially the same way as the 
prison.”94  
MacDonald and di Furia were correct in saying the sexual psychopath 
population was a major escape risk for the hospital. The 1957 “Progress and Problems” 
memo presented a hard figure for every other population attribute but sheepishly stated 
"some" sex offenders escaped. It hinted that major change was needed to keep the figure 
from rising.95 Internally, there appears to have been a lot of pressure to stop the escapes. 
However, whatever “public outcry” surrounding the escape rate existed was quite 
muted. A wholly separate program concerning “psychopathic” juvenile delinquents 
existed at the hospital at the time, and a similarly high escape rate was the source of a 
lot of community and media concern. There were no mentions of “sexual psychopaths”, 
however, in the numerous articles and editorials on the escapades of the psychopathic 
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delinquents.96 Western State had little pressure from the public or the legislature to do 
something about the sexual psychopath. The motivating forces for developing 
treatment, to be discussed later, were in fact internal. 
Similarly, MacDonald and di Furia’s claims that sexual psychopath treatment 
began with the 1958 program appear inaccurate. A number of historical documents 
described attempts at treatment of the committed sexual psychopaths before di Furia’s 
program. These efforts were inconsistent and lacked a long-term plan, but they did have 
one consistent point: a group approach. In a 1952 letter to J. Edgar Hoover, Robert 
Brown, the hospital’s Clinical Director, asked Hoover about "the disposition" of an 
escaped patient, [Andrews]. [Andrews] was diagnosed as a Sexual Psychopath, but he 
escaped in November 1951 before he could be returned to court for a commitment 
hearing. The hospital sought his return for “further treatment”, suggesting that someone 
at Western State was interested.97 Later documents described explicit attempts at 
therapy. The 1954 Biennial Report stated that "[a] special sound-proof room, wired for 
tape recording [,] has been constructed for group therapy practice. At present time a 
special study is being conducted with a number of Sexual Psychopaths... When this 
series is completed, a number of Schizophrenics will be studied in like manner".98 In 
Superintendent Shovlain’s view, discharging the thirty-three “psychopaths” committed 
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to the hospital’s care was an essential step to alleviating the hospital’s overloaded 
inpatient units.99 The other mentions of the "Sexual Psychopath Program" in the report 
gave no description of the "program" further than the word "treatment".100 The study 
itself, or any other mention of it, sadly could not be located. The group approach, 
however tentative, persisted for the rest of the decade. A "progressive group therapy 
setting" was stated to be the "primary" treatment for Sexual Psychopath programs as of 
1957. The same memo described the "formulation of a treatment program for sex 
psychopaths" that was sent to the Clinical Director for approval. Again, no description 
of the program is included. Observers inside the hospital took notice of the lack of 
progress in treating the sexual offender. Research into the treatment of sexual offenders 
was, in the Psychology Department's estimation, "the type [of research] needed most by 
the hospital at this time".101 The memo is not dated, but its contents strongly suggest an 
end-of-year report from 1957. di Furia did not arrive at the hospital until 1958.102 These 
treatment attempts, while only described in passing, do not suggest a common 
understanding of the sex offender. They do, however, strongly suggest that group 
therapy was the de facto approach before the innovation of any targeted approach to 
treatment. Before di Furia began a full-scale program, there were numerous scattered 
attempts at Western State, to provide some degree of treatment to sexual offenders, 
primarily involving group therapy. Di Furia’s efforts were the birth of a long-term plan 
for sex offender treatment, not the beginning of treatment itself. 
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Washington’s patchwork history of sexual psychopath treatment before di 
Furia’s arrival was similar to how sex psychopath legislation played out in other states. 
Few other states developed a coherent approach to their “sexual psychopaths”.103 Those 
few that did primarily launched scattered pseudoscientific attempts to “cure” same-sex 
interest. California was, along with New Jersey, Wisconsin and New York, one of the 
most prominent states to embark on curing the sexual psychopath. The state passed its 
law in 1939 and steadily committed offenders in large numbers for the next thirty years. 
Like Washington, despite numerous commitments, California’s first organized approach 
to treatment took a decade to arrive. This program was the Norwalk program, which 
began at Metropolitan State Hospital in Norwalk in 1948.104 The program was 
minimally restrictive and used individual therapy alongside a group living situation.105 
By July 1953, the state had diagnosed and committed 1,163 “sexual psychopaths” to 
state mental hospitals.106  Then, the program was abruptly ended by the legislature, and 
in an about-face in policy all “sexual psychopaths” were sent to the new twenty-million-
dollar medium security Atascadero State Hospital.107 Atascadero added chemical and 
surgical castration, lobotomies, electroshock treatment, and group therapy to previous 
psychoanalytical efforts.108 At one of the most advanced psychiatric hospitals in the 
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nation, explicitly designed for “psychopathic offenders”, little research was done on sex 
offender treatment distinct from wider psychiatric practice.  
Washington’s first ten years of sex offender treatment were, in sum, part of a 
larger effort to allow the indefinite detention of sexual offenders. The state felt obliged 
to respond to a public fear of sex offenders and saw psychiatry as a simple solution. It 
paid legal lip service to the possibility of rehabilitation as a means of accomplishing this 
end. The state did not give Western State or any other hospital a funding increase to 
handle its new residents, and made no initiative under a different agency, to investigate 
possibilities of treatment. The courts showed unusual tenacity in applying the law. 
“Sexual psychopaths” were committed in numbers uncommon elsewhere in the United 
States, and these commitments held steady for a full decade. This created a serious 
burden on the hospital’s operation. The hospital made assorted tentative efforts at 
treatment which were by and large predicated around group therapy. They did not, 
however, extend these efforts to a program, and never stated why they pursued one 
approach over another. The staff instead fell back on punitive measures as a long-term 
management strategy. Their heavy-handed approach resulted in frequent escapes and 
high per-capita costs, but the hospital chose to turn its attention elsewhere, for reasons 
that will become clear in the next section. A lack of legislative oversight and public 
interest meant the hospital was under no pressure to resolve its problem.    
 
The Institutional Milieu and the Foundation of the Program, 1959-1965 
In 1958, Dr. Giulio di Furia was a newly-hired psychologist at Western State 
Hospital, serving as the Mens’ Wards Supervisor. During his time there, his attention 
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turned to the sexual psychopaths committed to the hospital’s care, and he decided to 
implement a series of group therapy sessions.109 His efforts, and the efforts of his 
colleague Dr. Hayden Mees, were the foundation of a program for treatment which was 
later christened the Treatment Program for the Sexual Offender at Western State 
Hospital. Their sudden change from abortive one-off attempts to a cohesive program 
was a watershed development in the handling of sex offenders in Washington. The shift 
was later described by the program’s founders as budget-minded innovations 
undertaken in the face of mounting escapes, mounting costs, and an angry public.110 The 
reality was that a cascading series of events created a much different hospital 
environment which was conducive to major initiatives in sex offender treatment. This 
change precipitated from three primary factors. The hospital hired a large number of 
new staff after it faced major public scandal for mistreating patients. A movement in 
psychiatry emphasized the role of the patient’s environment in their illness and in their 
treatment, and advocated  the patient become the primary actor in their own cure. 
Lastly, issues with costs, patient population, and escapes encouraged clinicians to find a 
means of treating sex offenders so that they could be released. All of these factors gave 
the doctors an avenue of approach and depend their resolve. From their efforts, an 
initially tentative exercise in group therapy was made into a long-term program with a 
clear, innovative treatment method and an explicit philosophy of the offender and his 
problems. Their principles and approach would remain the program’s bedrock for 
twenty-five years. 
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In 1958, Western State Hospital was in the aftermath of a year of public scandal. 
It had begun in March 1957 with an investigative report in the Seattle Post-
Intelligencer.111 According to the report’s findings, Western State Hospital 
psychologists had hundreds of patients assigned to their management each. A doctor 
could only review an individual’s treatment progress every couple of months. Nurses 
were unofficially directing treatment of patients with rubberstamp approval from 
doctors, attempting to give some therapeutic attention. Supplies were chronically low, 
and on one occasion, the hospital ran out of Thorazine for three weeks.112 Conditions 
were so poor that the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals had pulled its 
accreditation of the hospital in 1953, and ordered the suspension of resident training in 
the hospital in the coming June.113 This meant that the hospital’s low accredited staff 
level, which the staff stated was the primary problem, dropped even further.114  
Meanwhile, the newly-elected Governor Rossellini was involved in a minor 
controversy. He had changed staff hiring and qualification requirements, which had 
resulted in eight support staff being fired from Western State. They argued it was due to 
their union ties, not their behavior.115 While the state was investigating, a released 
patient, who had not been committed as a sexual psychopath, was arrested on child 
molestation charges. It was discovered he had been paroled from the hospital to go 
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work for a fish hatchery, making only three dollars a week plus room and board. No 
medical reason was given for his discharge, and his condition was not described as 
cured in any capacity. Rossellini ordered an evaluation of the hospital.116 During this 
initial review, it emerged that three ward aides were stealing barbiturates and selling 
them to outside parties. They were arrested.117 Other cases emerged of patients being 
prematurely “released” to employers, who hired them at below market wages. The 
hospital’s Business Manager, Phil Lelli, began hearing testimony from “more than a 
dozen women nurses and attendants” to gauge what they’d known about the situation. 
Their testimony quickly went beyond the cases at hand and spoke of larger, systemic 
abuses of the patients. Lelli telephoned the state prosecutor, and a “probe” began 
immediately.118  Its findings were, in general, the same problems that the Post-
Intelligencer had discovered, but worse. Most shockingly, patients were malnourished. 
Some were fed less than 1,000 calories a day. Nurses had begun bringing food from 
home on a rotating schedule to get their patients enough to eat. This burden of low food 
was not shared: the staff got larger and heartier meals than the patients.119 Neglect was 
endemic. Patients went unspoken to for days at a time. Incontinent patients were 
strapped to furniture to make management easier.120 Child and adult patients were kept 
on the same ward with no special supervision for the children. Other abuses were also 
investigated, which had largely to do with employee theft. The hospital’s response to 
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the probe was silence. The administration claimed it had not been informed of these 
problems, and non-medical staff claimed they were being scapegoated for budgetary 
problems.121 Newspapers and taxpayers called for reform, and Rossellini positioned 
himself as their champion. The union dispute was forgotten. 
The affair broke quickly, but there had been numerous warning signs. First, 
there was the hospital’s loss of accreditation. Then, Dr. Richard Hartley, the hospital’s 
chief clinical psychologist, quit the job in 1955. He wrote a public letter that lambasted 
the hospital’s low pay, understaffing, and lack of a coherent "theory" or "policy of 
treatment". He blamed the size of the institution as the primary cause of its problems. 
The hospital could not sustainably hire enough staff with as many patients as it then 
had, and no management could effectively “monitor” that many people. 122 In 1956, a 
routine Legislative Budget Committee audit was done to compare the hospital to APA 
standards. The hospital was certified to hold 2513 patients. It held 3091.123 Northern 
State and Eastern State Hospital were similarly overcrowded, to the extent that the APA 
recommended the construction of a fourth hospital.124 A detailed follow-up focused on 
accounting issues. It found a number of disturbing financial practices and trends in 
patient demographics. One was representative: "a number of physicians [who] 
performed various services [between] 1953-1955...” were only paid in the month before 
the report.125 Western State was, in short, desperately parlaying its minimal complement 
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of funds and staff into a workable hospital. A rising patient population and rampant 
abuses over the last decade had only accelerated an inevitable breakdown in 
management and care.126   
The tumult led to a major change in the direction of patient care at the hospital. 
The immediate result was the dismissal of a portion of the backline staff and the hiring 
of a new dietician. The superintendent and most administrative staff survived.127 It 
emerged later that Lelli himself was involved in assorted theft, and he was handed a 
five-year sentence for larceny.128 The government by and large accepted the hospital’s 
argument that money and staff deficits had caused the problems. Governor Rossellini 
sought, and received, a three-million-dollar biennial budget increase, which gave 
Western State Hospital a thirteen-million-dollar budget for the 1960-1961 biennium.129 
The hospital hired a slate of new staff over 1958 and 1959, now assured that it could 
pay their salaries. Dr. Giulio di Furia was hired in the midst of this drive in 1958.130 His 
first position was Supervisor of the Men’s Wards of the Hospital, and it put him in close 
contact with sexual psychopaths.131 He had “limited” experience and no background 
knowledge with managing or treating sex offenders.132 His primary goal was ending the 
flood of escapes and freeing staff from what was effectively “guard duty”.133 To this 
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end, he assigned a staff psychologist, Dr. Hayden L. Mees, to oversee once-a-week 
group therapy sessions with the offenders. These “nonspecific” sessions were led by the 
psychologist and centered around developing “insight” into the offender’s 
psychological problems generally.134 Patients with comorbid psychotic disorders were 
admitted alongside the regular offenders, a practice that would end almost entirely 
within the year.135  
The program proper started on the offenders’ initiative. di Furia hoped that the 
sessions would be meaningfully therapeutic for the offenders but did not have high 
expectations. The offenders, however, were enthusiastic about the sessions, and wished 
to hold them more regularly. Dr. Mees was too busy, and there were no other qualified 
staff available to lead the proposed new sessions. The state was extremely unlikely to 
allocate staff and funding resources necessary to intensify the standing mode of 
treatment would be allocated to this program.136 Dr. di Furia and Dr. Mees decided to 
allow the offenders to lead the sessions themselves.137 Dr. Mees still sat in with the 
offenders once a week. At the new sessions, however, the residents were left to 
themselves. There were no attendants in the room with them. They were not given 
instruction or an agenda.  
Placing residents in a direct leadership role was a dramatic departure from the 
previous therapeutic interventions at Western State. The concept of group therapy for 
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sex offenders was not new. It had already been attempted at Western State numerous 
times. Nationally, it had been attempted in at least one instance in American 
psychiatry.138 This new effort sought to make residents interact with each other on their 
own terms. Di Furia sought the patient’s use of his firsthand knowledge of his offenses 
in a productive way, by critiquing the actions of their fellows and offering insight into 
how they could change.139 If this proved not to be the case, the sessions would at least 
give the offenders something to do, and cut back on cagey, restless “acting out”.140 The 
gamble paid off. These initial offender-led meetings were so successful in terms of 
offender engagement that the pair began designing a program of “self-guided” 
rehabilitation around it.  
The Sexual Offender Treatment Program started in earnest in 1959. It is unclear 
if di Furia and Mees came to their conclusions about the psychology of the sex offender 
before or after they started the residential program. Most information on the program’s 
development from ’58 to ’63 was written retrospectively. These papers described the 
program as though it emerged with both its policies and its theoretical underpinnings 
fully formed. Much of this theory was adapted from milieu therapy, a point which will 
be explored later. The extrapolation of these principles to sex offenders, however, and 
some of the conclusions di Furia and Mees derived from the extension were novel. 
Considering di Furia and Mees’ lack of experience in the field, it was unlikely they 
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began with these understandings. One paper by Mees, from ’62, was written within the 
“development era”, but it could not be located.141 For the sake of simplicity, this paper 
will first describe the program’s understanding of the sexual offender, then explain how 
those principles informed the Program’s initial form. The reader is advised that most 
likely, the program’s philosophy was slowly built out from preexisting considerations 
when it proved “successful”. 
The program considered sexual offenders a group needing present help. Dr. di 
Furia and Dr. Mees did not establish in writing a full conception of the sexual 
offender’s internal drama and its origins. They admitted that the "etiology of aberrant 
sexual behavior is not known", and they did not attempt to differentiate between 
different “sorts” of offenders.142 It was not considered necessary for treatment. In di 
Furia’s view, the assorted hypothesized causes -"unconscious motives, symbolism, 
regression..." – did not need to be known to attempt to stop the offender’s 
wrongdoing.143 The primary driving cause of offenses laid in the offender’s everyday 
behavior and emotional malcontentment.144 The program was “behavior-oriented”, and 
followed a “learning theory” approach to human interaction.145 People learned by 
reinforcement, and the sexual offender had reinforced in himself a cruel means of 
coping with his stresses and his internal problems. He had to learn how to cope with the 
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stresses of life without sexual violence.146 While his offenses may well have emerged 
because of past trauma or an underlying adjustment problem, it was the offender’s 
present state of mind and present life that pushed him to offend. Therefore, the program 
did not investigate the past of the newly-admitted offender beyond what he attested to in 
an autobiography.147 If the offender proved cooperative with and amenable to treatment, 
the events in the past that mattered would be revealed in the group sessions, and could 
be dealt with there.148 The sex psychopath, in the program’s view, was not defined by a 
case history but by his present condition and his underlying personality problems.  
The offender’s present condition was simultaneously the cause and the result of 
the offender’s sexual violations of others. Surmised, sexual violence was a “self-
defeating, self-reinforcing” cycle of isolation, denial and fantasy.149 It varied in the 
specifics, but at its core, the pattern of thinking and action were the same among all 
offenders.150 Despite being legally considered psychopaths, most sexual offenders were 
not psychopathic.151 He was sane enough to know right from wrong, and did not desire 
to hurt people with his assaults, but did so because of blocks relating to other people. 
The man, for any number of reasons, had come to see himself as “inadequate and 
inferior”.152 He considered himself unworthy of attention and love.153 His ability to 
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socialize with others was hampered by his reservations about himself, and he met his 
rejection or disappointment with further withdrawal and self-isolation. He still nursed 
the same need for human attachment and affection that most people have. To meet 
them, he turned to “solitary and socially aberrant sexual behavior” – rape, 
exhibitionism, or whatever else – as a means of fulfilling that desire. Many offenders 
had a wife or a long-term lover, but because they refused to invest themselves 
emotionally in their relationships, they were unsatisfied in that relationship as well. 
Their turn to crime, however, didn’t make up for their dissatisfaction elsewhere. The 
offender knew they hurt others.154  
The offender couldn’t accept this reality. He believed he had no other avenue of 
gaining affection from others. To avoid confronting his own failure, he denied reality. 
He replaced the actual offense with a fantasy in his mind and blocked out the feelings 
and responses of his victims.155 Most offender’s fantasies recreated the situation as a 
consensual, socially permitted encounter with someone who accepted them. One 
offender, for example, pretended his exhibitionism was lovemaking with an imaginary 
“cheerleader”. The woman he was exposing to was, according to him, not of interest 
besides her literal presence, and he did not look at her during the offense.156 Child 
molesters claimed that the children they raped loved them, and enjoyed the assault, not 
simply to defend their actions but because that was what they wanted to believe was 
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true.157 Despite their attempts to distance themselves, the truth lingered in the offender. 
After his first assault, the offender saw himself, rightly, as a criminal, and he 
internalized this role. He believed he was unable to pursue any other course to satisfy 
themselves. The mental gymnastics he performed drove the offender even further within 
themselves and made the task of change and reconnection seem impossible. He’d repeat 
his offenses, entrenching them with habit.158 Eventually, he would stop trying to restrain 
himself, because he believed there was no way out. His offenses almost always 
continued unless he got caught, died, or grew so guilty he turned himself in.159 In short, 
the offender’s crimes were crimes of need for emotional fulfillment far more than 
sexual contact. They were an immediate means of meeting needs for self-worth and 
control which they felt others would never consensually provide.160  
The sexual offender’s crimes were founded in self-doubt and isolation. di Furia 
and Mees believed this mindset would be apparent in the rest of the offender’s life.161 
The pattern between different offenders was less clear in this part of their lives. Not all 
offenders were “failures” in life, and not all were wholly antisocial.162 Rather, the 
offenders writ large would have dysfunctional relationships and be unable to 
communicate their needs in general. The most prominent of these traits was constant 
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"deceit and dishonesty".163 Offenders lied about their feelings to everyone, going 
beyond their sexual desires to habitually lie about anything of importance. The need to 
lie emerged out of the offender’s feelings of inferiority. He thought that no one would 
love him if spoke his mind. He shut himself up or put on a “mask” of machismo or 
disaffection to distance himself from his feelings.164 Their withdrawal intensified as the 
offender began committing crimes he could not talk about without severe 
consequences.165 With time, it hardened into a deeper, internal denial of his feelings, 
and of the victim’s feelings.166 It was essential to him that the reality of his violation 
was blotted out, at least partially, to make the assault satisfying. By the time he arrived 
in the program, the fact that his offenses hurt others had become “a very foreign 
concept”, not because he didn’t feel for the victim, but because he had rewritten in his 
head what actually happened during the offense.167 The offender was, at this time, not 
thought to enjoy the sensation of power over another, but to be actively denying to 
himself that was what he was seeking and “achieving” through rape. Another common 
trait was irresponsibility. The offender felt they were “out of control”, and internally 
dismissed his breaches of contract and expectation with others as an aspect of himself 
he could not change.168 The offender retreated further from society to avoid the 
confrontations and rejections his behavior incurred. He manifested his feelings of 
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helplessness in irresponsible behavior. He made few friends and spent much of his time 
alone. He had trouble keeping jobs due to absenteeism.169 Alcoholism and divorce were 
considered the statistical evidence of these wider discipline, and satisfaction, problems, 
and fueled the offender’s negative self-image.170 The program emphasized that most 
offenders did not fit the pattern exactly. A fair number of offenders maintained a 
successful marriage, and the majority had managed to provide for themselves without 
unusual support.171 However, all offenders, regardless of their social or fiscal success, 
were believed to be nursing the same negative conception of themselves. This negative 
self-image was the primary cause of their offenses, and the cause of more individualized 
negative coping mechanisms in other aspects of their life. They kept silent on their 
problems in fear of rejection and retribution, allowing them to fester and worsen. The 
offender had to learn another way of seeing themselves and the world before their 
behavior could change. 
“Our contemporary way of looking at the sex offender leads us more and more 
to the conclusion that…we’re dealing with a problem that arises from the way in 
which individuals have learned to be human…” 
- George MacDonald, in The Sexual Offender: Safe To Be At Large? 
 
Di Furia and Mees thought the impulse to violate another person was greatly 
similar in all offenders, regardless of their differences in “target” and method.172  A 
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mindset problem plagued the sexual offender. Both the exhibitionist and the child 
molester shared this mindset. Therefore, the program did not need to vary its approach 
between different sorts of offenders. Child molesters, violent rapists, voyeurs and 
incestual fathers were all admitted, and all treated with the same self-guided group 
method.173 The program also subscribed to the theory that sexual offenders generally 
went through an escalating cycle of offenses. “Minor” sexual offenders, such as 
exhibitionists, turned to more assaultive offenses over time. The line between sexual 
misbehavior and sexual assault was thought of as a downward “slope”, not a categorical 
distinction.174 Once a man began assaulting others, he would not return to voyeurism 
alone.175 His offense “target” or “targets”, however, were thought to remain the same. If 
the offender exhibited himself to adult women, he would likely continue to only target 
adult women if he progressed to assault.176 The program did not classify how far an 
offender had “slid” on a scale of offenses. The point was moot. The ability of the 
offender to slide from one kind of offense to another was support, in di Furia’s view, for 
his generalization of sex offender maladjustment. One offender, without treatment, was 
ultimately as dangerous to the community as any other. Only stress and time separated 
the voyeur from the violator. All offenders needed a run in treatment to face their 
impulses.177  
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This theory of the mutable offender also supported the program’s choice to 
target the offender’s self-image and sociability, rather than his desires. Desire was, 
following its logic, a dependent variable. The offender was thought to be seeking 
affection and acceptance when he raped others. The changing offense showed that the 
act of rape or exhibition was little satisfying in-of-itself. Addressing the particular 
crimes the offender committed was necessary, as his offense eventually became habit 
and had to be confronted as such. This habit, however, manifested out of and was 
reinforced by a wholly different need. The desire would change more effectively by 
targeting, in the main, its source. Elucidating the stress causing these offenses was the 
most important piece in stopping the cycle of sexual violence.178  
Di Furia and Mees’ offender inclusivity was sharply limited to sexual crime. No 
sexual murderers were admitted to the program. While di Furia, MacDonald and 
Williams speculated a number of nonsexual criminals had the same sexual/interpersonal 
frustrations as sexual offenders, the program did not attempt to treat them.179 A few 
offenders convicted of burglary charges entered the program, but they were committed 
for sexual crimes that had not been prosecuted, or which had bargained down to a 
nonsexual charge.180 It was another decade until the program’s approach was broadened 
beyond sexual offenders to other types of convicts. 
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In sum, a “larger pattern of socially deviant behavior" in all aspects of life, 
accompanied by major stresses, was thought to push the offender to recourse to sexual 
offense.181  To end the offender’s assaults, the offender had to fix his flawed capacity to 
relate to others. Before the program, the offender, according to di Furia and Mees, had 
bottled up his emotions because of his mindset of inferiority. He created an artificial 
emotional distance between himself and the world. Carrying out his offenses in secret 
was the furthest extension of this distance. To rehabilitate himself, the offender had to 
purge their mindset and accept their emotions. That mission was totally in his hands. 
The program did not believe an offender could be “changed” without his active 
involvement. Instead, di Furia and Mees sought to create an environment where the 
offender would be repeatedly forced to handle the consequences of their actions, day in 
and day out. This would challenge how the offender viewed themselves and how they 
accordingly lived their life. Confrontation in the present was thought to best engage the 
offender and entrench more positive habits and attitudes.182 By forcing the offender to 
face the reality of their situation and their actions, di Furia and Mees sought to establish 
to the offender how they hurt others and the connection between their self-image, their 
fantasies, and their wrongdoing.183 By creating a self-critical group, the doctors sought 
to create a space where offenders would confront and analyze each other’s denial, 
shame, and fear. It was essential that the offender wanted to be free from his impulses. 
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The program would not work if the offender did not invest himself in treatment, and it 
therefore rejected offenders referred by the court who continued to deny their crimes 
and who explicitly stated they did not want to enter treatment.184  
di Furia surmised the program’s treatment objectives as:    
“1. Recognition of his hurtful behavior patterns, 
 2. Understanding of the origin and operation of these patterns; 
3. Acceptance of responsibility for change; and  
4. Application of new patterns of responsible behavior in dealing with 
people.”185    
The chosen approach to meet these goals was the aforementioned group 
sessions, described by the program as “self-guided group therapy”. The offenders met in 
two-hour sessions. The number of sessions increased over the first few years from two, 
to five, to ten. When the program reached ten sessions, it began holding them twice a 
day, one at midday and the other in the evening. The sessions were straightforward. The 
residents of a group convened at a scheduled time in a dayroom. They circled chairs 
around large, freestanding ashtrays. There was no “podium” for speakers The senior and 
junior group leaders led proceedings from behind a desk. They used the desk to take 
notes and, as a stand for the tape recorder. If a new “observation man” had joined the 
group recently, the group went in a circle, introducing themselves and their sexual 
offenses to the new arrival. The “observation man” then introduced himself and his 
crimes. Following this, or on a day without a new member, the group began going over 
any immediate inter-hospital announcements and concerns. From there, sessions took 
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off on whatever avenue the participants thought appropriate for analyzing each other’s 
behavior.186 The therapeutic group’s mission was to correct their collective mindset, and 
the group was free to pursue any line of inquiry they thought would achieve that end.187 
The sessions became, under the leadership of the offenders, no-holds-barred, 
verbal arenas. The therapy was largely freeform analysis of the day’s events, used by 
the group to probe an individual’s temperament and problems.188 The ward’s everyday 
happenings, such as arguments, work assignments, were very prominent topics in 
therapy. The group examined these “pedestrian” events closely. Residents had to 
describe what they did from day to day in detail and discuss the feelings he had that 
day. Emotional disclosure was not voluntary. The offender had to be candid, even about 
things he knew were petty. 189 The group also discussed the circumstances of an 
offender’s crimes, but the goal was to frame present emotions and avenues for change. 
It encouraged the residents to discover how their daily activities were tied to their self-
image, their emotions, and their larger “personality”-based habit patterns.190 It 
emphasized the thing in his life that he could control and change – his present – over his 
nonnegotiably criminal past.  
Program residents needed to be honest in all of their descriptions, even if it cost 
them respect or suggested that their treatment was not going well. If an offender was 
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plagued by recurrent fantasies, he needed to tell the group. If he believed he was getting 
the worst work assignments because the other group members disliked him, he needed 
to tell the group.191 Failing to disclose something like a telephone call was, in the 
program’s view, an attempt to create a private sphere outside the group’s oversight. 
Maintaining private conversations with people outside the program and keeping private 
hobbies allowed the resident to hide their thoughts and emotions from others. The 
offender had to live in the open. Being quiet opened a resident to accusations they were 
hiding something.192 The group climate became so demanding and inquisitive that the 
program administration made an explicit policy that communications between the 
offender and their lawyer could remain confidential.193 
To counteract a life of reticence and deceit, the group had to be open and honest 
about their feelings, concerns and judgements. All offenders, from the leader down to 
the trial member, were intended to be equals. Anyone could theoretically criticize 
anyone else.  Honesty opened the offender to criticism. The individual might lose some 
dignity, but only through other’s critique of his actions and words. The offender had to 
be willing to chance their censure in the pursuit of correcting their errors in thought and 
action.194 Their actions were condemned, but their personal pain was validated.195  The 
group could reject his actions, but not him, and their feedback gave him an opportunity 
to reflect. By opening himself to the judgement of others, the offender was beginning to 
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rebuild the social connections that the program architects believed he was too scared to 
build before. The exposure of the offender to social pressure and control gave him the 
opportunity to internalize some of those pressures, and build the offender’s confidence 
that he could function under them, if he tried. 196 
The approach took some practical adjustments to function. Initially, the 
offenders were scattered around the hospital. To cut down on transit time, the offenders 
were brought on to the same ward a short time after the self-guided group began.197 The 
ward was a “standard” ward. It was locked at night, like a handful of other wards, but it 
had no added security “features” or additional attendant staff.198 Once the offenders 
were on their own ward, they were cut off from their previous ward’s schedule and 
activities. To occupy their time, the administration entered the offenders into work 
assignments throughout the hospital. Work assignments were primarily housekeeping, 
but also included positions in the barbershop, the hospital kitchen and in various 
maintenance capacities, depending on their skills.199 The offenders were paid for their 
time, with different wages for different positions. By the turn of the decade, the 
offenders, lived a very regimented life on weekdays, going to work, then lunch, then 
therapy. The “sexual psychopath” was no longer confined to a locked ward, awaiting 
another ambitious psychiatrist’s stab at treatment. On the contrary, they were now given 
a specific goal in their treatment and made to understand they were responsible for its 
accomplishment.   
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At this stage, the group as a unit was not considered outside of the therapy 
sessions. The group was a means to the end of group therapy, rather than a therapeutic 
environment in and of itself. As a group, the residents had little power. The group’s 
primary privilege was the ability to “recommend” to senior staff whether or not a group 
member under observation should be accepted. In general, however, the self-guided 
group sessions were a means of providing group therapy, rather than the creation of a 
semi-autonomous self-help group. The most telling demonstration of this was that Mees 
and di Furia did not believe the group could lead itself. Even with no professional 
present, a specific person or persons was still through necessary to chair the 
proceedings. “Thus evolved the role of Senior Leader”. 200 The Senior Leader was 
fittingly chosen by seniority of stay. There was no gradation at this time of program 
progress at this time; seniority was thought best to allow the most experienced offender 
to lead the group’s procedures. The Senior Leader “moderated” the meetings – a duty 
which di Furia and Mees never bothered to describe in any detail – and gave oral and 
written progress reports on resident progress to staff. As a reward for their progress and 
for their additional duties, the Senior Leader was afforded numerous privileges, 
including living quarters on a separate, open ward and grounds leave.201 When the 
number of sessions proliferated to include both mornings and evenings, the Senior 
Leader was given exemption to miss evening meetings. Their residence on a different 
ward was thought to make their attendance of the evening sessions an undue hassle for 
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them.202 To run these evening sessions, the program staff developed the position of 
Junior Leader. This figure was also made responsible for any issues that arose on the 
ward in the Senior Leader’s absence.203 Resident leadership of therapy remained, 
therefore, predicated on a figure of authority and guidance. 
The residents responded well to this independent discussion format. They 
became proactive and inquisitive in their sessions with each other. Men who entered the 
group denying wrongdoing or refusing to talk at all began to accept the pain they caused 
others. di Furia and Mees considered the group’s engagement proof the program was at 
least somewhat effective.204 The residents’ open communication with one another 
showed they were taking the first steps in opening themselves to others. Their hard 
work in their occupations was proof they wanted to be accepted by the hospital 
generally, which meant they were beginning to internalize a concern for their society’s 
values. While the two doctors stated repeatedly that this did not prove the treatment 
effective, they did not state any plans to evaluate the program by more definite 
means.205  
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Figure 1: A meeting of Milieu Therapy patients and staff.  
The man on the far right holding a pair of glasses is Giulio di Furia. Taken from “New 
Treatment Proves Valuable by Statistics”, an article by Larry Spears in the The News Tribune 
which ran on October 2nd, 1961. 
 
In di Furia and MacDonald’s later account, the Sexual Offender program 
emerged from Mees and di Furia’s impulse creation of a self-accountable group, 
modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous and other self-help groups, and their wise efforts to 
cultivate it further after it proved engaging. This was an oversimplification. di Furia and 
Mees came to the problem of sex offender treatment with a different understanding of 
mental health and the possibilities of institutional care than that of their forbearers. 
Their new perspective on mental illness was shared nationally by many psychiatrists. It 
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was diffusely identified and did not receive an all-encompassing name. 206 The 
therapeutic approach it suggested to practitioners, however, was much more clearly 
delineated. It was variously called the “therapeutic milieu”, “milieu therapy”, and 
“community therapy”. Its principles and methodology greatly informed the creation, 
mission, and structure of the Sexual Offender Treatment Program and of therapy 
generally within the hospital.  
The model emerged as the dominant therapeutic model at Western State rapidly. 
Dr. Arville Davis, chief psychologist, Leon Tibbets, chief ward attendant, and di Furia 
himself established a pilot program in 1959 for “Milieu Therapy”.207 The “group 
leadership” concept was imported from self-help groups among civilian populations, 
such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Synanon.208 Under the new model, the Freudian 
psychodynamic understanding of the causes of mental illness remained much the same, 
and illness was categorized in the same way as before. There were two major changes. 
The modes of expression and perpetuation of the patient’s disease were considered an 
aspect of daily life as much as past trauma. Alongside this, the role of the 
“environment”, or the institution’s physical and social apparatus, in furthering the 
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patient’s negative behaviors and entrenching their illness took on paramount 
importance.209  
The approach sought to create an environment where the patient "learn[ed] the 
techniques of living" in an environment of their peers.210 For the non-psychotic or 
mildly psychotic mentally ill, chief psychologist Davis explained, the patient’s primary 
problem was maladaptation.211 They had a grasp of themselves and the world, but their 
ability to handle either had deteriorated due to external pressure, such as changes at 
their job or a divorce. Their worsening problems of day-to-day living threw their early 
trauma into sharp relief. As their problems worsened, they became isolated from their 
loved ones their career, and themselves. When they lost those anchors, they lost the 
ability to account for their desires, their fears and their needs in a sensible way.212 
Mental illness flared as a stress response in most nonacute cases and cultivating the 
patient’s ability to handle stress was the most effective cure. The everyday had inflicted 
a psychic wound upon the patient, not a past of trauma.213 Accordingly, an institutional 
treatment program predicated on fundamentally different terms than life outside would 
not treat the depression as it manifested in everyday life. It would only treat the 
patient’s mindset and feelings while in the institution. 
This understanding of mental illness demanded patient initiative in their 
treatment, as well as involvement.214 A tight schedule of staff-orchestrated activities 
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were not therapeutic, as they took the patient’s agency and disregarded their individual 
desires. The institution’s everyday structure and activities could not be disconnected 
from the activities demarcated as therapy. Too little attention to the patient’s interests 
and desires led to the same alienation and withdrawal that typified the patient before 
admission. Too much regulation of the patient’s life would nurture an unhealthy 
reliance on outside moderation.215 Patient leadership of their own care, in the form of 
limited self-determination over their activities, elegantly met both demands. It mirrored 
the responsibility the patient would shoulder outside the hospital. The patient could 
choose who they would speak with and what they would do, and when, with their core 
therapy group and its designated staff leader meeting with each other to discuss why 
they made those choices.216 To complement this direction, the patient needed individual 
as well as group autonomy, and the patient had to identify as an individual to act as one. 
The group would help each other evaluate their problems, and rebuild themselves, while 
reacclimating the patient to the demands of everyday social life. What this practically 
entailed were major changes to hospital policy. A mixed-gender dorm was established, 
a then-first for Western State. Uniforms were discarded. Patients were allowed to keep 
their personal effects with them in their room, rather than keeping them uniform as 
before.217 Most importantly, an “open door” policy was instituted: patients were to be 
free to wander around the wards and dayroom as they chose, and explore the 
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surrounding community by signing in and out.218 “Unauthorized” leaves were 
considered a sign of recovery. It was taken to mean that the patient sought to 
“[restrengthen their] ties with… family and community”.219 According to the 
philosophy of milieu therapy, patients had to be conscious actors in their own treatment. 
They had to establish and shoulder their own routines and activities to ready themselves 
for the world outside.220 By creating a smaller-scale social experience within the 
hospital, the patient could be reintroduced to socialization in steps. This, more than 
internal self-discovery, was the key to treating their condition. The patient had to learn 
how to live under their own power, a day at a time. Any other therapeutic goal was 
ultimately a distraction from this fundamental need.221  
The Sexual Offender Treatment Program was an outcropping of this new stream 
of thought. Most of the program’s principles were derived from this wider 
reconsideration of the psychiatric approach, rather than consideration of the treatment 
needs of sexual offenders as a specific population. An example of the practice of the 
“therapeutic milieu” makes the internal similarities clear. One woman, appearing before 
the admissions board, described her paranoiac fears that her husband was unfaithful. 
The entrance board identified a flaw in her logic and asked she explain it to them. "She 
admitted she didn't know, [and] she felt guilty. She was taking the first step to recovery 
- recognizing that she had a problem..."222 The woman's paranoia was something to be 
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confronted like a drug addiction, as a flawed coping mechanism, an “unsuccessful way 
of life”.223  
Milieu was an attempt to change a mindset and a lifestyle, just like the Sexual 
Offender Treatment Program. The two programs were not identical approaches with 
different populations to be treated. To better suit the perceived needs of their different 
populations, they altered the treatment approach and modality within group therapy. 
“Confrontation” was a core piece of the sexual offender program, and it was directed 
from the “outside in” to foster within the offender intense self-questioning. It would be 
as vicious, petty, and insistent as the group decided it ought to be.224 In milieu, 
confrontation in group was intentionally much more delicate. A heavy-handed lecture 
about character failings was obviously not appropriate for a suicidal person. Therapists 
emphasized creating an environment where the patient would question the way they 
viewed things, rather than “themselves” per se. Their independence, rather than group 
accountability, was sought.225 Individually, the patient in milieu was granted time to 
“de-isolate” themselves on their own terms. Sexual offenders were not; a fundamental 
component of their internal problems had been self-imposed secrecy.226 In the Sexual 
Offender program, cultivating “responsibility” was a major goal. Milieu emphasized a 
return to “harmony” and engagement with the patient’s social and personal life. The 
resumption of responsibility as a part of this return was soft-pedaled.227 These 
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differences made significant differences in the group environment. The preservation of 
institutional regimentation of life in the Sexual Offender program, under the guise of 
maintaining group responsibility, was avoided whenever possible in the “milieu”. The 
offenders had much less contact with their assigned therapist. The milieu did not 
“promote” anyone through leadership positions. These differences, however, summed to 
adaptations based on the same theoretical consideration of mental illness. Society and 
the self were at odds for both the depressive and the assaultive. The mental hospital’s 
job was not to “fix” them, but to develop the person’s ability to help themselves, 
whether their problem was personal or social. 
By 1963, the year of the program’s first public mention, the program’s tentative 
measures had become its policy. The Sexual Offender Treatment Program was centered 
on the use of group therapy to give offenders insight into their societal and personal 
maladjustment. It was not crafted in response to any inquiry on the “needs” of sex 
offenders. No survey of sexual offender’s stated motivations or analysis of criminal 
histories underpinned the program’s treatment objective.228 The method was chosen in 
accordance with a new understanding of nonpsychotic mental illness. The problem 
faced by most with a personality or mood disorder, in the eyes of the contemporary 
psychologist, was poor social adjustment. This, in turn, was almost always due to a 
fundamental problem with the way the patient situated themselves in the world. A 
sexual offender was obviously far worse in their social maladjustment than a depressed 
person. Placement in a group, a much longer stay in therapy, and strict regulation of 
their day was necessary to account for their lack of self-discipline. However, it was the 
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same socialization problem, not a discipline problem, that had caused the offenses. It 
was the former that therapy needed to target in the main. The cultivation of self-
discipline in the sexual offender was a means of allowing for that socialization, rather 
than an end-in-itself.  
The two doctors began writing a series of articles to tell the world of their new 
method. The two wrote four papers between them: one research report for an in-
department bulletin, one critical evaluation of the Washington’s sex psychopath law for 
the state law review, one which surveyed sex psychopath treatment across America, and 
a final paper that described the nascent program as it stood. The subjects of the papers 
were telling. They concerned themselves with the more concrete aspects of the program 
and, in the case of the survey, of programs elsewhere. They made little reference to 
existing criminology or psychiatric thought, instead describing their program 
philosophy as though it had no roots or connections with other movements or 
psychiatric principles. Mees and di Furia did make a serious effort to place themselves 
within the national practice of treatment, by conducting an innovative and effective 
survey of other mental hospitals. They did not have an interest in locating the program’s 
understanding and approach to the sexual offender within social policy or psychiatric 
theory. Their critique of psychodynamic formulation engaged with the ideas solely as 
they functioned within the clinic. Their veracity as models of human behavior were not 
discussed. All of the authors cited in the Prehistory of the concept of the sexual 
psychopath, and all the terminology and theory they bandied about, were absent. This 
could not have been because of Mees and di Furia’s ignorance of their publications. 
Their description of the maladapted, self-loathing sex offender was too similar to 
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Karpman’s antisocial neurotic paraphiliac and too in line with the mainstream of 
psychiatric thought to have emerged without outside research.229 Any outside influence 
was not cited. In line with this disinterest in theoretical engagement, Mees and di Furia 
made no comment on how their work related to the larger practice of corrections. The 
difference between the internal psychic troubles of the murderer and the rapist were not 
considered. With their initial slate of papers, Mees and di Furia set a precedent of 
nonengagement with wider theorization that would define the program’s reports across 
its lifespan. 
The first writing on the topic was a 1962 paper by Mees which could not be 
located. It was published in a research bulletin within the Division of Mental Health. 
The content is cited elsewhere as a simple description of the program’s principles and 
activities.230 Considering the size of the journal, the chances anyone outside the state 
saw it are almost zero. 
The other three papers were published in much larger journals. The first of these 
was a paper penned for the Washington Law Review, examining Washington’s sexual 
psychopath commitment law as it stood. Di Furia and Mees thought that the Sexual 
Psychopath law, while founded on a sound principle of rehabilitation, was outmoded. In 
an open letter to the Washington legislature, they articulated their concerns, and in the 
process revealed the course they wished the program would take. Their first two 
comments were straightforward: they wanted the term "Sexual Psychopath" replaced 
with the term "habitual sexual offender", and the end of the court’s use of a psychiatrist 
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as a “lie detector” who screened real “sex psychopathy” from feigned illness.231 Their 
third comment sought to change the policy for discharge. In short it gave the hospital 
superintendent the ability to demand the offender be tried for their crimes when released 
from the hospital.232 Their last complaint, and the most interesting, railed against the 
state’s demand that the program operate strictly as an inpatient effort. The future of the 
program was, in the doctors’ view, outpatient therapy. The triggers within society that 
had tempted the rapist to offend remained waiting for him when he left the hospital.233  
The program needed the license to allow offenders outside the hospital, so they could 
readjust to the pressures and temptations of the outside world.234 Granting offenders 
increasing freedom gave an opportunity for physician guidance for the offender’s 
reintegration.235 The most drastic change suggested was the commitment of a majority 
of referred offenders to outpatient therapy straightaway.236 The nature that the proposed 
outpatient program would take was not described. Regardless, Mees and di Furia’s 
intent was clear. An outpatient program was the best possible means of curing an 
interpersonal socialization issue. Monitored engagement with society, not isolation, was 
necessary. To keep offenders confined would only delay their rehabilitation.  
Their next article, “Legal and Psychiatric Problems in the Care and Treatment of 
Sexual Offenders”, became one of the most prominent articles in the field. Mees and di 
Furia had searched for literature on sex offender rehabilitation when they began the 
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program and found next to nothing. They wondered if this was because few programs 
existed or if these programs were simply not being documented.237 To evaluate the state 
of the field, they created a survey and sent it to the administrator of every mental 
hospital of a certain unspecified size in all states that had passed sexual psychopath 
legislation. Of the close to 300 hospital administrators solicited, 122 responded with 
data.238 Their responses showed a general disinterest in innovating treatment or noting 
what elements of standard practice were effective. The few commonalities were non-
therapeutic security precautions, such a preference for locked wards and long 
commitment terms.239 There was one hang-up: due to odd formatting, the question 
“How long do sexual psychopaths stay in the hospital?” got a number of incomplete and 
bizarre answers. In di Furia and Mees’ opinion, the way that the hospital administrators 
filled out the survey suggested that the length of stay for a patient was an arbitrary 
period without a clear criterion for release.240 Administrators effectively gave 
“sentences”, releasing certain offenders before other ones because of a certain amount 
of time served. The remainder of the data is clear. Only 25, or ~20%, of hospitals 
received more than 15 court-committed patients. 44 hospitals who had been ordered by 
state authorities to receive sex offenders had received none, showing the lack of use of 
sex psychopath laws by a number of states.241 18% of hospitals had "no apparent 
treatment program...available for sex offenders", and 71% treated them alongside their 
other patients, without a distinct treatment program or protocol for their particular 
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problems.242 Most of the statistics, di Furia, argued, showed that institutions were 
actively hostile to the possibilities of sex offender treatment. 
What few hospitals had treatment approaches were little better. Their treatment 
philosophies, to di Furia's concern, were predicated on "dynamics and etiology" and 
"psychoanalytic and non-directive therapy". “Active therapeutic manipulations...are not 
used."243 The hospitals were using effectively the same old-fashioned psychoanalysis 
used on all other patients.  di Furia thought this was a regressive understanding of the 
sexual offender. The very act of offense was centered on deceit and manipulation. 
Attempting to unearth hidden practices by psychotherapy simply gave the offender 
another place to explain their activity away and bury their secrets. Talking about 
impulses on a psychodynamic level distanced the offender from them and from the 
problems that fed into their crimes. 244 The authors concluded with the reminder that 
these laws and their corresponding treatment programs existed to reduce recidivism and 
improve the mental health of sex offenders. "…[H]ospitals should take the initiative in 
developing effective treatment programs... otherwise, custodial rather than treatment 
orientation [may remerge] and we will lose the opportunity to fulfill our self-imposed 
obligation to society."245  
These early reports made one particularly high-ranking ally: Governor Daniel 
Evans. In 1965, shortly after the publication of Mees and di Furia’s survey of other 
mental hospitals, he hailed the program as a highlight of Washington’s mental health 
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reform. Citing their study, he created an Advisory Committee to investigate how 
Washington could further the cause of sexual offender treatment.246 MacDonald and di 
Furia kept Evans updated on the program’s status throughout his term as governor, and 
he maintained interest and support through the end of his tenure.247 
In the local press, the focus was naturally narrowed to the program itself. The 
new program’s method and philosophy was summarized in The News Tribune in July 
1963. This was the first mention of the program in the local popular press, and it was 
very positive. As the reporter described it, the program was a novel effort based on new 
theorizations that was already proving successful. He focused on the group’s ability to 
pressure its members to conform to society’s standards, and downplayed the self-
leadership component.248 Dr. William Conte, the supervisor of the Division of Mental 
Health, commented that Western State’s program was "probably the only program of its 
kind nationally in a large general mental hospital".249 At this time, the program 
remained small enough to avoid major public inquiry. Only twelve patients were 
enrolled for as program residents at the time the article was written.250 The program’s 
small size and “good behavior” dulled the public’s interest. There was only more 
newspaper article written about the program before 1966. It, too, focused on describing 
the program’s philosophy on what motivated the sexual offender.251 The public had 
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been major agitators for sexual psychopath legislation, but even when it resulted in a 
program, they remained disinterested. They would not turn their eyes to it until a 1965 
murder called sex offender rehabilitation to their attention. 
The program was inpatient in the interest of security, but residents were 
minimally confined. The ward was locked at night, but the individual rooms were not, 
and they were able to move about the hospital with little hindrance. This was about to 
change. Western State Hospital’s public image, and image to the justice system, was 
improving. In 1962, the hospital was reaccredited by the Joint Commission. A three-
year reaccreditation, "the highest form...that can be granted", followed in June of next 
year.252 The hospital could once again take on resident medical students. Alongside this, 
the “milieu” philosophy proved a useful change. The growth of outpatient care reduced 
ward crowding, and increased attention to the patient’s living conditions made the 
facility more livable for all.253 While the hospital was on the upswing, however, the 
program’s success was troubled. Dr. di Furia was promoted to the position of senior 
clinical director in 1962, busying his schedule.254 Mees slowly phased out his 
involvement from 1963 onward as he entered a teaching a position at the University of 
Washington, finally leaving outright in 1965.255 In July of 1963, Dr. Shovlain resigned 
as superintendent, and the Department of Institutions appointed di Furia as his successor 
that month. With his many new responsibilities, di Furia could no longer manage the 
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program on a day-to-day basis.256 Dr. George MacDonald was hired on as Senior 
Clinical Director shortly thereafter.257 With only Dr. Mees present in a reduced role, the 
sexual offender program had no proper supervision.  
In the preface to their desired revision of the Sexual Psychopath statues, Mees 
and di Furia spoke to the national community and contended that research into effective 
treatment of the sexual psychopath was "long past due and immensely needed”.258 Their 
own effort, they argued, was going it alone, and improvement would be slow if no other 
states stepped up to the plate. Their lament, by and large, went unheeded. Only a 
handful of sex offender treatment programs opened for any length of time before 1970. 
The only other program west of the Rockies was the aforementioned California program 
at Atascadero State Hospital. In the 1950’s, the program appeared successful. Between 
1954 and 1957, just under two thirds of the 1,414 sexual psychopaths committed to the 
hospital were discharged as Safe to Be At Large.259 The program remained reliant on 
prison-like surveillance and discipline. Toward the end of the 1950’s, the more extreme 
interventions, such as lobotomy, were phased out as they lost favor in psychiatric care 
in general. As more attention came onto the program and its results, however, the 
program fell into disrepute among both professionals and the public. 260 1960 saw a 
murder on the ward and a mass escape. The city’s population petitioned Governor 
Brown to replace the medical administrator with a warden.261 In response to the 
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outbursts, security was tightened further. One reporter compared it to San Quentin, with 
numerous headcounts every day and a long chain of procedures for going to meals, 
yard, and back to bunks.262 Residents were not allowed to put posters on the walls or 
decorate their space in any other way. They had to keep all possessions in a box, ready 
to move at a moment’s notice.263 The effect was aggressive dehumanization. Moreover, 
the cost of such heavy security made it as expensive as a maximum-security prison.264  
This security was toxic to treatment. Like Western State Hospital, milieu 
therapy became the primary philosophy of the hospital’s practitioners at the end of the 
1950’s. A 1960 article claimed that “the treatment program for the committed cases is 
essentially that of the therapeutic community, with group therapy and patient 
government in the milieu…”265 By 1966, the program had also incorporated 
interpersonal confrontation therapy. Their attempts to foster community in a hospital 
with extreme limitations on movement, independent action, and individualization failed. 
An outside team evaluating the program stated that resident morale was extremely low, 
primarily due to the heavy restrictions. Few offenders engaged with doctors any more 
than necessary.266 Residents only received around three hours of group therapy and one 
“confrontation” session a week. 267  To the authors, “one to three hours per week is 
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ludicrous in face of Dr. di Furia’s…program at Western State Hospital where patients, 
carefully selected… receive five one and one-half hour sessions per week.”268 
California’s program was a cautionary tale at best, demonstrating that even major 
commitment of state funds and the cooperation of the justice system could lead to 
disaster if the therapeutic approach proved unsuccessful.  
By 1964, di Furia and Mees’ initiative for sex offender treatment had become a 
coherent program.  Their achievement was not, however, the result of bold 
experimentation by two recent hires, guided by a spark of insight into the psychology of 
the sex offender. It was the result of a confluence of intellectual currents and political 
shifts at Western State Hospital. A broad intellectual movement toward environment 
and initiative-oriented therapy pushed institutions to emphasize patient leadership and 
group approaches.  The program’s understanding of sexual offense followed the same 
lines of the dawning “milieu” understanding of mental health. The offender’s violations 
were considered the product of their failed relationship with society and reality. It was 
an illness of maladjustment, framed in the same fashion that most non-psychotic mental 
illnesses were framed in institutional psychiatry at this time. Program resident 
leadership took the “milieu” to its limit, by allowing the offender’s therapy to rely 
wholly on their engagement with one another The doctors found that allowing the 
offender group to question itself resulted in high engagement, and they accordingly 
centered the new program around group interrogation. Following a national survey di 
Furia and Mees found their interest in the treatment of sex offenders a national rarity, 
and the two attempted to kickstart wider interest in the field by reporting his results in 
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academic journals. This initiative, however, was curtailed by the departure of both 
founders, and the “documentarian” style of these reports set an unfortunate precedent in 
the program of nonengagement with theoretical changes and sparse detail. While the 
initiative of di Furia and Mees was predicated more on a general tendency in psychiatry 
than a well-controlled experiment, it should not be discounted as more aimless 
sputtering. It was a coherent approach that reached sex offenders in a way no major 
program had before. As of 1964, thanks to the efforts of these two men, meaningful sex 
offender treatment on the West Coast had begun.  
The MacDonald and Williams Era, 1965 - 1975 
When Mees left his position at Western State Hospital in 1965, the Western 
State program had moved through its first phase of development. Its therapeutic goal 
and the central aspects of its method had been established, and they would remain much 
the same for rest of the program’s lifespan. This early period, however, had the 
unfortunate quality of not only being an innovator, but of attracting very little attention 
from both political and academic authorities. The Division of Mental Health and the 
Western State Hospital administrations seemed to hardly notice it existed. Annual status 
reports from the Division of Mental Health and more detailed biennial surveys from the 
Department of Institutions were required by the state legislature following the hospital’s 
1957 scandal. The status reports from 1959 through 1964 and the 60-61 and 62-64 
surveys do not mention sexual psychopaths or the emerging program in any capacity. 
Western State Hospital itself got a lot of attention, but the state’s interest was in its new 
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outpatient pediatric unit and inpatient dementia unit.269 Academic writing on the 
program from outside was nonexistent. The Atascadero program remained by far the 
most prominent in the literature, but as previously discussed, its serious issues and 
heavily correctional air made its lessons largely irrelevant to the Western State example. 
The program was not getting the constructive criticism it needed to improve.  
Enough of the Washington courts retained their interest to keep the program 
populated. Unlike other states, the “sexual psychopath” commitment law was not 
voided by a lack of commitments. From July 1961 to June 1966, around 37% of those 
charged with a sexual offense in court were sent to the program. After observation 
screened out about 55% of the candidates, just below 20% of sexual offenders were 
kept for treatment.270 This large percentage, however, came from a small pool” of the 
same lawmen repeatedly invoking the statue. A portion of judges and prosecutors in 
Pierce, King, and Clark counties sent the majority of the sexual offender cases to the 
hospital, and their commitments ensured the program’s survival. Beyond this group, the 
program was rarely used.271  
This shelter of disinterest proved useful. The program weathered what could 
have otherwise been a ruinous scandal. In early 1965, a group member attempted 
suicide. Dr. George MacDonald, Western State Hospital’s senior clinical director, 
investigated. He discovered the program’s “therapeutic community” had been corrupted 
by Senior Leader’s abuse of their privileges.272 The group’s leaders had become 
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responsible for the conduct of the group at large. What should have been a limiting 
factor became a point of leverage, as they spoke for the group to the staff. The Senior 
Leaders assumed nearly complete control. They chose the other group members’ work 
assignments outright and gave the highest-paying jobs to cronies. They abused their 
grounds privileges to make an “off-ward pad for… illegal fun and games”. They 
enforced silence by threatening to give negative marks to residents that confronted them 
or tried to go to the staff. Meanwhile, they told staff whatever the staff wanted to hear. 
Their falsified reports were accepted by the inattentive management without question, 
who promptly rubberstamped the leaders’ disciplinary actions and job choices.273 To 
avoid being booted, a resident would have to “play along”. If they made trouble, they 
would be labeled a problem case in the Senior Leader’s next report.274 How the suicide 
attempt and the improprieties were connected was never disclosed.  
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Almost immediately after, the first public outcry against the commitment of 
sexual offenders to mental hospitals ordered the state to attention. On June 9th, the body 
of John Siverts, a 12-year-old boy, was found off Empire Highway south of Spokane.275 
Evidence quickly led police to Melvin Briggs, a cook in the city. He was previously 
committed as a sexual psychopath due to an offense against a different boy in 
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Sex Offender care at Western State. From B. James Glynn, “Briggs Charged in Boy’s 
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Redmond, in 1959. He had been committed to Eastern State Hospital until 1963, when 
he was discharged as “safe to be at large” by the superintendent.276 The hospital records 
stated that Briggs’ behavior was exemplary, and there was no suggestion he should be 
monitored.277278 The community was outraged at the failure of Eastern State to protect 
the community from an offender who proved to be dangerous. This uproar was less 
strong among the general public in the Western part of the state, but it was still 
apparent.279 The Spokane Daily Chronicle ran a multi-part investigative report on the 
treatment, or lack thereof, for sexual offenders at Eastern State.280 Their findings 
showed that Eastern State used the same sort of high-security, low-effort “treatment” 
that Western State had previously employed. Offenders were released when it was 
convenient. The situation “made everybody sick”, in the words of one state Senator.281   
The situation did not result in Washington State’s rejection of sexual offender 
rehabilitation, despite significant public and law enforcement hostility.282 The state 
instead decided to eliminate the commitment of “sexual psychopaths” to Eastern State. 
In the legislative committee’s view, Eastern State had shown it did not have an effective 
treatment approach for sexual offenders.283 It did not know how to treat them and could 
not gauge their danger to the community. Western State’s treatment approach, on the 
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other hand, had an explicit treatment goal, a logical background for why that goal was 
pursued, and a programmatic methodology to achieve it.284 The legislature decided, 
however, that the danger to the community of the “sexual psychopath” was too high for 
standard corrections. Any avenue to reduce their danger was worth the venture. 
Accordingly, the Western State program was designated by the Director of the 
Department of Institutions to be the sole program granted custody of committed sexual 
psychopaths. The program’s formal title was hereafter the Treatment Program for 
Sexual Offenders, and this title was included on the title page of all the program’s self-
published reports.285  
The Briggs affair became the primary focus of a 1966 television documentary 
titled “The Sexual Offender: Safe To Be At Large?”. Produced by a crew primarily 
from Washington State University, the picture took an in-depth look at the Western 
State program and at the legislature’s reasoning for supporting it. The latter angle was 
primarily sought by interviewing legislators about their thoughts on the Western State 
program and Washington’s future in sexual offender treatment. The crew also 
interviewed mental health division director Dr. Conte, and a Seattle psychiatrist. The 
legislators were unanimous in arguing that a community program was necessary to treat 
sexual offenders. The Briggs affair, in their view, was not merely the failure of the 
hospital to properly treat the man. It was the end result of state institutions attempting to 
fulfill the public’s impossible demand of reforming a “sexual psychopath” apart from 
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the community. They accepted the program’s arguments and stated their intention to 
create community programs that could meet the offender’s needs for controlled 
reintegration. The shift of sexual offender rehabilitation to the hospital best equipped 
for the job was, therefore, only the first step in creating a complete program. The 
legislators admitted that this initiative would be heavily contingent on obtaining 
community support. They seemed fairly convinced, however, of the efforts’ importance, 
and committed to its completion.286 di Furia, as previously discussed, had agitated for 
the revisal of the Sexual Psychopath law to better accommodate outpatient efforts. 
These interviews suggested that his vision was approaching fulfillment. 
This did not come to pass. Washington did not follow through on its interest 
with any programs, initiatives, or legislation. There is little evidence it even attempted 
to pass legislation to that effect. Much like the sex psychopath law itself, the state 
seemed content to let the issue die once public attention shifted. A separate outpatient 
treatment program for sexual offenders would not emerge for ten years, and it was not 
affiliated with Western State Hospital. MacDonald, as the program’s new director, was 
left with the task to make the Western State program into a complete solution for sex 
offender treatment. This flew in the face of all standing psychiatric expertise, but with 
no further state support coming, there wasn’t room to object. His mission was difficult. 
As of August 1965, MacDonald was in the position of reforming a program that had 
undergone major decay in its therapeutic efficacy. By that same time next year, he was 
responsible for the observation and treatment of all committed sexual psychopaths in 
Washington. By 1970, the resident population had skyrocketed into the triple digits, and 
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it was abundantly clear that no outpatient programs would be arriving to alleviate 
Western State’s caseload. MacDonald was effectively tasked with creating an all-
around performer in sex offender treatment within a hospital facing major staffing and 
budget cuts MacDonald responded by doubling down on the elements he believed had 
originally brought the program success. Through 1976, MacDonald, with the help of 
Robinson Williams, managed the program with the intent of keeping offender 
leadership the fundamental operating principle. He added numerous facets of treatment, 
including couple’s therapy, work-release, and outpatient therapy to allow the treatment 
to permeate every aspect of the offender’s life.  In the process of enlarging the program, 
he significantly changed the program’s internal focus to emphasize much more strongly 
the importance of the group itself in the offender’s treatment. His changes made the 
program into a self-sustaining entity that could maintain the burden of a high number of 
commitments. The program’s efforts in research and self-evaluation, however, were 
poor. The program remained invisible to outside observers.  
MacDonald’s investigation into the suicide attempt made it clear to him that the 
program would fail without dedicated management. It also piqued his interest in sex 
offender treatment. In August 1965, di Furia asked MacDonald to become the 
program’s director, and he accepted.287 Like di Furia, MacDonald had no prior 
background in sex offender rehabilitation. di Furia chose MacDonald because he 
thought MacDonald’s “non-[mainstream]-psychiatric” philosophy was a good fit with 
the standing treatment model. MacDonald also had shown enthusiasm and initiative in 
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investigating the program’s internal problems.288 MacDonald joined the program just as 
the Briggs case broke, and he began his efforts to cure the program’s ills under that 
incident’s shadow. 
His conclusion on the group’s present state of the decay was that undue power 
had been invested in the group leaders. The principle of resident leadership was valid, 
but it had been implemented improperly.289 His first changes from this conclusion were 
straightforward. The group leaders who had violated the staff’s trust were removed 
from the program.290 Group leaders could no longer the “center” of the proceedings. 
They maintained their standing as the session moderator, but their previous ability to 
control the group was strongly tempered. They were now chosen by election, not 
seniority, and could be removed by group vote.291 A written transcript was prepared by 
a different group member, the “secretary”, than the leader.292 The group leaders and 
“runner”, or secretary, were now required to have a daily “briefing” with the clinical 
director.293 Leaders needed to give “sound therapeutic reasons” for the topics brought 
up in group, “show familiarity” with all group members, and explain the reasoning 
behind the confrontation or discipline of a particular member.294 The hospital quit 
paying the offenders for their work. The various work positions, with their differing 
salaries, could no longer be a means of coercing or rewarding group members.295 These 
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practical changes in the way the group operated were successful in preventing 
“enterprising” group leaders from turning a therapeutic environment into their 
playground. While there were problems with discipline in the future, there was never 
misbehavior and abuse of privilege on this scale again. 
MacDonald implemented stronger measures of surveillance and discipline over 
all members, to increase the group’s accountability without hampering its initiative. The 
group had bought a tape recorder with the funds it had earned when their work was 
paid. Running it during the sessions now became a requirement, to provide an 
“objective” witness to the secretary’s notes and to deter attempts at letting certain 
conversations go unrecorded.296 Staff only consulted the tapes occasionally. They found 
that the transcripts were “more detailed” than the audio tape and almost always 
accurate.297 These changes significantly increased the program’s emphasis on the power 
of the group to police and monitor one another, with the leader now more of an agenda-
setting equal than an administrator. In the realm of discipline, the program was given a 
more defined length. Offenders were previously released on the sole authority of the 
hospital staff. Therefore, their stay varied drastically, depending on the staff’s opinion 
of their improvement, with some only staying a few months.298 MacDonald was 
concerned that this encouraged offenders to try and convince everyone they were cured 
and seek release as quickly as possible, rather than engage with therapy. He also 
believed it opened the groups to undue moderation by the staff. The residents would 
appeal to the administration for their release, rather than attempt to prove to their 
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fellows they were “ready”. He wanted tighter surveillance, but the group needed to 
remain the primary actor in the therapeutic process. Accordingly, the program began 
enforcing “mandatory minimums” of therapy. Once an offender had passed observation, 
they could not graduate the program until they had been there at least X months. The 
first minimum instituted was a year of inpatient therapy.299 
MacDonald and di Furia emphasized combative, confrontive group sessions. 
Residents were expected to make their emotional displeasure with themselves or one 
another undeniably clear. 01 stated residents talked over each other, barraged one 
inmate with doubts of their loyalty to the program, accused each other of lying. At 
times, groups would become a screaming match.300 The goal of such a “heavy” 
approach was to “demand” the offender understand they are accountable for what they 
do to others, and to problems anymore.301 The documentary showed the interrogation of 
one patient, named Nolan. In the process of recounting what drove his offenses, he 
stated his desire to rape was predicated on "getting even" with the person in question. 
He then said this vindictiveness was an "inborn" trait. A chorus of voices yelled at him 
that he had just disrespected the group. After the outrage subsided, another group 
member explained he has effectively stated his own inability to control himself is 
representative of the group's action. Did he not think that the group could change, and 
was changing? Why did he smear the others with his own failure? His answer was 
defensive, did not mention the group, and stated that his experience was his own. His 
group members roared and doubted if he really considered himself a part of the group. 
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One of the leaders observed, “you constantly are talking on separate terms with the 
group. You set yourself aside…” As Nolan tried to defend his reticence, another 
resident asked, "Are you aware you have a real communication problem?" Nolan began 
to answer, "Yes, I'm aware, but...", only to be interrupted by the same man, shouting 
"Well, what else is new?" Throughout the sequence, the microphones are repeatedly 
overloaded by the volume of the shouts.302  
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MacDonald sought friendlier relations between the program, the hospital, and 
the state. The resident’s work around the hospital had helped to alleviate dislike, but the 
group remained alienated from the general patient population, and outside staff 
remained ill-informed about the offenders in their midst.303 01 began working at 
Western State Hospital on the Geriatric Admissions ward. She knew nothing of 
substance about the program until one of the janitors on her ward told her he was a 
resident and discussed the program with her.304 MacDonald made it clear to the 
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offenders that they were expected to be “open and responsible” members of the hospital 
community, as well as their own. They could not simply talk about their sense of duty in 
the group session – they had to live up to it. Heeding his call, residents joined patient 
government and volunteered to complete various tasks outside of their work 
assignments. By 1968, they were so well trusted that some even served in the hospital 
search posse, which combed the open land surrounding the hospital for escaped or 
confused psychotic patients.305 They were unaccompanied, and could easily escape, but 
chose to cooperate. The therapeutic group was establishing itself as a participant in a 
wider hospital community.306  
In the interest of improving the program, MacDonald began searching for ways 
to give the offenders educational opportunities that could help them on their return to 
society. He turned to recruiting volunteers from the public to treat offenders. Volunteers 
from the general public were sought throughout Western State Hospital in the 1960’s 
and 70’s. They primarily gave patients companionship and filled assorted service roles 
like Recreation Aide, "Fashion" Aide and Chapel Assistants Volunteer.307 MacDonald’s 
initial aim with volunteers gave them the more involved role of teacher. The first 
volunteer, Mr. Becker, was brought on in 1967. He taught assorted lessons in “social 
and interrelational skills” with lectures and exercises on specific days of the month. A 
short time later, a social worker, Ms. Mock, joined him.308 MacDonald hoped that the 
two would be seen as “role models” as well as instructors by the offenders. This 
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pedestrian, “rote” state of affairs did not satisfy MacDonald, as the volunteers were 
doing the same type of task that the larger hospital’s volunteers did. They provided a 
service, rather than gave the offender an opportunity to improve themselves. It was a 
few years before the program arrived at a solution.309  
Dr. Robinson A. Williams was hired in February 1967 as Associate Director. He 
was chosen for his “broad background” in “clinical, correctional and administrative” 
experience. MacDonald viewed the program as lying outside of the “psychoanalytic 
approach” and sought a staff that could forge a new path alongside him.310 With the 
arrival of Williams, MacDonald became more ambitious in changing the program. He 
wanted more than group accountability. He wanted to alter the program’s model to 
make the group a more potent environment for change. The program’s new elements, 
however, were not modifications devised wholly by MacDonald and Williams and 
imposed from above. The program considered group leadership an essential aspect of 
the program, to the extent that the program staff sought group input on the program’s 
architecture and procedures.  
The first instance of this occurred when MacDonald called a conference of 
leader-level residents, program staff, and some discharged graduates in May of 1967. 
The goal was to create some sort of outpatient follow-up after the offender completed 
inpatient therapy. The residents were very concerned a more gradual form of release 
was necessary to prevent the offender from being “shocked” into a relapse. Following 
their recommendations and staff consideration, a two-part scheme was drafted. At first, 
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offenders were allowed off the ward on weekdays to work an outside job, returning to 
the ward for evening therapy sessions and to sleep. This portion, called “work release”, 
allowed the offender to begin taking on the demands of the outside world a day at a 
time.311 An offender was only placed on work release if he had served admirably in a 
group leadership position, and if group and the program staff both agreed he was ready 
for it.312  
Once the offender had spent at least three months on work-release and was 
thought to be adjusting to their new freedom well, they were placed on probationary 
release. They were required to attend weekly outpatient meetings at the hospital for at 
least a year and had to meet with a court-assigned probation officer. Generally, the 
offender was assigned eighteen months.313 The outpatient portion of treatment was 
minimally involved beyond these meetings. of outpatient.314 After they completed 
outpatient, they went on probation proper, continuing to meet with the officer per court 
orders. Its minimum length was also one year, but according to the later director 
Maureen Saylor, “almost everybody [got] five”.315 When the offender went on 
probation, it was the end of the hospital’s official oversight of them. All graduates were 
told that they were members of their groups for the rest of their lives. They were free to 
return to the hospital and their group whenever they wished, to discuss their problems, 
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to provide help to others, or even just to check in. A number did.316 The new system 
promised continuing group oversight of offenders through their release. If, at any time, 
the residents sense that the offender was lapsing into old patterns of thought or behavior 
that preceded his return to offense, they could “pull” the offender back in and return 
him to their previous therapy arrangement.317 The new outpatient program was greeted 
enthusiastically by the residents. The staff considered the innovation a good thing in and 
of itself, but also clear evidence that offenders could meaningfully contribute to the 
creation of the program architecture.318 Therefore, these “conferences” between higher-
level group members and program staff became the program’s default method of 
brainstorming improvements and troubleshooting issues.  
At the start of 1968, the program was beginning to grow rapidly, and the 
changes were piling up. The low cost of the program compared to prison and the 
attested lower recidivism rates attracted notice in the court system. Commitments had 
leaped in the two years before 1968. Between 1957 and 1966, the annual admittance 
rate had a median of 36 when exempting the outlier year 1962-1963. The number 
ultimately retained in the program was about 18 new patients in a given year.319 The 
strain made itself known quickly. The 1966 new arrivals of were initially moved into 
the preexisting group, resulting in a group that brushed near forty men.320 The 27 men 
in treatment found themselves wholly preoccupied with evaluating the new arrivals and 
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could not give each other adequate attention in group.321 Unable to maintain a 
therapeutic environment, the men created a regime of control over the new arrivals and 
each other. Group discipline became “authoritarian” and arbitrary, rather than 
treatment-oriented. The decay in quality was not because of a lack of supervision. The 
closer oversight procedures established in the wake of the 1964 suicide allowed 
MacDonald to notice the trend quickly. He was not, however, able to direct the therapy 
to meaningful ends by administrative intervention. Guiding the sessions did not solve 
problems with disenfranchisement, and unspecified “irresponsible behavior” continued 
to rise.322  
MacDonald, after consideration, fingered the expanding group size as the 
primary problem. No matter what was done by the clinician, he thought, if a group had 
close to forty people, the residents could not engage with each other. He split the 
program into two "virtually identical” therapy groups of ~20 residents.323 MacDonald 
thought around 20 residents had been “maximal for efficient operation".  It allowed for 
every resident to have time to speak in a session and get to know their fellows well, 
without becoming overly attached to each other and unwilling to confront behavior. The 
two groups elected their own group leadership. They acted independently of one 
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another. The leaders convened to talk about tactics and to gauge the program’s 
aggregate progress.324 
Splitting the group had instant results. Residents became engaged with each 
other and with the group sessions again. “Irresponsible behavior” declined dramatically. 
In this initial “split” to two groups, the groups remained physically close together and 
were in frequent contact. These two groups were led by different leaders who followed 
different agendas, but the two could easily keep tabs on the other. 325 By October 1968, 
the expanding patient population led the program to split off another new group, which 
was housed outside of the “headquarters” in North Hall.326 The distance marked a new 
challenge. It cut early-stage offenders, who had limited grounds privileges, off from the 
other groups’ residents. The offenders still “dined together”, but there were so many of 
them that they could not possibly get to know everyone at meals alone. Group leaders 
found they had difficulty keeping abreast of the developments in the other groups, and 
difficulty maintaining intergroup procedures. The program had another all-group 
conference. The staff and residents arrived at twice-monthly town hall style meetings as 
the solution. The new meetings were effective. The staff trumpeted their success in the 
1970 Annual Report, underlining that residents had been essential in developing these 
changes.327 
MacDonald was initially unfazed by the program’s growing population and 
limited financial support. He believed that an increasing number of smaller groups 
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would not demand a great increase in administrative oversight. Proportional staff 
increases were not necessary. Because the therapy was primarily resident-driven, as 
long as there remained adequate staff for oversight within each group, the groups could 
effectively manage themselves. A larger administration might prevent the occasional 
escape, but it would not give the offender higher-quality treatment. The program could 
not be managed into effective therap. The treatment was in the hands of the participant 
offenders. The groups had to be given sufficient resources and privileges to encourage 
cooperation, be kept small, and be allowed to run themselves.328  
"[We] have confidence that the program can meet the new problems...of 
increasing size, increasing complexity of services, and of increasing critical 
appraisal...[as] its substance is people: patients, staff and volunteers who believe 
in the untapped self-help capabilities of the offenders themselves..."  
George MacDonald et. al., Treatment Of the Sex Offender, 9 
As MacDonald’s administration continued, his perceived success brought the 
program further attention and further commitments. MacDonald sensed the growing 
interest and projected ~80-90 admissions for observation to the program from the 
summer of 1968 to the summer of 1969. The reality was only slightly below his 
expectations. 67 offenders were admitted in 1968 and 76 more in 1969. The program 
became more selective to compensate, cutting the acceptance rate to ~42%, but this did 
little to stop the overflow.329 From 1967 to 1969, the group was seeing three times the 
number of new arrivals than before.330 The situation developed in the next three years, 
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as commitments rose near-exponentially.331Accordingly, the program split off a new 
group at least once a year for five consecutive years.332 This was not the result of a 
"prosecution boom" of sex offenders. There was only an 8% increase in the number of 
commitments to both adult corrections and the Sexual Psychopath program at the 
time.333 Instead, there was a dramatic increase in percentage of those sent to the 
offender rehabilitation program, rather than Corrections. From July 1961 to June 1970, 
this percentage skyrocketed from 37 to 68%.334 The suspicious policeman in Safe To Be 
At Large? was being overruled by hopeful prosecutors and justices.  
The groups were originally named based on their positons within the hall and on 
the Western State campus – East Group, West Group, North Group, and so on – but as 
the groups proliferated, the program switched to more poetic names. As of mid-1976, 
the groups were North, East, South, West, Friendship, Star, Rainier, Brotherhood, Echo, 
Aquarius, Sunrise and Evergreen.335  
The program’s population rose as Western State Hospital’s population fell. 
Governor Daniel Evans was a strong supporter of the Western State program but was a 
strong advocate for deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill. Under his tenure, funding 
for mental institutions declined accordingly.336 In 1966, Western State had an average 
daily population, or ADP, of 1770 patients. About 25 of those at any given time were 
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sexual psychopath commitments.337 In 1971, the hospital’s average daily population had 
dropped to 1,124 patients, including an average of 125 sex offender commitments at 
any given time.338 Western State’s budget fell alongside its population numbers. The 
1973-1975 Biennial Budget projections for Washington list the budgeted figures for the 
state’s mental institutions generally, but do not break down the budget and expenditures 
of each hospital. The “general trend”, however, is clear: the budget for mental 
institutions in Washington dipped from ~16,082,000 to ~14,528,000 from 1970 to 1972, 
with a further proposed decline to ~12,167,000 by 1974.339 Simultaneously, Northern 
State Hospital in Sedro-Wooley was closed in 1973, with its remaining patients 
“discharged” either to Western State, to community care, or, most often, to the 
Greyhound station.340 The program was, in a twist of fate, no longer attempting to 
discharge offenders to free up ward space for  “civilian” patients. Instead, it was 
claiming more and more disused space from a hospital system that was being cut to the 
bone. 
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Figure 4: Stills from the 1966 Documentary "The Sexual Offender: Safe To Be At Large?”  
The stills show, from left to right, show: Dr. George MacDonald, one of the program’s founders; 
a group session, showing the group leaders by the tape recorder; a wider view of the group, with 
the tape recorder on full display; the end of a conjugal visit, with the father handing his child 
back to his wife; the same conjugal visit in progress, with North Hall in the background; and two 
offenders sitting on the lawn during recreation.  
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MacDonald and Williams were refining the group’s understanding of itself at 
the same time they were changing its procedures so dramatically. With the arrival of 
MacDonald, the “group” as an entity both in and out of therapy took on much more 
weight in the program. Mees and di Furia had created “the group”, but the group living 
situation’s contribution to therapy had not been fully realized. They observed the 
group’s constant exposure to itself had positively affected the ability of offenders to 
gauge the attitude and commitment of their fellows. The group was not merely more 
familiar with the offender’s problems, but better able to read his emotions and tell when 
he was hiding something. 341 As one report put it, “A man who can readily con even a 
skilled psychiatrist finds it hard to con 15 fellow-offenders with whom he has been 
living in close quarters for 168 hours a week, week after week.”342  On a more reflexive 
level, the group understood that the news media would present the residents as a 
homogenous group. If one member slipped, the entire program would be under public 
criticism. The group’s public vulnerability was, accordingly, “leverage” against an 
offender that pushed him to mind his behavior.343 All of Mees and di Furia’s 
observations were predicated on how a group member acted toward other members and 
the “public audience”, rather than how the group might accomplish the program’s 
mission of reforming the individual.344 Further, the group thus formulated only offered 
risks for it participants. The threat of confrontation and shame within the session and 
                                                        
341 di Furia and Mees, “Legal and Psychiatric Problems”, 984; di Furia, "On the Treatment and 
Disposition of Sexual Offenders, 630; Wojtech, “The Unmasking of a Sexual Psychopath”, 1-2. 
342 Brecher, Treatment Programs, 16. 
343 di Furia, "On the Treatment and Disposition of Sexual Offenders, 630-631; The Sex Offender: Safe to 
Be At Large? KWSC-TV. 
344 Rigert, "Group Therapy Program at WSH Aids Patients". 
  
95 
 
the threat of a wrathful public sending him to prison was seen as pressure to stay in line, 
rather than incentive to change.  
MacDonald observed that the group was more than a pressure cooker.  “Group 
membership” was also “group belonging”, and the offender’s newfound inclusion 
fundamentally changed his understanding of himself. As previously stated, the offender 
was thought to be emotionally distant, resulting in social isolation. When he entered the 
group, he was forced to become emotionally open under threat of expulsion. In the short 
term, he would “play along”, if nothing else, confessing his sins and completing tasks to 
appease the others and maintain his membership.345 When his efforts met with 
approbation and acceptance, MacDonald thought, the offender would discover his fears 
of socialization were exaggerated. He would see how the other offenders were helped 
by his criticism and his attention.346 It wasn’t easy for the offender to put himself in the 
open, and he would lower his internal defenses slowly, fearful of facing the reality of 
his crimes.347 He was not alone, however, and as he came to accept how he had hurt his 
victims, he saw how others in his group avoided reality, and pushed them to come to the 
same realization. He revealed a side of himself that he had never seen before, a side of 
him that helped others, rather than hurt them.348 He achieved a lasting emotional 
satisfaction that was previously absent. His cooperation would turn into active 
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investment of himself in the group as he pursued this new feeling. A new, positive self-
image was built up by habit.349 During a confrontation, the group asked the offender 
how he felt about his place in the group. By asking, the group ensured that the offender 
knew the way he felt was important, even if it very forcefully disagreed with him. His 
presence was something the group ostensibly thought was worth keeping. At the end of 
treatment, the offender had found happiness and peace in living in the open. They 
would stop hurting others not only to avoid the consequences, but because they found 
greater happiness in a new, positive lifestyle and a new, positive self.350 For 
MacDonald, the group was more than a mirror that the offender could not escape. The 
group was a mirror where he could see himself smile for the first time.   
The change in the program’s theoretical understanding was accompanied by 
further development of the group structure. The most obvious aspect of this move was 
the creation of “steps”. Previously, the group was a self-managed but open-ended 
environment. While the internal issues of the offenders were believed to be much the 
same, the path to overcoming them was intentionally left minimally described. “Where” 
a resident stood on the path to success was determined by the other group members 
according to whatever criteria, explicit or unstated, they chose.351 MacDonald, working 
with the groups, began laying out a series of necessary “realizations”, behaviors and 
tasks to move from “offender” to “ex-offender”. The groups then drafted their own set 
of “steps” that each member had to fulfill.352 The “steps” approach soon solidified into a 
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program module in of itself. The steps were a hierarchy of privileges and 
responsibilities. Offenders who were admitted to the program past the observation 
period were placed on Step One. Every two weeks, the offender could ask to be 
promoted to the next step.353 To reach the next step, the offender had to have shown 
themselves to be accomplished in the capacity that the step in question “tested”, and to 
have been a model resident.354 Promotions from “member” to “junior leader” to 
“leader” were limited to those who had reached a certain level. Step Seven was 
accordingly the most important, as reaching it made the offender eligible to become a 
group’s co-leader.355 Each step had certain tasks and character requirements. For 
example, an offender had to write and present a comprehensive report on the nature of 
their sexual offense(s) for Step Five. The report’s focus was what had led the offender 
to commit his specific crimes, what choices or signs were apparent before he violated 
someone, and how he could avoid lapsing into a cycle of offense going forward.356 
What a resident was expected to learn and do as part of the group was thereby 
standardized within the group, creating benchmarks of progress. Different groups had 
different progressions, but the vast majority of the goals were the same across the 
program.357 Every offender would know the road ahead of them, what they needed to 
achieve, and what they needed to help others achieve. 
This expectation of honesty was joined by an expectation of vigilance. It was 
assumed that since everyone in the program had committed sexual offenses, they had to 
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have serious socialization problems. The members had to closely watch one another for 
signs of these patterns or for signs they were hanging on to their deviant sexuality. If a 
group member believed another was lapsing into old behavioral patterns, or was 
behaving inappropriately in any way, he was obligated to confront the other offender on 
their actions. The group’s goal with these “confrontations” was less to determine if 
someone had violated group protocol, but to determine why they had done so. A 
resident who had been slacking on the job might have been hiding something, fearful of 
the group’s response. He could also have viewed himself as “smart” and “above” the 
others for refusing to participate in the work, as he knew the group would do his share 
to keep the program’s good image.358 Once an issue or a transgression was brought 
before the group, all members had a chance to speak on the matter before the group 
decided a course of action.359  
The refinement of the group disciplinary procedure also showed the increasing 
prominence of the group as a collective entity. Each individual group drafted their own 
ground rules for behavior. Certain rules were common throughout all groups on the 
program, but in addition, each group set their own “code” which governed their group 
sessions and the general conduct of that group’s members. These codes gave 
expectations of participation and self-discipline, as well as proscribed certain actions 
beyond the program wide rules. Generally, a transgression resulted in a curtailment of a 
privilege. The code, however, only specified what not to do. Each punishment was 
awarded uniquely. The primary goal was to relate the offender’s wrongdoing to the 
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particular problems of character and socialization that his transgression had 
shown.360Groups also imposed additional restrictions on individual members, based on 
their individual habits and the needs of their treatment. For example, a used car 
salesman had used his gift of gab to talk around his problems. He was prohibited from 
speaking outside of group, to prevent him from using charm to avoid scrutiny.361 To 
complement this point, almost everything the offender did was qualified as a privilege, 
subject to removal at the group’s discretion.362 The group was an agent of targeted, 
shifting control, rather than an enforcement agency carrying out defined punishments 
for defined rules. Every member was to participate in the enforcement of proper 
behavior, forcing them to consider the meaning and purpose of the rules, as well as the 
letter of them. 
The admissions process was reconfigured to make the group a central figure. 
The offender was put into a group on a tentative basis during his ninety-day observation 
evaluation.363 This was now his group, for however long he stayed in the program. The 
new offender observed the group’s sessions for the first few days, learning about their 
fellow residents and the everyday pattern. They received their group’s manual. It 
outlined the gist of the treatment philosophy, the group’s procedures, and a few 
practical details about life on their ward. Each group had slightly different “steps” and 
procedures, and each wrote their own manual for new arrivals.364  
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After a few days immersing themselves in the environment, the inductee had to 
write an autobiography that covered the important events of their life, their offenses, 
and their feelings throughout. The group reviewed it for its honesty, totality, and 
insight. For the first point, they could request access to police reports and court records. 
01 suggested this was rarely done, but the option was available.365 The staff and group 
expected the new resident would protest his innocence or downplay the severity his 
actions. They allowed it at first.366 If the group found the autobiography insufficiently 
revealing, they would tell the inductee to rewrite it.367 Most offenders had to rewrite 
their autobiography at least once.368 While he wrote his autobiography, he was assigned 
his first job, which was always on the group’s ward. Once his autobiography was 
accepted, he became a full participating “speaking member” in the group. The other 
full-time committed residents monitored his state and progress over the rest of the 
ninety days.369  When the end of his observation approached, the group had a special 
session where it determined whether or not an offender would be accepted. The senior 
staff had the final word on admittance, but they generally followed the group’s choice: 
in 1974, they followed the group’s decision 85% of the time. If the staff and group 
disagreed, the leaders and staff would meet to discuss what had divided them and what 
each party could better bear in mind in the future.370 If the offender was accepted, he 
                                                        
365 01 Interview Transcript,  
366 Brecher, Treatment Programs,  
367 Hendricks, Some Effective Change Inducing Mechanisms, ; MacDonald et. al., Treatment of the Sex 
Offender: Ten Years, 2; The Sex Offender: Safe to Be At Large? KWSC-TV; Denenberg, “Sex Offenders 
Treat Themselves”, 60. 
368 Bill Ripple, “No ‘Ruzickas’ in WSH now”, The News Tribune (d.uk.); Denenberg, “Sex Offenders 
Treat Themselves”, 60.  
369 Brecher, Treatment Program, 15; Wojtech, “This Is The First Time Anyone Bothered To Give Me 
Some Hope…”; 
370 Brecher, Treatment Program, 15; Denenberg, “Sex Offenders Treat Themselves”, 59. 
  
101 
 
was officially “on the ladder” at Step One and went from an “observation man” to a 
“resident” proper. He had officially begun his treatment.  
 
Figure 5: Two women volunteers listen to an offender talk during a group session. From Louise 
Wojtech, "Volunteers play role in rehabilitation", The Daily Olympian, Olympia, WA (October 
22nd, 1970). 
As MacDonald and Williams dramatically reinvented the concept of the 
therapeutic group, they sought to expand the program’s methods to capitalize on other 
potential avenues to rebuild the offender’s character. In their new efforts, they 
maintained their focus on improving the offender’s ability to socialize and relate with 
others. The volunteer program was their first target for overhaul. They had sought to 
make the program less "insular" and more reflective of the problems and temptations 
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residents would face on release. Lectures on etiquette were not equivalent to practicing 
keeping good conduct in the face of daily aggravations or more acute emotional 
disruptions. They also interrupted the group’s internal analytical process with outside 
pedagogy. In the program’s view, offenders had to be confronted with “true” 
socialization, with real people who might harbor great anger against them for their 
actions or profound indifference to their problems.  Granting the offenders more 
involvement with the outside world before work release, however, wasn’t feasible 
without a major change in the program’s structure to a partially outpatient modality, 
which the State had previously refused for a number of reasons. 
The program’s solution was to bring what it thought offenders found the most 
challenging – socialization – inside, to the offenders. The program began assigning 
volunteers to group sessions. The program used volunteer pairs – one man and one 
woman in each, whenever possible. The pair would no longer give lectures or engage in 
discussions of topics. Instead, they simply sat in and weighed in on the group’s 
discussion when they thought it appropriate. 371 The program found that many men were 
extremely poor at handling the presence of a woman in any capacity, and that their 
presence during group almost paralyzed some of them. One offender couldn’t speak to 
the woman volunteer assigned to the group, and instead tried to tug at her hair to get her 
attention.372 In 1968, the volunteer initiative earned the program another vocal 
supporter. Jerry Holzinger, a popular Seattle talk show host, joined as a volunteer, and 
found the work so rewarding that he joined the program staff, staying with the program 
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until the end of the 1970’s. His presence significantly raised the program’s profile, and 
the number of volunteers jumped from four in July 1969 to ten in June 1970.373  
As MacDonald became more confident in the new model, he began introducing 
group psychodrama, a traditional therapeutic tool.374 The group psychodrama had a 
number of operating elements. To help the reader get a sense of their character, an 
example session has been included as Appendix B. Generally, the sessions were 
intentionally artificial situations in which the volunteers would roleplay all sorts of 
figures - strangers, potential romantic interests, a woman coworker. Sometimes, some 
of the men would take on a role as well, but most often the men were to play 
themselves. The resident would then have to accomplish some sort of basic 
socialization goal, such as asking a woman out on a date or telling them about their 
criminal past. Sometimes, the conversations were primarily exercises in empathy, such 
as when the woman roleplayed as the mother of a victim.375 The volunteers recruited 
were largely women.376 The program believed the vast majority of sexual offenses, 
regardless of the victim's age, were rooted in an inability to have a healthy, emotionally 
open relationship with an adult woman.377 For that reason, women volunteers were 
essential. While staff preferred a man and a women working as a “couple”, to provide a 
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male model of healthy interaction, they were unable to find as many men who were 
agreeable volunteers.378  
 There were a number of rules to keep the sessions as safe as possible. Touching 
the volunteers, except for extremely limited contact initiated by the volunteer, was 
forbidden.379 The volunteers themselves were screened for any emotional issues. They 
were given a handbook to read which detailed what would happen in a session and what 
to expect, then asked to sit in on some sessions as an observer. In later years, they were 
also given some training in offender rehabilitation to prepare them.380 These sessions 
were eventually given set for all groups at Tuesday, from 2 to 4 P.M. The time was 
chosen to allow the group’s therapy supervisor to sit in on the meetings. The result of 
these precautions meant that there were very few incidents, and none resulted in a 
serious assault.381 The primary issue was, instead, romantic relationships between the 
residents and the women volunteers.382 The program explicitly preferred married 
women because they [thought] they [were] less likely to become romantically involved 
[with the offenders]..."383 The problem was serious enough that it demanded frequent 
warnings and constant attention from the program staff to prevent it. The Volunteer 
Handbook listed five “expectations” for volunteers. Three of them were:  
- Do not favor or get involved with any one man, 
- Do not meet with anyone outside of standard sessions "without... the approval 
of the [group's] therapy supervisor", and 
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- Do not pursue any kind of private involvement with a resident before, during, 
or after the resident’s stay in the program.384  
In the most grievous breach of these rules, one volunteer "helped a resident escape and 
took off to California".385 These affairs, however, were rare. The program was generally 
effective at screening out “unsuitable” candidates. Despite the large possibility for a 
public outcry, there was never a public scandal of any kind about the use of volunteers, 
giving the program a valuable source of support when talking to figures from the DSHS 
and the Legislature. Because of its powerful effect on the group members and its 
excellent safety record, MacDonald considered the volunteer program the most 
effective supplement to group therapy the program devised.386 
Around the same time, MacDonald and Williams sought to dramatically 
overhaul the way the program worked with married offenders and offenders in long-
term relationships generally. Married offenders were a very large portion of the 
program’s population. The percentage of married offenders hovered around 50% 
through 1968 and humped at around 60% for the first years of the 1970’s.387 On 
admission, the offender’s family, if they had one, was now a particularly intense source 
of stress. The offender’s marriage was threatened if not immediately ended by the 
reveal of his wrongdoing. Further, his wife was under severe emotional strain, coming 
to terms with their husband’s wrongdoing, bearing community shame, and often being 
forced to make major changes to financially survive.388 Many of the married offenders 
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expressed fears of losing their wife and children while he was confined, and sought to 
change his ways specifically so they could return to them.389 MacDonald and the other 
program staff believed their problems at home needed to be addressed for effective 
treatment. Guilt, shame, and unresolved preexisting disputes made the family a great 
deal of stress for the offender. If he was not given a means to see his loved ones and 
work through their problems, the stress might drive him to re-offense.390  Along these 
lines, staff believed that the family was the offender’s best available post-release 
support. Familiarizing the offender’s wife with his internal problems would give the 
offender someone who could support him upon release.391 For obvious reasons, the 
program was less explicit in the popular press about its second reason for trying to 
improve these relationships: the offender’s wife was an appropriate, of-age sexual 
partner for child sexual abusers. Encouraging the offender’s attraction to his wife would 
curtail his desire for unacceptable sexual acts and targets.392  
MacDonald began a host of efforts to support these couples, some of which went 
well beyond “therapy” in the traditional sense. The most important of these was the 
aforementioned couple’s therapy program. Women who decided to stay with their 
husbands were “strongly” encouraged to participate. di Furia had started a once-a-
month session for married couples at the end of his initial administration of the 
program. Under MacDonald’s administration, the effort was ramped up drastically to 
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weekly three-hour sessions.393 The population rolls for the program suggest fairly high 
participation. 17 wives were on the rolls in June 1970, two years after the program’s 
debut. That number jumped to 30 by 1973 and 49 by 1976.394 The couples’ sessions 
were conducted within groups, meaning that only the wives of offenders within a 
particular group met. Therefore, the sessions themselves were quite small. A 1972 
outside report observed one group’s couples’ meetings over a few months and reported 
only “three to five” couples participating at any given time.395  
MacDonald’s efforts had a strong basis in the sex offender’s treatment, but 
MacDonald also strongly believed in the importance of family. He thought he needed to 
make sure “the offender… remain[ed] as active as possible in his role of father”, as 
children needed a father figure and that a man’s crimes should not strip his children 
from him.396 With all of these improvements, the staff created a comprehensive 
“program-within-a-program” for offenders with wives, fiancés, or other committed 
long-term relationships. MacDonald’s enthusiasm extended to assisting in forging these 
bonds, under the right conditions:  
“Perhaps the ultimate in the program’s emphasis on strengthening martial and 
family ties has been the celebration of two weddings at the hospital, complete 
with beautiful receptions on the ward…” 397 
 An unintended but positive result of this aspect of the program was that the 
families of offenders were major public advocates for the program. In newspaper and 
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scholarly articles, they testified to the intensity of the therapy and to the positive change 
it had on their husband’s behavior.398  
The program’s bold changes and minimal paper trail were facilitated by a lax 
attitude toward medical experimentation that prevailed in the profession. Regulations on 
experimentation with human subjects were minimal through the end of the 1950’s. For 
psychiatrists and psychologists, the situation was even more lax, and almost no 
oversight personnel or procedures existed. In two famous examples, Kinsey openly 
deceived subjects to obtain their confidence, and Milgram made the subject believe an 
unseen other party was receiving near-fatal electric shocks. The question of “Quis 
custodiet ipsos custodes” began to percolate through the 1960’s, but it was as a point of 
discussion, rather than a point of policy. Major, binding changes to Human Subjects 
research was not instituted until the mid-1970’s.399 Western State Hospital, therefore, 
had few to answer to when it began the “self-guided” sessions.  
The staff’s claims that the program was the only one of its kind in the country 
made it, by definition, experimental. The staff understood this, and they warned their 
colleagues that results may vary. di Furia’s 1966 Northwest Medicine article and 
MacDonald’s 1968 report both stated explicitly that the treatment’s impact should be 
thought uncertain.400 They did not, however, either take the steps necessary to evaluate 
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the treatment’s results or give much thought to how the offender might be impacted 
behaviorally or mentally in the long-term by the self-guided group sessions. As will be 
discussed in greater detail later, the program made few serious inquiries into treatment 
efficacy of the group approach. The end of the self-published reports marked the end of 
this information’s appearance elsewhere. The few surveys taken focused on the 
offender’s change in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory across their time 
in the program and re-offense on release.401 The use of this metric alone is questionable 
as clinical data. Staff took positive comments and appraisals from former group 
members at face value and reiterated them to the popular press as a sign of success.402 
The program never attempted to find out if any problems besides sexual crime emerged 
after an offender’s graduation. The “experiment” effectively never ended. The program 
was not confronted for these gaps by any scientific or academic community. Only 
Washington’s efforts to evaluate the program and actively sought the opinion of Dr. 
Kellogg, Dr. McGovern and other psychiatrists from 1979 on.  
The program was not communicative with the larger academic community, but 
the academic literature of the time does hold a tentative insight into the program’s 
philosophy. The program literature seemed extremely confident that sex offender 
treatment was a sure bet, and that there was no question some sort of therapeutic 
intervention would reap dramatic benefits for the program. This may be because the 
majority view in psychiatry held that sexual offenders were low-recidivism criminals. 
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Kenneth G. Gray and Johann W. Mohr wrote in Sexual Behavior and the Law that "The 
low rate of recidivism for sexual offenses in general has long been recognized.... "403  
Atascadero Hospital listed a rate of 14% recidivism for male homosexual pedophiles 
and 7% for male heterosexual pedophiles.404 The belief in a "one-time" offender was 
shared by members of the criminal justice policymaking community. Sol Rubin, a 
counsel for the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, states that "of all types of 
criminals, sex offenders have one of the lowest repeater rates [sic]...."405 These 
arguments were not accepted wholesale. Gebhard’s 1965 study of sexual offenders 
complained that the existing recidivism studies only surveyed imprisoned offenders, 
which skewed against offenders who didn’t get caught a second time. He therefore 
made no claims on recidivism compared to other criminals and demanded further study 
in the area.406 These doubts, however, were the minority in the field. The program staff 
similarly believed that sex offenders were an especially treatable sort of criminal. If a 
man was captured before his habits became too entrenched and redirected from the 
negative environment of prison, they thought his chances for meaningful change were 
good.407  
The believed certainty of help, however, did not preclude the possibility of 
harm. Questions about informed consent were more prescient at the Western State 
program than in most other circumstances. The overwhelming majority of program 
                                                        
403 Kenneth G. Gray and Johann W. Mohr, “Follow-Up of Male Sexual Offenders“, in Sexual Behavior, 
ed. Slovenko, 745. 
404 ibid, 749. 
405 Psychiatry and Criminal Law, 90-91. 
406 Gebhard, Sex Offenders, 709-711. 
407 The Sex Offender: Safe to Be At Large? KWSC-TV; MacDonald et. al., Treatment Of the Sex 
Offender: Ten Years, 8.  
  
111 
 
initiates sought to join the program to avoid jail. Many also wanted to stop their 
behavior, but avoiding jail was the primary concern for most offenders upon their 
entry.408 MacDonald, in the 1968 report, noted that the majority of those committed to 
the program were declared sexual psychopaths with criminal charges pending a trial. 
Those who had not been charged frequently had struck a deal with the state prosecutor 
in advance of an indictment.409 Therefore, those who left the program would rarely 
return home without a court battle, if not a certain jail sentence. The staff argued that 
the offender was not placed under undue stress in choosing the program or prison. The 
“fork” of a hospital stay or jail time was the reality of the offender’s continued 
wrongdoing.410 If they wished to return to court, they were encouraged to say so. The 
staff wanted no one kept in the program without their consent. Further, the demands on 
treatment involvement with offenders meant they (supposedly) largely controlled what 
was happening in therapy. They were not “guinea pigs”, but “co-participants” in an 
investigation of the possibilities of group therapy. Leadership granted them influence in 
what they did while in therapy well beyond what most test subjects receive.411 The 
program staff were far more concerned with offenders who sought an “easier” term than 
jail and the offenders that the courts refused to withdraw from the program.412 They 
were much less concerned about the possibility that the program did psychological 
damage, and never investigated the long-term effects of their approach. No participant 
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brought a case against the program for being less effective than “advertised” or for 
causing long-term emotional harm.  
The lack of supervision was coupled a lack of academic analysis in general. In 
April of 1971, the program was awarded a Significant Achievement Award by William 
Ogle, on behalf of the APA. His reasoning was simple: “You people happen to have put 
together the elements of correction, education, and medicine…  It is cheap. It is good. It 
works.”413  Tellingly, his knowledge of the program had come from a personal visit. 
When that award was granted, only three nationally available articles had been written 
about the program. All had been written by program staff, and two were part of di Furia 
and Mees’ first batch of articles on the program and were well out of date.414 The fourth 
and last article for five more years arrived in 1972.415 No full-length outside analysis of 
this program was made before Brecher’s 1978 report. One mention of the program, 
from an article criticizing Atascadero, has been quoted earlier in the paper. This was 
one of a handful of “national” mentions found before the turn of the decade.416  
The reason for the coverage deficit was multifaceted. The first and most 
important factor was the staff’s focus on maintaining the support of local law 
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enforcement.417 Academic approval was irrelevant if the program lost the trust of the 
criminal justice system that supported it. Therefore, from the beginning, the program 
prized local support over national psychiatric approbation. In 1965, Dr. Mees gave 
presentations on the program not to academic groups, but to the Pierce County Bar 
Association.418  “Close working relationships” with judges, prosecutors and probation 
officers were cultivated by sending frequent status updates on individual offenders and 
“regular” statistical updates and status reports.419  The staff toured counties with slide 
projection presentations to “advertise” the program to courts that gave it little attention. 
The program even invited “a few probation officers and… superior court judges” to 
visit and “live” in a group for a few days to experience the program firsthand.420 
Maintaining contact with dozens of people about hundreds of cases took up time that 
could have been used to research, write and publish reports for an academic audience.  
Interested parties who couldn’t visit the hospital were limited to mailed “program 
descriptions” of a few pages, and copies of their assorted self-written and published 
reports.421 
The second reason was the scattershot state of sex offender literature at the time. 
As previously stated, only a handful of independent researchers visited the Western 
State program before 1979. This was the norm for sex offender treatment programs at 
the time. Western State was undiscussed because the field in general made few clinical 
enquiries. The first journal dedicated to child abuse, Child Abuse and Neglect, did not 
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begin until 1975, and criminal sexual behavior was not given its own journals until the 
end of the decade. Accordingly, no “formal mechanism” for programs and researchers 
in the field to communicated with one another existed “until the 1980’s”. In an article in 
Commonwealth magazine, Dr. Barbara Schwartz, a renowned expert in sex offender 
treatment, described her introduction to the field: 
“[In 1972], as a mental health clinician in Albuquerque, NM, [Dr. Schwartz] 
was asked to compile a study of how other states treated sex offenders. She 
laughs when recalling her resulting report… “The literature was one half page,” 
she says. She could find only one program in the country even touching on the 
subject.”    - Commonwealth, “A Question of Commitment”. 
 
This lack of knowledge was partially a problem of communication. Research 
and discussion of the sexual offender continued in the 1960’s and 1970’s, even after the 
profession had backtracked on the “sexual psychopath”. The efforts were small, but 
their results were considered significant enough for publication. Numerous articles 
appear on the treatment of sexual offenders in both general journals, such as 
International Psychiatry Clinics, and in specialized organs, such as the previously-
mentioned International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 
and Federal Probation.422 Gebhard’s mammoth 1965 work Sex Offenders: An Analysis 
of Types combined the results of a mammoth survey of convicted felons with assorted 
psychological explanations for the development of the impulse to molest or rape.423 It 
did not describe any treatment methodologies besides individual therapy. A handful of 
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academic studies considered recidivism. These reports gave a small degree of attention 
to existing rehabilitation programs. 424  
Even this research, however, received little attention. It was also almost entirely 
theoretical, or, as in Gebhard’s case, statistical exploration of sex offender psychology. 
To give another example, the International Journal of Offender Therapy… had a 
symposium on the treatment of “sexual offenders” in its second issue of 1972.425 The 
definition of “sex offender” was used broadly to mean anyone in violation of laws on 
sexual behaviors, including prostitutes and (outside the U.S.) pornographers. Over the 
77 pages, no practical approaches are described at all. Some of the observations are 
about patients the practitioner encountered in a rehabilitation program, but the program 
itself is not discussed.426 The offender’s treatment environment, in an ironic reversal of 
the milieu understanding, was not discussed.  
Only the rare piece, such as H.L. Resnik and M.E. Wolfgang’s New Directions 
in the Treatment of Sexual Deviance, broke this pattern and analyzed the practice or 
results of sexual offender treatment.427 These more “practical-minded” surveys were 
rare. Reports that described a program’s day-to-day operations, such as the 1966 report 
on Atascadero, were rarer still.428 What works did detail offender treatment appear to 
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have been state-funded, state-published research, such as Louise Frisbie’s 1969 analysis 
of California’s sex offender treatment initiatives.429 These works received little 
academic notice and were difficult to locate. What programs existed had great difficulty 
ferreting out information about who was attempting treatment, let alone what these 
other programs were doing. Edward Brecher’s 1978 survey noted that program 
administrators were “without exception astonished” to hear that twenty programs 
existed at the time. Most had believed there were only a handful.430  
The dearth of literature did not mean the program was wholly unknown. A 
Wisconsin “sexual psychopath” treatment program inside Waupun State Prison used the 
Western State SOTP as a successful example while asking the state legislature for a 
non-prison inpatient facility of their own.431 In 1974, another program, the Behavioral, 
Emotional, and Attitudinal Development program, was begun at Minnesota Security 
Hospital, taking its approach verbatim from Western State, with explicit credit.432 In 
general, however, the program received little attention in the academic literature. 
Through the mid-seventies, legal critique of the sexual psychopath commitment statues 
and psychoanalysis of the “generalized” offender dominated what little literature there 
was on the psychology and treatment of the sexual offender. Western State, despite its 
local prominence, a nationally-syndicated television documentary and a lauded, distinct 
approach, remained under the professional radar. 
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As there was no academic effort to investigate the program, the program’s 
documentation was limited to what it wrote itself. A flurry of self-published reports 
were written by the program staff in the first half of the 1970’s. The first of these was 
MacDonald and Williams’ 1968 summary of the program’s history and current position. 
It was written to “pull the past together”, give a coherent description of the program’s 
therapeutic target, and describe in brief the program’s development.433 This was 
followed by biannual reports on the program in general, and a half-dozen reports written 
on particular aspects of the program, irregularly published. The biannual reports were 
intended for figures in the justice system and the government. They focused on costs, 
program population, and other demographic information rather than treatment 
philosophy or specific clinical practice. The other articles were primarily intended for 
clinicians and focused on treatment philosophy, methodology, and attempts to gauge the 
program’s results. Due to the lack of outside documentation, much of the available 
information on the program at this time was only documented in these self-published 
papers. 
The staff’s reports had serious problems. Like the documents from the Mees and 
di Furia era, the self-published reports of the MacDonald era described and discussed 
only the principles immediately applicable to their program. Only one document, 
Hendrick’s Some Effective Change Inducing Mechanisms in Operation in The 
Specialized Treatment Program For The Sex Offender (1973), was an exception. The 
reports did not attempt to compare the program to others, did not attempt to square it 
with criminology generally. Much of the reports were simple description, with little 
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analysis or explanation. Only one, Nichol’s “Effect of treatment of the habitual sexual 
offender as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory”, conducted 
anything like an experiment, with a control population, a research goal and clear, 
explicit data.434 The majority conducted some quantitative analysis of the population 
statistics, but it was overwhelmingly focused on resident population demographics. The 
number of offenders in the program is important information, but it is not a substitute 
for This statistical analysis left a lot to be desired. For example, MacDonald and 
Williams’ 1968 retrospective states that according to “hospital records”, the program’s 
recidivism rate was only 8.9%. They give no other information whatever – how long 
they followed an offender after release, what qualified as “recidivism”, the sample size, 
or any other essential information.435 Even simple practical investigation was rare. The 
mechanics of running an inpatient program for treating sexual offenders were left to the 
reader’s imagination.  No report surveyed or studied the actual state of the group 
membership’s accountability to each other and the group, the group member’s ability to 
interact with women, or other program objectives in any fashion outside of Dr. Nichol’s 
personality testing. The program, in aggregate, did not try to determine if the program’s 
efforts resulted in the changes it sought in the offender.  
A closer look at one report helps illustrate these problems. David C. Hall, a 
therapy supervisor, wrote a report on the experimental use of group psychotherapy 
marathons among one group of the program in 1970.436  The marathons were described 
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as  "tri-monthly...20 to 30 hour limited encounter sessions devoted to the voluntary 
revelation and exploration of serious emotional conflicts…"437 The goal of these 
sessions was to concentrate on the building of trust and intimacy between the group 
members, via group confessions. The offender was more emotionally vulnerable in 
these long meetings. Exhaustion, tension, and to no small extent boredom pushed him to 
volunteer more about himself and his feelings to his fellows.438 The length of the 
session meant that all the offenders would have the time to bare their souls to those 
assembled. These confessions were hoped to be inroads for other offenders to learn 
about one another, and perhaps about themselves. By this reflection, Hall postulated the 
group would form deeper emotional connections. Hall believed that a closer emotional 
bond would result in more effective group therapy. If the offender cared for the others 
in his group, he would take their recommendations and censures in later, regular 
sessions to heart. He’d similarly invest more of himself into the rehabilitation of others, 
to help them with their problems. The impact of the group sessions would, theoretically, 
be greatly improved.439 He conducted a number of group marathon sessions to test his 
hypothesis. 
Hall’s account was extremely lacking by any standard. The whole report was 
only three pages, one of which was devoted to an introduction that recapitulated the 
principles of the program writ large. No description of a marathon session was given. 
The actual success of his approach was not measured in any quantitative or qualitative 
way. The four perceived benefits of the technique, presented in a list, are only supported 
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by assertion and arguments to the program’s theoretical underpinnings.440 The report 
stated the intent of the technique for a paragraph, then flatly commented that it 
accomplished those things, without saying how, or why he thought the technique had 
shown its success. The logistics of holding such a long therapy session were not 
described, despite the numerous obvious problems it poses. The obvious problem of 
exhaustion is touted as a means to wear down the offender’s defenses. What to do when 
the interrogator is falling asleep as well is not addressed, and techniques for the therapy 
supervisor to use in such a mammoth  In an offhand remark, Hall noted the marathons 
were particularly useful in teaching the offenders “approaches and techniques” for 
therapy that they can apply to their group sessions. He mentioned this as though it 
needed no introduction. Mention of offender “training” could only be found in one other 
document, and it did not describe it in any detail, either.441  
The report concluded with Hall’s considerations about the possible problems 
with the marathon approach. Critique was rare in the program’s reports, and Hall’s 
cautionary analysis was a welcome note of concern. Hall’s thrust is that the offender’s 
vicious confrontation of one another did not guarantee that the group faced the reality of 
a victim’s pain, or realized they could change.442 A group member was, by a certain 
phase in their treatment, used to detailing their offenses to each other. Their 
confessions, Hall argues, could be more commiseration than revelation. The repeated 
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unearthing of their crimes may have been propagating a sense of shared guilt and 
fundamental wrong in the offender, reaffirming him that he was a “bad boy” who would 
always be damaged, always be distant from others. Fifteen hours of parading his faults 
and finding them reflected in others may only have underlined his identification of 
themselves with his wrongs. Further, if they did find greater intimacy with their fellows 
in a shared experience of pain, they may have simply absorbed the pleasure from it, 
rather than any lessons. "...A group emotional orgasm [Hall’s own words] can be little 
more than an extension of the self-defaming behavior involved in his deviant pursuit of 
sexual gratification".443 When some of the group is not involved in this moment, which 
Hall attested happened in every session, then they feel alienated, frustrated, and 
confused – the same stressful feelings that had fueled their offenses. Even in a group 
theoretically dedicated to their treatment, certain offenders still felt “left out”.  
Hall acknowledged these faults and recommended that "limits [be] set to curtail” 
how much offenders could relish the pleasure of their alienation. He did not describe 
what those limits might be, even in a general sense.444 Hall underestimated the problems 
he raised with this criticism; they struck at the heart of the program’s treatment 
philosophy. The possibility that the group therapy approach facilitated confession, not 
change, applies logically to the use of a group therapy approach regardless of the 
session length. A later outside report stated that marathon sessions were used to “focus 
on” a particular member.445 That is not mentioned here, but regardless, the principles 
underpinning these sessions and the program at larger were the same. Therefore, the 
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possibility that the program engendered talk, not action, permeates the broader course of 
therapy that the program pursued. The program was potentially teaching offenders only 
how to corral their emotions to a “safe” place of discharge, of confession, which 
lightened their emotional burden but made little impact on their perpetuation of violent 
crimes. It was not rehabilitation, only therapy. Hall saw this objection coming but made 
no effort here to address it. He seemed to assume that the program was not obligated to 
assure Washington of its efficacy and that his concerns could be resolved later.  
These reports, in short, were largely glancing blows on the actual efforts the 
program was undertaking on a day-to-day basis. In this case, marathon sessions as an 
actual therapeutic practice remained largely a mystery to the reader, and much of what 
it described about the program raised more questions than answers. The staff were 
aware that their reports had serious deficits. To a certain extent, this was because 
program staff wrote them in their “spare time”. Before the significant hiring spree in 
1971, the amount of spare time the administration had was extremely small.446 The 
presence of only two research personnel hindered the program from undertaking more 
involved, precise projects. This does not excuse, however, the paucity of information 
the final reports contained. The staff defended themselves on the grounds that the 
program was a treatment center, rather than a research facility:  
“The Center has a definite philosophy about research and program 
evaluation activities. First, the Center believes that its primary reason for 
existence is the better protection of society through effective treatment of 
offenders, and therefore research activities should be consistently 
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directed toward practical improvements in the treatment process rather 
than the pursuit of academic or scientific recognition…”447 
 
Their argument would hold water if they had proven their preexisting method of 
treatment successful. The lack of even earnest inquiry into offender recidivism, 
however, make the argument ring hollow. Practical improvements of a treatment 
method which is ineffective is a zero-sum effort. While the reports were better than no 
analysis at all, their numerous blind spots and lack of follow-up study put them below 
the standards of scientific inquiry. The program was narrated, not analyzed.  
William’s 1971 Community Adjustment of Treated Sex Offenders delivered the 
first formal survey of recidivism made by the program, a survey plagued by many of the 
same problems as the reports in general. Williams followed twenty-four offenders 
designated "safe to be at large" and conditionally released as program graduates 
between January 1st, 1968 and June 30th, 1970. Seventy-five percent of those released 
had been charged with assorted offenses against minor females. Only two offenders 
apiece who had raped adult women or molested minor males were counted, while the 
remaining two were exhibitionists. This data on what patients were likely to see release 
is no Williams underlined that the re-offenses had been primarily with exhibitionist 
offenders, for exhibition offenders. There had been no rearrests for violent assault and 
child molestation. He concluded that “society’s prime concern” were being effectively 
managed by the program.448 The very small sample size of this report and its lack of 
long-term follow-up were not noted. Williams appeared to believe the primary concern 
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would be whether or not the survey was successfully caught all re-offenses, which he 
assures the reader it did: “…Program staff are fairly confident that the data is valid, 
because of the very close surveillance of the men by the program and probation officer 
during their first year of conditional release.”449 In time, the questions that the program 
staff left unanswered would return to haunt them. 
In some of these reports, there is a figure listing the number of offenders that 
biennium who were sent back to court with recommendations for community release, 
without treatment or incarceration. This category seems beyond the hospital’s authority 
to demarcate, but in keeping with their general reticence, only one of the reports 
explained why this option existed. The hospital was not recommending anyone be 
released without a jail term or treatment of some kind. The “Community Release” 
classification was instead the program’s classification for the non-correctional 
commitment of offenders to other programs. The other programs were not sex offender 
treatment – there was almost no sex offender treatment elsewhere in the state, public or 
private. It was also not the immediate graduation of the offender to the outpatient 
portion of the hospital’s program. Rather, it sought to offer a non-jail option for sex 
offenders with mental health or substance abuse problems that were not amenable to 
treatment by the program’s method. Offenders referred to the program for observation 
were evaluated in three areas: 
-Were they a sexual psychopath? 
-Were they amenable to treatment? 
- Were they safe to be at large?450 
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Figure 6: a weekly schedule of the program. From Guided Self-Help: A New Approach 
To Treatment of Sexual Offenders, Annual Report July 1973-June 1974, Western State 
Hospital, Steilacoom, WA (1974), “T.P.S.O Schedule”, 21. 
 
The first two questions were folded into one four-class system. If the hospital 
found the offender was a sexual psychopath amenable to treatment, then they were 
eligible for the program. If they fell into the other three categories, they were 
disqualified from the program. It was the designation used to “screen” those considered 
ill-suited for the program out of it. The third qualification, however, was different. The 
hospital superintendent could state to the court that, in their opinion, the offender was or 
was not safe to be at large. If the latter, the offender would be directed either back to 
court or into the program, depending on the finding of the previous two questions. If the 
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former, the hospital suggested the court to acquit the offender of their charges and 
release them into the community either with or without supervision. This was not just a 
theoretical possibility. Of 140 offenders evaluated from January 1968 to June 1970, 109 
were classified as “not safe” and necessitating some sort of intervention, 18 were 
classified as “safe with community supervision and treatment”, and three were 
classified as “safe to be at large” outright.451 This phenomenon received little comment 
in the program’s material. It was a point of such little concern that, as of 1971, “the 
Center [had] no… system of feedback to learn whether the committing courts followed 
[their] recommendations [of release] …”452 To the Center’s credit, these were 
suggestions, not decrees, and the court had the choice to overrule their decision if they 
believed the Center mistaken. “Informal feedback indicate[d]” that, overall, the 
program’s suggestions were followed for at least the majority of the 21 offenders in 
question.453 The majority of these offenders, according to one source, were senile 
elderly, chronic alcoholics, or offenders with a developmental disability. The 
“confrontational” approach of the program was irrelevant, as these offenders were not 
fully aware of their actions and could not engage with others or control themselves. 
They needed a different form of treatment. What “treatment programs” or “supervision” 
existed to assist these offenders was not described. One source vaguely states they were 
“appropriate community treatment facilities”. Most likely, these offenders were sent to 
facilities explicitly designed for their particular problem, be it alcoholism, dementia or  
something else, that had the security to handle escape-risk clients. Whatever it was, 
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program authorities thought it sufficient and used it with double-digit percentages of 
offenders through the end of the decade.454  
There was one notable therapeutic method tested in the program that 
MacDonald did not explore. In 1965, Dr. Mees conducted an experiment in “aversion 
treatment” on an offender. “Unpleasant stimulation” was used over 13 weeks in 1965 to 
change a patient’s “sado-masochistic masturbatory fantasies…to normal heterosexual 
ones”. The full report cited in the paper was never published. No later report mentions 
this experiment in aversive conditioning.455 Mees was ahead of his time. This 
unpublished report is one of the earliest mentions of aversive conditioning with a sex 
offender in the clinical literature, and perhaps the first within a codified treatment 
program. Papers describing experiments in conditioning human beings with aversion 
therapy appeared sporadically from the 1940’s on, but they were generalized to all sorts 
of behaviors. In the 1960’s, behavioral psychologists became very interested in 
reconditioning homosexual men, seeking to make them heterosexual. A number of 
studies, some quite comprehensive, were undertaken. Pedophiles or rapists, however, 
did not get the same attention by other conditioning practitioners until the early 1970’s, 
and those efforts took until the end of the decade to reach wide acceptance.456  
Despite the promising result initially shown, MacDonald chose not to pursue 
aversive conditioning. The program’s failure to capitalize on Mees’ innovation was 
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uncharacteristic, considering his success and the generally experimental environment of 
the program. It was the result of the program’s change in treatment goals during 
MacDonald’s ascendance. Mees’ experiment took place at the end of di Furia’s tenure. 
At that time, the “deviant desire” of the offender was thought a product of his negative 
mindset. Their desire was a very literal outgrowth of their internal maladjustment. It had 
no staying power of its own. Making offenders understand how their violations hurt 
others would make the offenses unappealing, and the offender’s need to resort to 
violation would fade as they adopted a healthier self-understanding.457 As the “group” 
approach cohered under MacDonald, desire and mindset were increasingly divorced 
from one another. Di Furia’s understanding was still correct: the desire to violate others 
grew from a negative self-image and a mindset of rejection. However, as it became 
entrenched in habit, it took on a life of its own. It was not satisfying, but it was, for that 
moment, pleasurable. The staff considered desire something that was beyond the 
capacity of the group to eliminate: “the program has learned that most offenders will 
continue to have deviant desires [through and after] treatment”.458 Desire was more 
diffuse and non-negotiable than the practical evidence of behavior that it left. Building a 
will within the offender to stop their negative actions was considered a more achievable 
goal. Attempting to dull particular deviant stimuli would start a task – eliminating 
deviant desire – that could not be finished. Following the Mees experiment, MacDonald 
made a complete commitment to the patient self-help group as the sole mode of therapy. 
Attempts to uproot the offender’s deviant desire directly were set aside for the decade, 
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and the strategy of conditioning did not come back on the program’s radar until 1981. 
Ironically, it was this delay in beginning aversive conditioning that made the program a 
target of later criticism.459 
MacDonald thought the program was revolutionary. In his view, "[our] so-called 
‘behavior modification’ treatment approach [was] in absolute contrast to the [standard] 
psychoanalytic approach” that dominated the analyst’s understanding of the offender.460 
Writing the reports, the staff laid a lot of emphasis on the originality of Western State’s 
treatment modality.461 di Furia had already claimed their program was unique, and he 
and MacDonald would continue to claim their program was the only one of its sort in 
the country through the mid-seventies.462 These claims became increasingly inaccurate 
over the 1960’s. Atascadero attached themselves to the “therapeutic milieu” 
understanding as quickly as Western State did, and from the available history on similar 
programs in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, it seems that group therapy for offenders 
was in fact very common.463 This is not to say the program was not a major pioneer in 
the field. The program’s choice to have offenders lead the sessions was truly novel, and 
few programs had such frequent sessions coupled with an intensive outpatient program. 
By 1968, Dr. Geraldine Boozer had solidified a program in Florida which explicitly 
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copied Western State’s modality, down to the principle of resident leadership.464 In 
general, however, these claims of originality speak more to the staff’s ignorance 
through the 1970’s of programs elsewhere than of the actual state of sex offender 
treatment.465 
The program slowly moved from regional attention to scattered national interest. 
As previously stated, discussion of this program was nearly nonexistent in the 
professional literature. Other clinicians, however, were interested in learning about its 
approach, and wrote the program directly. One letter came from Dr. Rogers, the director 
of Health and Rehabilitative services in Florida, in August 1972. MacDonald responded 
with a collection of reports and an invitation to tour, tagged with his succinct summary 
of the program: “…it works, it is as cheap or cheaper than prison, and it is 
duplicable.”466 Dr. Rogers was invited to send a member “or two” of his staff to tour 
and to write again if he had any further questions.467 A woman in British Columbia 
wrote to Williams, and he sent her a collection of documents and invited her to a full 
day tour of the facility.468 This resulted in a visit from “representatives of the Canadian 
Government”. At times, the visit was a mutual exchange: a treatment program in 
Minnesota sent a consultant for a seminar on sex offender treatment.469 The discussion 
of the program was, through this period, limited to this kind of change.  
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The program’s explosion in population rapidly taxed staffing levels. As early as 
1968, staffing was "critical[ly short]". For the care itself, the problem was easily fixed 
by the addition of "only one or two [more] trained clinical staff”.470 However, the 
"secondary" efforts of "program development, evaluation, research and interpretation" 
required at least two new dedicated professionals in MacDonald’s view.471 He 
suggested that this be undertaken by patient graduates - "one...to work with the 
outpatients, parole staff and community agencies....[and] two others...to work as 
research aides..."472 However, there was no follow through on their request until 1971, 
when the state finally allotted it a substantial budget increase to hire more staff. 
MacDonald and Williams wrote to the Department of Social and Health with a 
considered proposal. The program did not want a proportional increase in staff numbers. 
While some support staff were necessary, the numbers could be drastically less than a 
“normal” psych ward. MacDonald and William’s proposal, in fact, asked for three 
fewer ward attendants and the reduction in hours of one nurse from their previous 
allotment.473 The offenders were expected to take care of themselves, their living space, 
and monitor one another. They did not need staff to do it for them, and to have staff do 
it for them would derail attempts to make the offenders more personally responsible. 
Therefore, MacDonald and Williams instead sought to proliferate the number of staff 
therapists, giving each group a dedicated staff leader. MacDonald and Williams, 
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however, considered the qualification and duties of the state position classifications 
previously used too divergent from the actual job to continue their use.474 
“Psychologists” and “Psychiatrists” were trained to deal with the disturbed, not the 
maladjusted, and “Psychiatric Social Workers” were overqualified to work at the level 
the position demanded.  
To fill the needs of the program, the two wrote their own, new classifications for 
“Therapy Supervisors”.475 The duties of their new classification differed in principle 
and in practice from most therapy positions. To reiterate, in the Western State program, 
the initiative for treatment was laid with the individual. The Therapy Supervisors did 
not create detailed psychological profiles of each offender and did not conduct 
individual therapy. They did not even attend the majority of group sessions. The other 
residents, gathered in group, were the offender’s “therapists” and inquisitors, and he 
was, in turn, theirs. The new therapy supervisors had to be good organizers who could, 
alongside their resident group leader, guide their specific group’s reformation. They had 
to be intimately familiar with the members of their group and assist in their progress as 
best they could. The four tiers of the position were divided “according to the degree of 
responsibility” the therapist undertook. For example, a Therapy Supervisor II needed a 
B.A. degree with a behavioral or social science major, and a year of experience as a 
Therapy Supervisor I or experience within a similar group program. A Therapy 
Supervisor IV needed a M.A. in the “clinical field” and three years of clinical 
experience.476 With these classifications, MacDonald and Williams sought to intensify 
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the group dynamic by adding additional oversight, as well as keep costs at the low 
levels the program had maintained for a decade.477 The program staff and 
Superintendent di Furia wrote to an ascending line of Division of Mental Health 
officials over three months, asking that their new classifications be accepted. It took 
directly appealing to Dr. William Conte, the then-Deputy Secretary of the DSHS and a 
long-time supporter of the program, to gain approval.478  
MacDonald had a secondary aim with introducing these new classifications. He 
wanted to hire program graduates to work with the program full-time. His reasoning 
was the same that endorsed a “self-help” group in the first place: “it takes one to know 
one”.479 MacDonald strongly believed that the input and presence of the other residents 
was essential to the program's success. They were personally familiar with a 
maladaptive cycle of sexual abuse. More importantly, they were personally familiar 
with the difficulties of living with their guilt and living a lie. They could look into the 
daily life of another and find, in certain behaviors and attitudes, the same doubt and 
uncertainty that had driven them to violate other people.480 He took this point to its 
logical conclusion: the right offender could lead rehabilitation as well as any trained 
professional. di Furia and Mees had believed in this as well, but it was not until 
MacDonald that the program began hiring graduates.481  
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Before the revision of classifications, there were few positions which the 
standard offender was qualified for. The only position a graduated offender was 
qualified for, provided they had sufficient schooling, was Hospital Attendant or Clinical 
Aide, and there were at least two offenders hired as such before the new classification 
scheme was implemented.482 For most, the program instead allowed them to volunteer. 
Their labor was limited to clerical duties such as typing reports and tabulating figures. 
Some of those who did these jobs were listed as contributors on the reports.483 With the 
new classifications of Therapy Supervisors, MacDonald made the goal of having 
graduates lead residents in therapy a reality. It took a little while, however, for this goal 
to be fulfilled. The program first employed them as full-time research assistants and 
statisticians, positions that amounted to extensions of their previous clerical work on 
reports, as such labor was rightfully thought “desperately needed”.484  When this need 
was satisfied, he recruited program graduates to serve as therapy supervisors. Any 
program graduate with a high school diploma was eligible to become a Therapy 
Supervisor Aide. Those who did well in the position were encouraged to return to 
college. From there, they were only limited in their advancement by their ability to 
progress in higher education.   
Of the graduate-employees, the most prominent was Larry R. Hendricks. He 
went through the program shortly after Williams arrived as associate director. Upon his 
graduation, he started working in the program as a Clinical Aide, and completed a 
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Bachelor of Arts degree at a local college “by way of in-service training”.485 As he 
gained experience, he moved further up the ladder, and by 1973, he was a Therapy 
Supervisor II in charge of his own group.486 By 1977, he reached Therapy Supervisor III 
and was appointed the director of the Lifeboat drug offender program. His contributions 
to the program went beyond major professional positions. He was also the sole program 
graduate to independently write a published paper on the program. His 1973 work, 
“Some Effective Change-Inducing Mechanisms in Operation in the Specialized 
Treatment Program for the Sex Offender”, was one of the program’s series of self-
published reports. Unlike the others, it was a standalone, serious work that attempted to 
place the program’s methodology within contemporary academic literature of sociology 
and criminology. Hendricks related the then-popular formulation of “out-group” 
psychology to the understanding of sexual offense employed by the Western State 
program.487 The paper broke from the program’s general non-interaction with the more 
“abstract” conceptualizations that dominated academic discourse. Further, it was one of 
the best reports the program produced. For MacDonald, there couldn’t have been a 
better example of the program’s promise than Larry Hendricks.  
The program’s focus on group leadership was maintained even with the ramping 
population. In 1973, the program saw a record number of escape attempts. MacDonald 
established a committee to deliberate on what measures to implement. As before, 
resident leaders and group representatives were included alongside program staff. 
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Collectively, they decided not only to change some protocols but to make a significant 
change in the operation of the program. The group ultimately created the “buddy” 
system.488 The system was simple: offenders were to be accompanied by another 
resident at almost all times, including any trips off the ward. The policy was far-
ranging. Work release on other wards was done with a buddy. The offender’s group 
leader or another “buddy” was present for a resident’s meetings with their group’s 
therapy supervisor.489  The buddy system was not foolproof: on several occasions, two 
or more residents would conspire to escape together, biding their time until they were 
dispatched as “buddies”.490 In general, however, the buddy system was extremely 
effective. It dramatically improved security, cutting the escape rate by 80% in three 
years and gave the individual offenders more perspective on the treatment of their 
fellows.491 The degree of group oversight within the program was so intense that some 
commentators accused the group of fostering a 1984-like “groupthink” in the offenders. 
The staff argued that this level of intervention was necessary to make the offender 
change his ways, and that no lesser intensity would suffice.492 
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Confidence in the program’s approach was strong, and MacDonald soon got his 
wish of applying the program’s method to other groups of offenders. The first of the 
program’s offspring was born in Spring of 1973. It was a modified form of the program 
intended for the seriously mentally ill. Dr. Donald Allison was enlisted as the head 
psychiatrist, while MacDonald remained its director, making him the clinical director of 
Figure 7: The cover and concluding note of a handbook for 
new residents of the Mentally Ill Offender program. The 
cover text - Unmask Untruth, Live With Dignity - was a 
program motto. From Mentally Ill Offender Unit Observation 
/ Evaluation Unit Handbook, Western State Hospital, 
Steilacoom, WA (d.uk.). 
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the legal offender programs at the hospital generally.493 The Mentally Ill Offender 
Program, as it was called, had the same guiding principles as the SOTP. The practical 
application was modified, however, due to their mental health problems. 
“Confrontation” within “mini-socie[ties]” of ten residents, overseen by a therapy 
supervisor, remained the core of the group’s therapy.494  Residents progressed through a 
levels system as their behavior and understanding, in the group and therapy supervisor’s 
judgement, improved.495  According to 01, these groups had significantly less 
autonomy.496 The ability of the group to “make its own rules” and moderate the 
progress of its members was limited by the abilities of its highest-functioning members, 
who were automatically designated leaders by the therapy supervisors.497 This 
difference in level, however, was not a shift in character. The primary internal target of 
alienation and inferiority and the therapeutic means of reaching that target remained the 
same as the sexual offender program. The justice system had confidence in the program. 
It started with just over twenty residents, but in a year had grown through transfers and 
commitments to sixty, and its population would land near a hundred by the end of the 
decade.498  
MacDonald also sought to make good on his aim to bring the best-qualified 
offenders out of corrections and into the program. This short-lived initiative by the 
program, which allowed qualifying inmates serving jail sentences to be admitted for 
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observation, ended up having serious consequences. MacDonald had complained since 
the first major reports that the most qualified offenders with the greatest chance of 
reformation and success were being diverted from the program. In the early years of the 
program, however, he chose not to conduct outreach, and claimed that an increase in the 
resident population couldn’t be supported with the program’s standing funding.499 As 
the program continued to grow, he seemed to lose this reserve, and began to advocate 
for the enrollment of specially selected prison inmates in the program. The 1974 Annual 
Report begins its section on security with a bold challenge to sentencing procedure: 
“The fact that courts are still sending about 15% of convicted sexual offenders directly 
to prison without benefit of the 90-day observation indicates that some prosecutors and 
judges choose not to utilize the obvious advantages of the sexual psychopath statue in 
certain cases.” The staff knew a number of those sent straight to prison were grossly 
unsuited for treatment, but protested that “some potentially good treatment candidates” 
were being lost behind bars, where they would harden into sure recidivists.500 
MacDonald’s needling eventually got him his wish, and a batch of offenders were sent 
to the program in 1973.  
MacDonald’s push to allow convicts into observation, however, ran into a major 
procedural barrier. As previously discussed, after 1967, the superintendent could not 
remove an offender they deemed unsuitable for treatment from the program without a 
court’s permission.501 In addition, all offenders who had been convicted had to go 
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before their committing court for the final approval of their parole or work-release 
placement. As their sentences were suspended, this was a rarely a problem. For these 
new offenders who transferred to the program from prison, they had to go before their 
parole board without this suspended sentence, leading to major discrepancies between 
their prison release date and what the hospital would prefer.  
In one instance, a “Mr. Wilson” was being held in Washington State 
Penitentiary on a 7 1/2 year minimum term for a rape conviction.502 He was admitted to 
Western State in March 1973 for observation as a sexual psychopath, and the staff 
found him an ideal candidate.503 He entered the program, performed well, and was 
certified “safe to be at large” and ready for work release by the Senior Staff Committee 
in July 1974.504 His parole board, however, denied the hospital's request to place him on 
work release, as it was before he was due to have his next meeting with the parole 
board.505 Writing back, Mr. Williams asked what reason had compelled them to reject 
the decision.506 The board's Chairman responded three months later with an extremely 
vague letter that reaffirmed their decision was final and implied that Mr. Wilson was 
"not a fit subject for release". The Chairman noted that Mr. Wilson was still six years 
from his earliest date of parole under his original sentence. An abridgement of that time 
was implied to be unacceptable. He concluded by asking that in the future, a parole 
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meeting for transfers such as Mr. Wilson be rescheduled upon his entry into the 
program, to time with their expected graduation.507  
The troubles with procedure, however, rapidly faded into memory, as the single 
worst event in the program’s history ended the initiative immediately. In January 1974, 
a resident named James Ruzicka escaped. While on the lam in Seattle he committed two 
rape-murders, then committed a rape in Portland before being captured. The escape and 
its aftermath were the program's first of three public relations disasters in the 1970’s, 
and it left the greatest public impact of the three. James Ruzicka was first admitted to 
the program for observation in March of 1973. He was one of the transfers from 
Corrections. He had been found guilty of the attempted rape and assault of an adult.508 
During his time in the program, he maintained sufficient perceived progress to reach 
level four, which gave him escort privileges for offenders working on other wards.509 
He walked away at 9 A.M. on January 31st, 1974, while escorting others to their work 
assignments.510 At this point in the program, according to 01, there was “no policy to 
notify Mental Health, DSHS or the public [about an escape], because there was still a 
sense… nine out of ten times, [they’d come] back.”511  When the staff realized he was 
missing, they began a search of the grounds and notified Superintendent di Furia. Di 
Furia, according to previous example, did not tell the police until hours after Ruzicka’s 
escape. Ruzicka went to Seattle, where he killed two teenage girls in Seattle in 
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February, then fled to Portland, where he sexually assaulted another girl before his 
capture.512 
Shortly after Ruzicka’s recapture, another terrifying crime spree compounded 
the program’s problems. In March, the first news stories broke detailing a puzzling 
series of kidnappings in the Seattle area. The disappearances all had the same suspect, 
who drove a Volkswagen and targeted college-age women with a ruse about a broken 
arm. Lacking a solid lead, Seattle police sought to collect relevant files from the SOTP 
program to see if any former program members “fit the bill”, and to interview current 
program members for further information. A 1973 law temporarily denied law 
enforcement access to either source, infuriating the police and creating further bad press 
for the program.513 Western State quickly reached an agreement with law enforcement 
about the files, but the damage was done.514 The kidnappings, later revealed to be 
killings, remained unsolved for years. Suspicions lingered that the SOTP had 
“harbored” the killer, meaning that the killer was one of the program residents 
committing his crimes while on work release, or that he had been caught and placed in 
the program on a different charge and was biding his time, letting the trail run cold. 
Almost a decade later, the spree was found to be the work of Ted Bundy. He was never 
affiliated with the program in any capacity. The news arrived too late, however, to clear 
the air.515  
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The last decade of attempted positive public relations by the program were 
instantly torched.516 The public seized on the perceived laxity of the program's security 
and demanded the state investigate the hospital. A legislative hearing was held in 
February, followed by an investigation by the House Social and Health Services 
Committee into the program in April. It found that from July 1973 to February 28th, 
1974, there were seven escapes from the program, including Ruzicka.517 While only 
Ruzicka's escape had such horrific results, the quantity alarmed outsiders. The 
Committee Chairman, Representative A.A. Adams, demanded that “…something has to 
happen. There has to be better security on these people.”518 A Seattle Times article 
pointed asked, "Should a potentially dangerous sex offender be placed in an institution 
that has little or no prisonlike security?"519  
The program began a dual-pronged response to the bad PR of the Ruzicka 
escape. The program had obviously known the potential security issues. In newspapers, 
they first apologized for putting the public at risk. A Seattle Times reporter asked di 
Furia "what went wrong", and he demurred "What can I say?...We are reviewing every 
step of his program here...".520 Then, the program sought to create own positive PR.521 
A flurry articles appeared shortly after the Ruzicka case in the News Tribune that sought 
to present the “good side” of the program to the public. One emphasized the program 
was not “soft” on offenders, another stated that more dangerous, escape-prone offenders 
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would be monitored more closely from now on, and another gave a first-person 
narration of a sex offender’s rehabilitation.522 01, in our interview, said that the legal 
offender programs appointed a former therapist as a “kind of a PR man”. Another 
source suggested this person may have been Sid Acuff.  Whoever, exactly, he was, he 
was tasked with engaging local media, asking them to come to the program and 
describe it to the public as it functioned day-to-day. That way, as opposed to the 
occasional horror story of an escape, locals would be familiar with the program as it 
operated on an everyday basis.523 Governor Daniel Evans helped their efforts by 
chiming in with support to various local media outlets. “If you want to get to…no 
failures, the answer is permanent high security. But that in itself would be a failure. 
There would be no hope [of rehabilitation]”.524  
This spin campaign, which played up the possibility of rehabilitation to the 
public, was the program’s primary response. Staff made few changes following the 
Ruzicka escape of their own accord. The issue was, to them, exaggerated. The program 
staff noted that the escape rate had dropped since the introduction of the buddy system 
in 1973. Escape was a rarity that demanded reevaluation of the residents and their 
therapeutic process, but no great changes to the therapeutic method or to the program’s 
protocol.525 The public’s outcry was generally dismissed as ignorant and reactionary. 
An internal memo on escapes gave their timeline of their response to the Ruzicka 
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fiasco. The first line is: “1-1974 to 5-1974: The public expressed concern about 
escapes.”526 Williams spoke of “dramatic” but rare escapes as an inevitable aspect of 
running a meaningful, successful program.527 To change the program drastically in 
response to a rare event would curtail the ability of the offenders to treat one another 
with little gain. The program’s choice to hold the line was in general supported by the 
rest of Western State Hospital. di Furia remained a firm believer in the program and its 
methods, and advocated for the outfit whenever possible.528 The April 1974 Fort 
Retorter, a Western State Hospital staff newspaper, ran a piece supporting the 
program’s staff in the wake of Ruzicka escape, rhetorically calling for a “kinder” media 
portrayal.529  
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The program staff did believe that some sort of response was necessary to an 
escape, less from a security angle than a therapeutic one. Ruzicka had managed to 
conceal his intent from his fellow residents, even his group, who supposedly was 
familiar with his pattern of offenses and his individual problems. The group clearly 
needed to reevaluate how it conducted itself, and evaluate how their “honest and open” 
discussion had deteriorated.530 They decided on a procedure they called “grounding”.531 
Grounding was the program’s equivalent to a correctional facility’s lockdown. All 
residents were confined to their ward, work release was suspended, visitor privileges 
were limited, and an escorting aide was required for any non-leader offender to leave 
the ward.532 The schedule was strongly tightened. Breakfast was brought to the group. 
After they ate, they entered group sessions with occasional breaks for the rest of the 
day.533 While the group worked through the issues in their method, they postponed their 
regular self-analysis and halted step progress.534 The therapy supervisor would be 
presented for these sessions, evaluating their findings. The group would eventually 
create a coherent presentation that stated why they believed the therapeutic environment 
had decayed and what changes in approach and procedure they would take to fix them. 
If their supervisor and the senior staff agreed with their conclusions, they would be 
allowed off grounding. If not, it continued.535 No previous escape had been met by such 
restrictive measures. In characteristic fashion, these groundings had a clear procedure 
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and character, but were wholly informal. There was no written policy on how and when 
to conduct them at any point in the program’s history.536 The procedure attempted, and 
largely succeeded, to make a restriction imposed from above a challenge that the group 
would have to collectively meet. It was not simply discipline, but an avenue for the 
group to conduct even more introspective analysis. The staff were satisfied by the 
results of “grounding” in the Ruzicka case, and for the rest of the program’s life, 
“grounding” would become the default response to a serious breach of conduct or an 
escape by a group.537 
The public’s concern about security was strong enough that the DSHS was 
ordered by the legislature to investigate the program. The department conducted an 
internal review. The review itself could not be located, but a summary was found in a 
memo between Morris and Burdman, two DSHS officials. The DSHS gave the program 
their enthusiastic approval. Its innovation and apparent success in “reaching” offenders 
on an emotional level was applauded. There was little actual analysis of the treatment 
modality in the summary – more of a general approbation of the program’s efforts. The 
review’s findings on program security, which were presented separately, were also very 
positive. The use of residents as door monitors was thought a success. It cut down on 
staff requirements while bolstering the therapeutic goal of self-reliance. The buddy 
system was thought a natural extension of this principle and similarly praised. Since the 
measures “[had] not been abused”, the DSHS saw no reason to order a change.538 The 
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DSHS mainly sought small-scale “tightening” of previously existing measures and 
better communication between the program and law enforcement in the event of an 
escape.539 The program’s walking patrols and car surveillance were found lacking in 
practice, and the hospital was told to make this a continuous, rather than sporadic, 
security measure. They ordered the program to hire a new guard force. The group 
ultimately hired was unarmed and intended as a means of detection rather than 
enforcement. Headcounts were increased, first to three a day, then to one every four 
hours, including overnight.540 The staff were instructed to no longer report an escapee 
as “ ‘discharged’ … to those involved in apprehension”, and to make no delay in 
contacting law enforcement when an offender was found missing.541 The program was, 
effectively, asked to follow through on preexisting measures. The primary overseeing 
agency that was best positioned to demand changes from the program waved it on as it 
stood.  
A few more concrete security reinforcements were floated by the Legislature, 
such as an eight-foot chain link fence surrounding the grounds. They never came to 
pass.542 Program staff insisted that those barriers would negatively impact the program’s 
morale and, correspondingly, the efficacy of its treatment.543 They also pointed out that 
the rest of the hospital was still a hospital, and that a high fence would negatively 
impact the rest of the patient’s treatment. When $200,000 was apportioned for the 
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construction of a perimeter fence in the 1975-1976 legislative session, the “top 
management” of the DSHS intentionally let the money rot.544 The most significant Post-
Ruzicka change relating to the program was undertaken by an agency wholly unrelated 
to the program. The Deputy Director of Community Services ended transfer of 
correctional inmates to the program in October 1974, ending the program’s initiative in 
treating correctional transfers for good.545 The program’s self-concocted grounding 
system was, from then on, the official default response to an escape attempt or a serious 
breach of program policy for the next decade. The Washington State government, 
pressured by the public, did not yield. The program carried on.  
George MacDonald had first taken the lead when the program was in crisis. 
Working with Robinson Williams, he had dramatically changed the program’s focus 
and expanded its treatment methodology. The changes impacted the program to the 
extent that he was often labeled by the DSHS “the architect” of the program proper.546 
His changes were massive improvements. He struck a balance between the self-
managed therapy group and its directing staff in evaluating the group’s results without 
compromising its principles. The reports suggested staff had a great deal of confidence 
in the program as it stood and sought to keep the program as close to what it had been 
both with its security and its treatment policies. While MacDonald made these changes, 
he remained committed to di Furia’s original model: creating a space where the 
offender was held accountable by others for their actions. His tenure, however, was 
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largely successful “on credit”. The program’s cavalier attitude, unchallenged by the 
state and unimpeded by public concern, would prevail for the next half-decade with 
mixed results. 
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Interlude: A Day in the Life of an Imaginary Resident, 1976 
 
Figure 9: A program resident reclining on his bunk. From Paul Henderson, “Sex 
offenders – Doctor defends unique group therapy program”, The Seattle Times (April 
20th, 1974). 
 
  
152 
 
At 6 A.M. on a Thursday in 1976, a convicted child molester, “Adam”, was 
awoken. He had dreamed a schoolteacher humiliated him in public for molesting a 
student of his. He made a mental note to bring it up in the afternoon group session. The 
group member assigned the task of morning rounds moved on to the next dorm.547 The 
offender was just accepted to the program by his group, East Group, two weeks ago. He 
slept in its main dormitory, a sunroom. A group’s sleeping arrangements differed, 
depending on the ward, but there were always spartan. Each offender had only a bed 
and a footlocker.548 For most groups, which were on North Hall, the offenders stayed in 
bunk beds in large repurposed sunrooms. Some groups from the late seventies on stayed 
on wards in Central Hall, with two-men rooms down the corridor.549 Some groups, like 
Star Group, had to make do with iron cots due to a lack of furniture.550 Wards were 
generally large enough to hold more than Offenders who progressed to work release 
were given, space permitting, a private room in the “short hall”. These rooms were 
extremely small. They had a bed, a chest of drawers and a nightstand. There was little 
room for much else.551 None of the wards were designed to house offenders and were 
constructed and outfitted like institutional psychiatric wards of the era. Some wards had 
barred windows, but the program staff preferred to put the Mentally Ill Offender groups 
on these wards instead. The upside of the sunroom design was that he floor-to-ceiling 
windows were helpful in waking people up in the early mornings.  
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Our offender, “Adam”, choose his clothes for the day from his trunk before 
getting ready to shower. There was no uniform and a minimally prescriptive dress code, 
so he is free to wear what he wishes. In most regards, program residents were treated 
the same as other residents of the hospital. There were no “badges” or any other kind of 
distinction for staff or residents, and they were hard to tell apart on sight alone.552 There 
was little privacy in the dormitory. Offenders could hang a sheet over their beds, but 
they were otherwise wholly open to observation by their dormmates, which was the 
intention.553 Adam hurried to the large group showers to be ready for the 6:30 AM 
breakfast.  
The offender’s day was highly scheduled. Residents had different wake-up times 
depending on their “step” in the program and their job at the hospital, but most were 
expected to wake at 6:00 AM.554 Breakfast was served at 6:30 AM. Adam went to the 
main cafeteria for breakfast with the rest of his group, escorted by his group leader. 
There was no staff escorting offenders around campus unless there was a need to move 
an “observation man” or a group was grounded.555 He returned to the ward at 7:00 AM, 
giving him enough time to tidy their living space and complete any small chores before 
he goes on the clock at his work assignment.  
On most weekdays, patients started their job at 7:30, broke for lunch at 11:30, 
and returned to work until 2:30 PM. This meant they worked thirty hours most weeks. 
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He was, like most offenders, on the janitorial staff.556 He had been confined to his ward 
for his duties while under observation. Now that he was a full member of the group, he 
went with his work partners to the male geriatrics ward, which was a welcome 
change.557 While on the other wards, he got to know the patients and staff there. For 
Adam’s group leader, their work assignment shift stopped at 1:30 so they could attend a 
one-hour "Daily Conference" with the Clinical Staff Supervisor. On their return from 
their work shift, the offenders had a little while to get prepared for their 3:00 PM 
Afternoon Group Therapy Meeting. Afternoon group sessions were focused on more 
“discussion” topics and procedural, intake work, such as hearing an “observation man” 
read their autobiography, but included layout and confrontations as well.558 Once this 
was over, Adams received a small portion of free time, which allowed him to do 
whatever he needed or wished to before 5:00 dinner.559  
After dinner, their activity depended on the day. On Monday, Wednesday, 
Friday and Sunday, there was an Evening Group Therapy Session for all patients, while 
on Tuesday and Thursday there were special sessions for married couples and 
outpatients, respectively.560 Evening sessions started at 7:00 PM, granting an hour block 
of time after dinner on Tuesdays. On Mondays and Thursdays, there was instead 
mandatory recreation. Evening sessions were the time for “requests”. These requests 
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were, quite literally, any request an offender wanted to make to the group. This included 
reinstating a privilege they had lost, taking away a privilege from an offender they 
thought was abusing it, seeking a change in work assignment, having a meeting with the 
Therapy Supervisor, and request for maintenance or materials, among many other 
things.561 On the schedule, the Evening Group Session was two hours long. In actuality 
these sessions lasted until all the items on the agenda and on the offenders’ minds were 
cleared, which often took the sessions an hour or more overtime.562 On days without 
scheduled evening sessions, most residents met with their dormmates in voluntary “sit-
in” sessions, discussing their problems amongst themselves from their bunks.563  
As Adam went to sleep, he looked forward to the weekend. Weekends were 
more relaxed. He, and all other non-leaders, had no work assignment and few assigned 
activities. There were televisions on the wards and various recreation possibilities, 
including – thanks to the facilities’ age – shuffleboard lanes. There was also a kitchen 
which residents could use to bake treats and small meals, if they wished. The groups 
were invited to join the rest of the hospital in watching a Saturday night movie. 
Westerns were a favorite.564  
“I really believe they felt a responsibility…[to] confront behavior if they saw 
[it]… If somebody was doing something they weren’t supposed to be doing, 
then they’d have a special group. You could hear that ring out over the ward: 
“East Group, Special Group.” And, they’d all come in, they’d have a meeting, 
and talk about what went on. And they genuinely, genuinely had a sense that 
they were responsible for each other and for each other’s success.”  
- 01, Interview Transcript, 6 
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Figure 10: A map of the grounds of Western State as of 1977.  In Lifeboat: A 
therapeutic community for the incarcerated drug offender, Western State Hospital, 
Steilacoom, WA (January 1st, 1977), 7. 
34 
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Figure 11: Ward Map of North Hall, the main Legal Offender unit. There were generally two 
groups on each ward for the Sex Offender program, and one for the Mentally Ill Offender 
program. From Charles Morris to Milton Burdman, memorandum, April 19th, 1974, “Facilities 
and Program for Mentally Ill and Sexual Offenses – Progress Report”, Attachment I. 
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Holding the Line: Lateral Program Expansion, 1975-1979 
 
“Control is inevitable. One can control oneself or society will…Look to the time when 
you can, through your own efforts, live decently, humanely and fully free.” 
 
-    Larry R. Hendricks, in Lifeboat: A therapeutic community for the 
incarcerated drug offender, Western State Hospital, Steilacoom, WA (January 
1st, 1977), 7. 
 
In 1975, Assistant Director Robinson Williams departed for private practice.565 
William’s old position of “Assistant Director” was henceforth known as “Acting 
Director”. The program’s choice for the position was H.R. Nichols, a therapy supervisor 
who had been with the program for at least seven years.566 Williams’ departure marked 
the end of the sex offender program’s most successful era. The program had grown 
drastically to a daily population well over five times its previous resident load. The 
staff, led by MacDonald and Williams, managed to maintain the program’s unique 
approach as it scaled up to match. Further, the program’s services massively expanded, 
realizing di Furia’s original vision of an “internal community” more closely than his 
original program design had. The program, like most of its kind, went unrecognized 
nationally, but received significant attention from justice and law enforcement officials 
in Washington. Confidence in their approach was high enough to bring them through 
the disastrous Ruzicka affair with little corresponding changes from any agency.   
The program’s apparent success hid its growing instability. The Ruzicka affair 
was the beginning of greater state government oversight of the program. In that 
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instance, it was transient and forgiving. As a few high-profile escapes and internal 
scandals accumulated, their attention became more frequent and more critical. Public 
opinion fell drastically. The program was little more than tolerated by the public for the 
rest of the decade. Worsening matters, the program’s cost continued to rise over the 
second half of the 1970s. The DSHS and the Legislature began demanding changes to 
program policy, rather than allowing it to “go its own way”. The program staff, looking 
inward, found them faced with clear problems with the treatment modality. Strong 
demographic skews and dissatisfaction among some of the couples pointed to 
unintended negative consequences of the self-guided group. More worryingly, an early 
recidivism survey and the horrific crimes of Larry Hendricks warned the program staff 
that the program might be, in fact, unsuccessful in changing behavior, even in offenders 
who seriously invested themselves in change. The program, for better or worse, was not 
challenged by the state on these problems until the end of the decade. From 1975 to 
1979, the program took on water, as its numerous internal issues became more and more 
apparent and interfered more and more with conducting therapy. 
At the time of William’s departure, some worrisome trends were showing 
themselves in the program’s population. The Sexual Psychopath unit was now receiving 
a majority of all convicted sex offenders in observation. The justice system still showed 
significant prejudices in who underwent the commitment process. The first gap erupted 
between rural and urban offenders. Simply put, judges in the urban King, Thurston and 
Pierce counties were far more likely to sentence an offender to the program than judges 
in rural counties.567 This divide was complicated by a socio-economic divide between 
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Eastern and Western Washington. Eastern Washington was, and is, far more rural than 
Western Washington, with only a handful of major cities and a dramatically lower 
population density. Accordingly, the sexual psychopath statue saw less use on principle 
in Eastern Washington. The 1968 report stated that, for the first ten years of the 
program, "courts in very small counties [did] not [use the statute... whether] east or west 
of the mountains". This is supported by comparable proportional rates of commitment 
between three urban counties in the east - Yakima, Walla Walla, and Spokane - with 
three urban counties in the west - Grey Harbor, Pierce and Thurston.568 In 1970, the vast 
majority of commitments in Eastern Washington came from Spokane and Yakima 
counties. These two counties are named after their respective cities, which are the two 
largest in the region.569 The text noted that courts in Eastern Washington were 
“interested”, with the implication that their use was tentative. The sporadic 
commitments the report describes agrees, showing rural courts meting out a handful of 
observation recommendations in a given year.570 The 1976 report does not discuss 
county of commitment in the text, but its statistics show the same story: a steady use of 
the service by Yakima and Spokane counties, the rise of the service in a few rural 
counties and its fall in some others, adding up to the disproportionate representation of 
urban offenders within the program. The text tacitly acknowledges this, stating that 
commitments “predominately [come] from the Western half of the state, [and] either 
                                                        
568 MacDonald et. al., Treatment of the Sex Offender: Ten Years, 14.  
569 Williams, Characteristics and Management, 3. 
570 ibid. 
  
161 
 
King or Pierce counties.”571 Eastern and Western Washington were more separated than 
might be originally supposed regarding the use of this program. 
A more pronounced and more difficult to combat divide was the low nonwhite, 
non-heterosexual population in the program. Legally, the judge and the prosecuting 
attorney could commit anyone they believed disordered and amenable to the treatment 
offered by the program. Their decision was supposed to be based on the court-appointed 
psychiatrist's testimony and their own impressions of the offender's commitment to 
change. The unspoken barrier was that both the judge and prosecutor had to believe the 
offender "deserved" enrollment in treatment, rather than prison.  The legal system 
strongly favored older white men of means over younger, poorer and minority men.572 
According to the acting director, their bias toward white offenders could not be 
accounted for by the seriousness or violence of the offense committed. While charges of 
younger offenders were generally steeper charges of the same type of crime the older 
offenders faced, Williams claimed this was not because they committed different 
crimes. Williams attributed this to "less than adequate legal counsel" for younger 
offenders and a corresponding inability to get the charge reduced, rather than the actual 
commission of more serious crimes. Racial minorities were excluded at an even higher 
rate, having less than one-third the chance of entering the program than a Caucasian 
offender.573 The bias was a source of frustration for the program, as it precluded a 
number of good treatment candidates: 
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"Adult Corrections receives a very large number of young and first offenders, 
including many of minority races, who have the best potential...and the 
Specialized Program [at Western State] receives... older men, chronic 
recidivists, and men of low intelligence, all of whom have very poor potential 
for treatment."574  
 
The problem did not entirely lay with the court. Dr. Williams observed that the 
program’s internal gatekeeping system of “acceptance after observation” was 
significantly biased toward certain majority groups. As previously stated, the majority 
of admissions were settled by the treatment group’s vote. People of color were, in fact, 
accepted at a higher rate than Caucasians. This may have been the result of a small 
sample size, however, because only ten people of color made it to the observation 
period.575 The program was instead biased toward rejecting offenders who committed 
crimes against men or boys. The rate of acceptance for offenders against women was 
46%; for offenders against men, it was 24%.576 The 1973-74 and 1975-1976 reports 
only tallied the percentage of the resident population that had offended against males, 
not the percentage who were accepted beyond observation. The percentage of the 
population who had offended against men kept steady at around ~20%, suggesting that 
this trend held.577 Younger offenders – those between 18 and 20 – were also 
significantly less likely to be kept for treatment at this time, although the difference was 
less pronounced.578 Dr. Williams also noticed that this inequality of participation 
appeared to have an impact on an offender’s success. No people of color graduated the 
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program during the period surveyed. Offenders against women who were kept for 
treatment had a 43% chance of graduating the program. Offenders against men had a 
28% chance. Offenders below the age of 24 had a <10% chance.579 In William’s view, 
this was likely due to lingering biases of the group members against homosexually-
oriented men and against more “hotheaded” adolescents that resulted in a “anti-
therapeutic”, prejudiced group dynamic.580 As long as their prejudices remained 
unchallenged, their biases would persist, and in an environment which hypersensitized 
men to group attitudes, they would be intensified.. One man who had molested young 
boys attested that, on his arrival in the group, “there was extreme mistrust… and a fear 
[he’d make] sexual advances…”581 In his 1977 trial, a defendant, Wilmoth, was 
sentenced to observation at Western State Hospital. When he returned to court, he stated 
he preferred prison to the program:  
“After I get out, I can't live with my wife for another 18 months... The 
homosexuals, I can't get along with them at all, and I don't feel that [the 
program staff] help people all that much. I asked some of the older 
members if they thought- they had been there for 2 years and I asked 
them if they thought the program had helped them and they says [sic] no, 
they didn't, and they had been to prison before and that didn't help them 
either."582 
 
Williams had concluded his 1971 report by calling for “study in great detail” of 
“treatment procedures” to improve the balance of the group demographics.583 These 
efforts, however, didn’t arrive. By 1975, younger offenders were closer to parity 
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figures, but this was primarily because of a major increase in the court commitment of 
rapists, who were on average younger than pedophiles and non-assaultive offenders.584 
The bias against nonwhite and homosexual offenders persisted. Later surveys of 
offender characteristics kept mute on the problem, and stopped providing resident 
demographics, making it harder to determine if the populations began to “level out”. No 
attempt to solve the problem in any fashion was acknowledged in the literature.  
Under the tenure of MacDonald and Williams, the demographic problems were 
at least discussed. The program’s greater issues, however, were not. First, the program 
could not continue treating people at the rock-bottom cost it once claimed it maintained. 
Before 1971, only MacDonald and Williams, accompanied by a complement of ward 
attendants, were the “treatment staff”. The cost of treatment was therefore exceedingly 
low, even when operational costs were factored in.585 The 1971 report on the adjustment 
of released sex offenders to the community states that the daily cost per offender is 
“$5.97, less than one-half the cost of $13.46 for adult correctional institutional care in 
the State of Washington….”586 This operation was not sustainable. MacDonald and 
Williams hollered for additional staff for three years.587 Once they got it, however, the 
costs of the program increased much more per capita than they had accounted for. For 
the first few years, they claimed that costs remained low. This claim appears to be based 
on faulty math. When the Therapy Supervisors were added to each group in 1971, 
                                                        
584 Guided Self-Help: A New Approach… July 1973-June 1974, 6; MacDonald et. al., Treatment of the 
Sex Offender: Ten Years, 15; MacDonald and Nichols, Annual Report: July 1st, 1975 – June 30th, 1976, 
10; Williams, Characteristics and Management, 23.  
585 MacDonald et. al., Treatment of the Sex Offender: Ten Years, Introduction. 
586 Community Care 3. 
587 Williams, The Washington State Sexual Psychopath Law, 3. 
  
165 
 
MacDonald and Williams stated that salaries for all staff amounted to ~$147,750. 
Operating costs were estimated at ~$26,725. This left a total of around $173,500 in 
annual expenditures for the program, with a cost per resident per day of $6.25.588 Their 
estimate of “operating cost”, when compared to later figures, seems to have been wildly 
inaccurate. The 1974 annual report stated that operational costs besides salaries were 
$478,301, with the total cost of the program annually running around ~$800,000. The 
program now estimated a cost of $14.81 per resident per day. The mammoth jump in 
operating expenses was not mentioned. 589  Later budgets universally put operating costs 
at a figure the same order of magnitude as the cost of salaries. The early economy of the 
program, then, was the result of less than precise accounting and unsustainable staffing, 
rather than a legitimately cheaper approach. 
While the cost savings were not as good as advertised, the program was still 
economically competitive with the prison system. As of 1974, the average cost per 
prisoner per day in Washington’s prisons was ~$20.79. The 1974 annual report, a 
number of memos, and academic journal articles played up the finding.590 Corrections 
was not pleased: 
“The attached December 10 memo from Western State Hospital 
concerns me. On other occasions, the staff at WSH have made 
comparisons of their program with Adult Corrections… They have not 
been carefully thought out and could be harmful if used inappropriately 
by readers.”591 
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Correction’s cautions proved wise. In 1976, the program costs were reported to 
have escalated to “20.00 per day per patient”, putting the program at near-parity with 
the prison system.592 Proportional costs continued to grow, to an unspecified degree, for 
the rest of the decade.  
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Figure 12: Two memos between “Bob” and “Dave”, two unknown DSHS employees, discussing 
the bed shortage at the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment Program and the closure of correctional 
transfers. From The Department of Social and Health Services 1965-1979 Archives, Subgroup 
Division of Adult Corrections, Box 48, Accession No 03A205. 
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The program’s cost problems were joined by even more serious concerns about 
program efficacy. A mysterious document sits in the Washington Archives, alongside 
other documents about the program. This anonymous sheet was the most 
comprehensive recidivism survey of the program made before the 1985 audit.593  The 
audit covered all residents who had gone on work release and/or graduated the program 
from December 1967 to November 1974, a total of 216 men. A date, “August 19th, 
1976”, is stamped at the top. Two names of unknown relation to the program are 
handwritten at the top, one of which with a phone number and address included below. 
Their relationship with the program could not be determined, and the address has since 
been redeveloped into a car audio business. The survey and its findings are not 
mentioned or cited in any other report. Two clues strongly suggest it was written by 
program staff: the survey used the methodology suggested in the 1974 Annual Report, 
and the word “us” is used to describe offenders reporting offenses to their group.594 
There is no “title page” or direct attribution.595 
The results of the survey were dramatic and discouraging: recidivism of 
program graduates was dramatically higher than previously thought. The chart broke 
down the data in three interesting ways: first, the person’s offense at the time of 
commitment, second, the point in treatment they reoffended, and third, whether police 
discovered their crimes or whether the offender confessed them to program staff.596 The 
survey only followed recidivism for sexual crimes, and only tallied the lapse of the 
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offender, rather than the number of their offenses once they “relapsed”. The results 
were discouraging. The most successful treatment category were incest offenders with a 
recidivism rate of just under 10%. The least successful treatment category was the 
“miscellaneous” non-assaultive offenders (voyeurs and exhibitionists), with a 30.3% 
recidivism rate. Concerningly, around 40% of all recidivists were undetected before 
their confession. It suggested that police arrests would underrate total recidivism 
considerably, and that the group was very good at inculcating responsibility in the 
offender, to the extent that they forfeited their freedom to comply with it. The 
bombshell figure was a general recidivism rate of around 20.3% for released offenders. 
This was much higher than the previous figures of 8.9%, reported in the 1968 history, 
and the low ~1/8 proportion suggested by Robinson’s 1968-1970 survey. 597 With few 
other programs publishing recidivism data, and few other programs lasting as long as 
Western State’s had, this report was of significance not only in evaluating Western 
State, but as an evaluation of sex offender treatment more generally. Yet the survey 
disappeared from view. It was not cited in the 1976 annual report, in the Kellogg report, 
in the Brecher survey, or by any other document, including the otherwise quite-
comprehensive Krell audit. This survey was assuredly seen by program staff at the time.  
For whatever reason, it was not seen by anyone else.  
The program tried to avoid letting this strain show publicly. The 1976 report 
painted a rosy picture of operations at the Center and underlined the recent increase in 
program security.598 The media representative the program had hired was doing good 
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work. Positive stories on the program ran regularly through the turn of the decade. The 
stories sought to humanize the sex offender in the eyes of the public and make his 
treatment seem possible. One in August of 1974 told the story of “Ernie”, an offender 
who had emerged from the program after two years of advancement and found a happy 
marriage with the mother of a young son.599  Another, in November 1976, emphasized 
the frequent recidivism of “untreated” offenders such as “Frank”, then stated those who 
have gone through the Western State program have an “eight in ten” chance of “not 
[being] convicted of a sexual offense again”.600 Others focused on the role of 
volunteers. With an eye to recruitment, these stories featured testimonials from satisfied 
volunteers. As those volunteers described it, they found the time they spent in the 
program valuable for their purpose. Their efforts had resulted in another person’s 
change for the better.601 In fiscal year 1976, the program had 29 volunteers.602  
Some of the changes the program underwent at this time were neither “good” 
nor “bad” in of themselves. The program’s numbers maintained their upward trajectory, 
but its demographics changed significantly. In 1972, the average daily resident 
population circled around 125.603 The number of offenders committed for observation 
continued to rise through 1976, as a greater and greater percentage of offenders were 
referred to the program. While staff became more selective, they did not set an explicit 
population ceiling. The resident population ballooned to a daily average of ~180 in 
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1976, and it threatened to increase further. The type of offenders that the program was 
receiving, however, was changing. Through 1969, the program had been populated 
overwhelmingly by offenders who targeted children.604 In 1970, the percentage of 
program admissions who targeted adults hovered was 7%. By 1975, this percentage had 
more than doubled, landing at 27%.605 This was, according to the program, the result of 
two factors. The women’s rights movement brought the seriousness and prevalence of 
rape to public and law enforcement attention, resulting in a much greater number of 
rapists being charged and brought to trial. At the same time, judges and prosecutors 
were growing more confident in the program’s ability to handle sex offenders, and were 
increasingly open to committing violent offenders to treatment.606 This new proportion 
would hold until the early 1980’s.607  
A significant shift in group therapy took place near the middle of the decade: the 
“de-escalation” of the therapeutic environment. The group’s “confrontations” were 
directed to be less intense. Group sessions remained founded on “confrontation” as a 
principle, but offenders were intended to be more conciliatory and moderate in their 
remarks.608 This change was not MacDonald’s doing. According to 01, MacDonald 
remained personally faithful to the more visceral, emotive “in-your-face” confrontation 
that di Furia and Mees had observed in Synanon. The offender had to be brought well 
outside their comfort zone and be willing to express themselves in an extreme manner, 
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to “truly” get in touch with their emotions. The numerous new therapy supervisors hired 
at the start of the decade, however, disagreed. They allowed their groups to be less 
bombastic in their sessions, so long as they remained equally critical. By 1975, the “in-
your-face” approach had been toned down.609 Some of the program staff were unhappy 
with the change, with one therapy supervisor going so far as to quit. The majority, 
however, were happy with the shift.610  
The approach and technique of the Sexual Offender Treatment Program 
attracted professional notice in the region, who adapted its methods to group programs 
of their own. These programs, however, were outpatient groups, and they pulled away 
from the principle of resident leadership toward more behavioral interventions. The first 
was the Eastside Community Mental Health Center’s Sexual Deviance Program, or 
SDP. It was founded in early 1975 in Bellevue, Washington.611 It was the first true 
outpatient program in the state. The architect, Steven Silver, stated almost all sex 
offender treatment is institutional and inpatient, engendering “the development of 
dependent and manipulative behaviors” that masked the offender’s internal problems, 
rather than solve them.612 He included in his footnote to that point the 1971 report on 
Western State in Hospital and Community Psychiatry.  There is no other mention of 
Western State’s program in the text. While he views the residential approach of Western 
State as inimical to treatment, his actual program design and practice is extremely 
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similar, to the degree that it is easier to list the differences than the similarities.613 
Therapy was “staff-guided, patient-led”, and revolved around once-weekly group 
meetings with fellow members. The group votes on who to accept into its ranks and has 
all newly admitted people read an autobiography on their first meeting. Even the 
therapy’s primary perceived problem – low self-esteem, leading to antisocial acting out 
– is identical.614 Eastside’s program was the pioneering outpatient program in 
Washington at the time, and it owed its model to the efforts of the Western State 
Program. It was an early arrival in what would be a wave of outpatient offender 
treatment, and one of the few that took inspiration from Western State’s approach. 
Following the same impulse that founded the Mentally Ill Offender program, the 
Sexual Offender Treatment Program cross applied its methodology to another group of 
offenders: drug addicts. MacDonald remarked that the program’s model could be 
extended to other kinds of offenders with “good results” back in 1970.615 The Lifeboat 
program for incarcerated drug offenders was the first and largest test of that assertion. It 
began in the summer of 1974. It was originally headed by a Mr. Gene Chontos, who 
oversaw about thirty patients on Ward R, in North Hall.616 It was a near - carbon copy 
of its parent program. Eligible residents were any convicts in Washington prisons 
serving time for offenses related to their drug addiction, who had between one and five 
years on their sentence, and who were considered a minimum-security risk.617 They 
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were evaluated by a chain of three committees, and if cleared, admitted for a sixty to 
ninety-day observation period.618 The philosophy of treatment was identical. Most drug 
offenders were sane and semi-functional but were unable to stop themselves from 
committing socially unacceptable or harmful behaviors. They believed themselves 
fundamentally “broken” in some way and unable to change. 619 They were physically 
addicted to their stress response, but the roots of their habit went beyond the drug to the 
same fundamental psychological maladjustment that sex offenders had.620  
Lifeboat was short-lived and unsuccessful. Next to nothing could be found about 
the program in its first two years. The earliest document found after the program started 
was the new program member’s handbook, written by Hendricks shortly after he was 
called to the program in the fall of 1976. A later newspaper article claimed he had been 
tasked with beginning the program “anew”, with tighter discipline, suggesting the 
program had been in turmoil before his arrival.621 His management, however, did not 
end the program’s troubles. The “guided self-help” honor-system security approach 
meant smuggling drugs inside or walking away was fairly easy.622 The program was 
“grounded” after every escape or discipline infraction, but these lockdowns could only 
persist for a short time, as the hoped-for progress of the residents would be jeopardized 
by time spent away from their occupations.623 Unlike the Sexual Offender Treatment 
Program, the latter-stage work release portion was not included within the program 
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proper by the government’s charter. It was instead overseen and run by the Department 
of Corrections. Hendricks began demanding the offenders on work-release remained 
ward residents. The Department of Corrections wanted the offenders to reside “in the 
present work-release program building” on the hospital grounds. They could continue to 
go to the program’s “counseling during their free time”, but their work release needed 
to be under the Department of Correction’s oversight and control.624  
While the two parties bickered, the internal problems festered.  Hendricks 
pushed for the resumption of work release to no avail. A legislative committee was 
convened in the summer of 1977 to determine the program’s future. Its findings are well 
surmised by a comment from Hendricks in front of the State Senate: “the vast majority” 
who had graduated the program had likely relapsed.625 01, working in her capacity in 
the Sexual Offender program, heard of “con behavior”, most notably drug smuggling.626 
The state was vacillating on the next move when four of the twenty-five residents 
escaped in one week in September.627 One of the offenders, when recaptured, claimed 
the program was in disarray. Staff supposedly encouraged resident silence to avoid 
being shut down, tacitly ignoring wrongdoing as recompense.628 An unknown number 
of anonymous callers, including one claiming they were a current resident, told the 
News Tribune that the program was a battleground between Corrections and Mental 
Health, with their treatment by “incompetent” therapists sidelined as they played out the 
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power struggle.629 Tellingly, the callers considered the use of therapeutic techniques 
intended for sexual offenders in the program an undue humiliation of the residents. The 
sex offender was the “lowest kind” of criminal, and drug offenders should not, in their 
opinion, be addressed the same way.630 Hendricks claimed the calls and complaints 
were due to his increased discipline as administrator, rather than actual problems with 
the treatment methodology.631 The state did not wait for an investigation to settle the 
matter, and transferred the program to the Corrections Division of DSHS in late 
September.632 A month later, the program was moved to a “secure building at Eastern 
State”. No staff moved with it. Tom Rolfs, “a longtime corrections department 
administrator”, was appointed as its new director.633 The “Lifeboat” name and the “self-
guided” group approach were canned immediately. Larry Hendricks left the hospital 
staff in the wake of the scandal, ending his professional affiliation with the offender 
programs. The program’s foray into drug treatment was a bust. It never attracted 
secondary interest or comment outside the local papers.  
A more successful “transplant” was a straightforward one: the creation of an 
identical sex offender treatment program at Eastern State Hospital. For ten years after 
the Melvin Briggs scandal, sex offenders in the east of the state who were committed as 
Sexual Psychopaths were sent to Western State Hospital. For a time, this was 
manageable, and program staff at Western State were pleased that interest in the 
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program was statewide.634 By 1977, the resident population at Western State had 
become an unbearable 228 residents.635 For offenders from the East, enrollment in the 
program came at serious cost: his family had to move to the Pierce County area, and he 
had to commit to living in the area through the outpatient portion of treatment. The 
Division of Mental Health agreed to restart sexual offender treatment at Eastern State, 
this time under Western State’s model, to relieve the population pressure. Two new 
therapy supervisors were brought on to the Western State program about six months 
prior, to learn the treatment method and philosophy that Western State employed.636 In 
November 1977, these supervisors moved to Eastern State Hospital with a group of 
volunteer residents originally from Eastern Washington.637 Saylor and di Furia visited a 
number of times the first year, than had annual in-person visits in the years that 
followed.638 The programs had almost no contact between each other besides these 
administrative visits.639 The Eastern State program, left to its own devices,  faithfully 
followed the “self-help” treatment model with a much smaller complement of 
residents.640 Around thirty-five residents were enrolled as inpatients at any given time 
before 1982, and about fifty after 1982.641 
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The program was dealt two major blows in quick succession in the spring of 
1977. First, Dr. MacDonald died suddenly.642 He had been the legal offender program’s 
director for a dozen years.643 No obituary was found in The News-Tribune, making the 
precise date of death uncertain; according to a May 13th, 1977 News-Tribune article, he 
had died in the “last few weeks”.644 His passing threw the program into disarray. Horace 
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Nichols, who had coauthored the 1976 annual report, remained the acting director until 
a full-time replacement could be found.645  
Then, in May, the second of the major scandals of the 1970’s broke. According 
to Nichols, speaking to the press, four residents “threatened” the two senior charges on 
“CQ” that evening, took the keys, and ran to a waiting getaway car.646 The four 
escapees were the headmen of a small marijuana ring inside the program. Nichols stated 
he had detected their operation and planned a group marathon session that day to 
confront them, which “would have likely resulted in their expulsion.”647 The escape 
forced the impropriety into the open, and the program into the public eye. The program 
was promptly put on grounding, and the residents and staff chose to show they were 
stern on disobedience. Ten offenders, besides the four escapees, were ejected from the 
program. Six of the expelled were part of the same therapy group.648  The escape was 
extremely reminiscent of an earlier marijuana bust. In April 1976, three men were 
ejected from the “Aquarius” treatment group for abusing off-grounds privileges to 
procure marijuana and bring women into the conjugal-visit cottages on the grounds for 
intimate rendezvous.649 The reoccurrence of the same problem in a short span was 
noticed by the press and the government. 
The incident was embarrassing enough, but when the four escapees were 
recaptured in the early morning of May 18th, it suddenly became much worse. One of 
the offenders, Tyrell, spoke to the press before this trial. He claimed that the treatment 
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program was in fact a den of vice, of which his own drug trafficking was a small part. 
As he told it, homosexual affairs between the patients were rampant, and drugs freely 
circulated. Staff participated in the bacchanal. His accusations ran in the News 
Tribune.650 The wives of other offenders wrote into the paper, denying his claims. They 
stated his charges were slander against their husbands whose recovery they could 
personally attest to. They concluded by asking the public to support the program so 
their husbands could complete their treatment and rejoin society.651  
Harlan McNutt, Secretary of the DSHS, ordered an inquiry into the program by 
the DSHS Investigation Unit. After they interviewed staff, residents and patients, the 
Unit found many Tyrell’s claims baseless. A program graduate, working as a security 
guard on a different ward, was found to be the perpetrator of an assault on a patient and 
was taken into custody. No other staff had committing any wrongdoing in the program 
or the hospital writ large. However, “clear evidence” of sexual affairs between residents 
was found, and a number of those acts were “coerced”.  McNutt blamed “insufficient 
monitoring and control” of the groups, but maintained a positive outlook on the 
program as a whole: “The value of the treatment remains clearly established; but it is 
necessary to maintain constant vigilance… to insure there [is] appropriate control.”652 
The program had not been able to notice sexual assaults within its own ranks, casting 
serious doubts on its ability to notice sexual offense on work-release or outpatient 
treatment. 
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The press was not pleased by the revelations. The News Tribune noted that two 
others from the “Legal Offenders” programs had escaped in the same week as these 
four, and the Pierce County Police Department complained that the staff did not give 
“timely and complete notification” of escape.653 To appease the critics, the policy of 
having “senior charges” conduct night watch duty was ended. Keys were now held by 
dedicated attendants on a round-the-clock basis.654 Staff objected that in this case, the 
escape was violent, and was not achieved by any coercion beforehand or a ward-wide 
conspiracy. Anyone “[could] be hit over the head”, whether they were a therapist, a 
security guard or a resident.655 Regardless, the effort was terminated.   
In early 1978, for reasons unknown, Nichols departed the program. Maureen 
Saylor became the program’s director. She had been a therapy supervisor since June 
1973 and had been the first woman therapy supervisor in the program.656 Nichols was 
the last holdout of the early days of the program. The program was now in the hands of 
a new set of administrators. What new actions they took is difficult to say, as their one 
conspicuous action was a sudden silence. The 1975-1976 Annual Report was the last 
report the program published. The biennial updates and self-published discussions of 
therapeutic interventions ceased.  
The program returned to the limelight in 1979 with a bang. It started with the 
last of three major scandals of the seventies, centering around the program’s previous 
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success story, Larry Hendricks. When Lifeboat ended, Larry Hendricks was no longer 
an employee of Western State Hospital. He periodically returned to see his group and 
visit with the program. During one of his last visits, 01 remembered, he arrived on a 
black motorcycle, dressed entirely in black leather. A staff member who had been 
involved in his treatment remarked that “something was going on”.657 In the early 
morning of May 1st, Pvt. Tolvo Redditt was hitchhiking back to Fort Lewis when he 
was abducted by Hendricks at gunpoint. Restrained, he was driven in a black van to a 
wooded location near Roy and pushed out of the car. A mutilated body was visible by a 
tree. Redditt struck out at Hendricks when he was commanded to lay down beside the 
body. After a struggle, he seized Hendricks’ gun and shot him.658 Investigation 
afterward determined that Hendricks also was the murderer of Bertram Zahnie and at 
least two unnamed men from the San Francisco area.659  
The program’s efficacy was now challenged directly. Larry Hendricks had been 
in and around the Sex Offender Treatment Program for nearly a decade. He had 
repeatedly demonstrated his understanding of what drove his offenses personally and of 
the personality and socialization issues sex offenders demonstrated in general. He had 
cultivated the discipline necessary to graduate the program. Less than a quarter of 
people sent for observation before 1975 managed to. His 1975 monograph on the 
motivations of the sexual offender was the most detailed articulation of the program’s 
understanding of the sexual offender written. He had served for years as a therapy 
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supervisor before becoming the director of a group therapy program at Western State 
predicated on the same model. His return “to outlet” was the failure of the program’s 
most prominent graduate. His case challenged the idea that making the offender 
understand what was fueling their offenses could change their behavior. 
The program, looking inward, came to a measured conclusion about the 
Hendricks case. The policy of having graduates serve on the staff was terminated, and 
the idea that an ex-sex offender was the best therapist for a current sex offender was 
repudiated. MacDonald had considered the hiring of graduates as a natural extension of 
the group therapy approach. The program reconsidered this, and instead decided that 
there needed to be a degree of separation between the group and the program staff. The 
therapy supervisor needed to guide the offender, which did not require personal 
experience with the cycle of sexual offense. The program did not extend this critique. 
The Hendricks case was not taken as a refutation of the self-guided group method in 
general. His failure post-graduation was an exception, rather than the rule. The program 
made obvious changes in the behavior and attitude of residents. The other program 
graduates who had been hired on as therapy supervisors did not recidivate and 
performed well in their various positions within the program. These positive examples 
were not invalidated by one “error”. 660 Accordingly, the program graduates who had 
previously been hired on were allowed to stay.661 01 surmised their view: “Larry was a 
disgrace to us” – his failure was a breach of trust, the failure of a man, not of the 
program that gave him a second chance.662  
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As the Hendricks case broke, Western State Hospital writ large was under 
pressure. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals moved to strip the 
hospital's accreditation in December 1978. An appeal by the DSHS netted a one-year 
stay on that threat, giving the hospital until January 7th, 1980 to come up to standard. A 
Medicare certification team scheduled an evaluation just three days before that date, 
putting the hospital at risk of losing around two million dollars a year of Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement.663 The Senate Subcommittee of Social and Health Services 
did a wider survey of Washington’s mental health apparatus in the second half of the 
year. Western State Hospital was one of their biggest disappointments.664 Chairman 
Senator Talmadge chided that “Television and medication [were] the primary treatment 
modes”.665  
The Hendricks case, like the Ruzicka case, exploded in the public eye. The News 
Tribune covered the story in particular detail. In general, however, the press coverage of 
the story gave little attention to the program and focused on the sordid details of 
Hendrick’s crimes. The case did not leave nearly the same lasting negative impression 
that the 1977 escapes and the Ruzicka murders left. The Washington legislature, in 
contrast, was greatly alarmed. It perceived Hendricks’s relapse as the sign of a grievous 
error. For the first time, the legislature seriously considered ending the program 
outright. The Senate Subcommittee on Mental Health ordered an investigation of the 
program’s practices. It put two psychiatrists, a judge, and a prosecutor and mental 
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health professionals from around the state on the investigating committee, aptly named 
the “Committee for Review of the Sexual Offender Program at Western State Hospital”. 
Dr. Howard B. Kellogg Jr. of Seattle was the chair, giving the committee’s findings the 
abbreviated title of the Kellogg Report.666 Their investigation started in May with a tour 
of the program and continued through the summer. It only sought and solicited 
testimony about the program, which it obtained from a variety of sources, including 
offenders, their wives, prosecutors, practitioners across the state, and program staff, 
among others. It did not conduct statistical research beyond the figures provided by the 
program itself.667  
The committee released its findings in August 1979. It was succinct but wide-
ranging. The committee placed the primary blame for recent events on overtaxation of 
program resources. The program staff felt they were going through the motions of 
reviewing new applicants. They were so backlogged in working with those already in 
the program that they could not properly investigate the new arrivals from court.668 
Treatment had become significantly less effective as screening deteriorated. Staff 
morale was ebbing, which resulted in correspondingly poor resident engagement.669 The 
issue was not solely fiscal. Dr. Kellogg highlighted inadequate training, a “lack of 
currency” with new trends in “[treating] the sexual deviant”, poor protocols for staff 
replacement, and the overburdening of the directors as significant issues with the 
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program.670 The primary problem, however, was the state’s overreliance on the program 
for all sex offender treatment in the state. The program could not continue to be an all-
in-one solution for all “treatable” sex offenders.671 
The committee prescribed both changes in state policy toward sexual offender 
rehabilitation and changes in the program itself. Their policy recommendations were 
grand. In a move echoing di Furia’s aspirations at the program’s start, the report called 
first and foremost for greater “community” outpatient evaluation and treatment of 
nonviolent offenders. Dr. Kellogg alleged that Western State’s institutional nature made 
it unnecessarily restrictive for most treatment.672 The state was spending a lot of money 
to treat offenders who would comply with a less-restrictive program in a residential 
facility, and their distance from the community made treatment less effective than it 
could otherwise be.673 It further demanded the state found institutional treatment 
programs to reach offenders not eligible for the Western State program, such as 
juveniles and the incarcerated. Unless treatment alternatives were established, Western 
State’s program would be packed until it burst. Within the program, the committee 
asked for a few changes in the hospital’s procedures and treatment modality. 
Admissions needed to become more intensive, and reports to the court had to be more 
detail.674 The committee underlined that security was not an issue. Conversely, 
monitoring and security measures had become too intensive, and were beginning to 
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obstruct treatment.675 The program needed to focus on determining what sort of 
offenders the program was most effective at treating, and refocus their efforts 
accordingly. The only explicit recommendations were that “Ex-offenders should not be 
hired as therapists in the future” and that the administrative staff should sit in on group 
sessions more frequently.676  The report concluded by reiterating that the program could 
not be expected to perform under its current burden. The majority of the program’s 
issues would be resolved when the program returned to a sustainable population and 
funding level, and when the state diffused its current high degree of responsibility 
among a number of programs. These findings were effectively ignored. No initiatives to 
create “sister” programs or in any way reduce the population burden were undertaken. 
The Kellogg Report’s only human target of criticism was the program’s 
administrative staff. In its view, weak leadership and overly rote reliance on “formula” 
had allowed the fiscal problems to overwhelm the program to the extent that they had. 
Its summary on “Personnel” read:  
“Finding: Although the committee was very impressed with the commitment of 
the therapy supervisors and found these first-line staff to be very articulate, it 
concluded that the entire administration of the hospital was deficient in allowing 
the morale of the staff and quality of the program to deteriorate.”677  
This paragraph originally stated the administrators in question to be Dr. 
Voorhees, the then-director of the Legal Offenders program writ large, and Ms. Saylor, 
the director of the SOTP. However, the paragraphs were rewritten before release, 
removing their names. The two practitioners, along with the other relevant hospital 
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staff, were still named at the beginning of the paper, but they were not explicitly 
connected to the program’s “poor administration” within the body.678 DSHS secretary 
Gerald Thompson stated he sought the change to “avoid [claims of] libel”.679 The move 
met with a flurry of negative press coverage, accusing the Secretary of shielding 
“bureaucrats” from public review.680  The program publicly acquiesced they knew of 
the troubles in the report. For the next seven years, the program staff maintained in the 
press that the program was overburdened, as it had grown too quickly, and that it 
needed more qualified therapeutic staff.681 Later, as questions of efficacy moved to the 
fore, it would concur that the program’s ability to treat offenders was uncertain.682 
Program staff did not mention the anonymous 1976 recidivism survey, instead stating 
that all previous surveys had been too limited in scope to provide meaningful data.683 
The public, however, was less interested in the report’s findings or the program’s 
overall efficacy than in the possibility of a resident’s escape. State Senator Beverly 
Vozenilek mailed a survey about a number of issues to voters in the 28th legislative 
district of Washington. About seven out of ten respondents stated they sought a 
“moratorium” on commitments to the SOTP until proper “revisions” in security were 
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made.684 No such revisions were made at this time, but the public’s opinion was clear: 
the program was considered a threat, not a possibility.   
A smaller story broke later in the year which suggested program resident 
dissatisfaction was also growing. The complaints came from the romantic partners of 
some of the residents. They attested the staff were interfering in the resident’s romantic 
relationships to an unacceptable degree. The intrusion extended, the women alleged, to 
demands on the offenders to divorce their wives or stop seeing certain women 
altogether. According to these women, the staff thought they were “no good” for the 
offender, for one reason or another.685 The offenders said that their group would refuse 
to let them progress in the program steps unless they terminated or greatly altered their 
relationship with their wife. To add insult to injury, the program’s couples therapy 
sessions were increasingly infrequent. The wives alleged that “more often than not”, the 
meeting wasn’t held because the therapist wasn’t available. They stated they felt 
expendable, like the staff considered them trouble and would prefer not to have to deal 
with them, rather than participants in therapy. They also resented the casual attitude the 
staff expressed toward conjugal visits. The “NPR” room that married couples could 
spend the night in was the butt of staff jokes. “Everyone on the ward [laughed and said], 
‘Have a good time!’”, according to one woman.686 The program’s disregard of the 
wives was especially frustrating to them because they thought the program was 
otherwise very effective: “The change in my husband [was] just incredible since he 
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started…”.687 The wives went straight to the press with their concerns, prolonging a 
very bad year in the public eye for the program.  
The staffing deficit was worsening. Mr. Fitzsimmons, the author of the 1979 
Legislative Budget Office audit of Western State, described the staffing situation at 
Western State as akin to the desperate situation in the film Beau Geste, with di Furia as 
the Calvary commander holding his distant, outgunned outpost as long as he can. 
“Staffing… has not been adequate [hospitalwide] for the last seven years.”688 
Fitzsimmons stated that this deficit was resulting in poor patient care in the hospital 
generally. Maureen Saylor, while serving as program director, was tasked to be The 
1974 Guided Self-Help report had prodded for a full-time staff member to conduct 
research and evaluate treatment outcomes. A few former offenders had been hired to 
assist with research endeavors, but shortly after the turn of the decade, they had all left, 
for differing reasons. The new restrictions on hiring graduates prevented their simple 
replacement.689 
One final cut capped off the decade. Gulio di Furia, the hospital’s superintendent 
for fifteen years and a long-time defender of the program, retired from the 
superintendent position on December 1st, 1979, and took over the position of Clinical 
Director. He left the position of his own volition, stating he had wished to return to 
clinical work for some time. He was replaced by Dr. Morgan Martin, previously the 
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superintendent of Eastern State Hospital. 690  While di Furia still had significant clout as 
Clinical Director, his move ended the administrative beneficence the program had 
previously enjoyed from the hospital administration.  
Western State’s program was not the only one in trouble. The Atascadero 
program had, despite major efforts at improvement, gone down in flames over the 
course of the 1970’s. The program’s problems and widespread academic criticism in the 
1960’s were greeted with legislative disinterest. Escapes were minimal following the 
unrest in the early ’60’s, so the California legislature allowed commitments to continue. 
Atascadero maintained a “remarkably stable” population of ~425 “mentally disordered 
sex offenders”, or MDSO’s, through the mid-seventies.691 A 1971 attempt at 
refashioning the program with more independence for residents and resulted in the 
entire staff being summarily dismissed by the hospital administration.692 It was only in 
the 1970’s, when security concerns reemerged and community hostility intensified, that 
the legislature became concerned about the facility’s efficacy.693 A number of notorious 
re-offense cases at the end of the 1970’s intensified the situation.694 The scholarly 
community remained skeptical of the hospital’s devotion to its stated principles. A 1976 
survey of MDSOs committed in 1967 found a slightly higher rate of recidivism for 
those discharged from Atascadero than those sent to correctional institutions for both 
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sexual and nonsexual offenses.695 Paul Burkhardt, the program’s director, had little to 
say. “[We] don’t claim any cures”.696 A 1978 evaluation revealed massive problems 
with hospital conditions and with treatment efficacy. An attempted reform failed, and in 
1981, the legislature ended state commitment of MDSOs to mental hospitals. 
Atascadero was thereafter a facility only for offenders found legally insane or seriously 
mentally ill.697 In short, California ran an ever-changing program for two decades that 
cost a small fortune without denting recidivism, despite attempting a similar approach 
to the Western State program, predicated on a shared “milieu” philosophy.  
Western State was now the only survivor of the first-wave institutional sexual 
offense programs on the West Coast, and it approached the dawning 1980’s in 
trepidation. In 1974, the program had endured its first major security and confidence 
breach. The program chose to maintain course, believing that the preexisting model was 
the best possibility for treatment for the majority of the program residents. The 
program’s foundations, however, were unstable. It had been rocked by repeated scandal 
and by continuing budget overruns. On a deeper level, the program’s policy and 
philosophy was being challenged by direct evidence to the contrary. The Hendricks 
murders showed that an offender who had undergone a stay in treatment, then 
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maintained involvement in the program for almost a decade, could remain a dangerous 
threat to the population at large.  
Bursting: Fear, Overload and Termination, 1980-1986 
“I believe treatment is a privilege. If they fail, as far as I’m concerned we can 
lock them up and throw away the key.” 
- Maureen Saylor, Program Director, in Jan Gildenhar, “Sex offenders: WSH treatment aims at 
molester’s responsibility and sense of himself”, The News Tribune, Tacoma, WA (January 3rd, 1984), B-1. 
 
At the time the Kellogg Report was published, the field of sex offender 
psychology and treatment was undergoing rapid change. The Western State program – 
inpatient, group-oriented treatment – was an increasingly rare breed. The existence of a 
rehabilitative prison alternative for sex offenders had dwindled greatly from the heyday 
of the sexual psychopath legislation in the 1950's. Only nine other states now operated a 
"formal" program within a mental hospital.698 Only two of those besides Washington, 
Florida and Oregon, had more than fifty patients.699  
At the dawn of the 1980’s, it was clear that the program could not continue to as 
it had before. According to the new batch of experts, sex offenders were a “predator” of 
habit, with a callous disregard for others and a pathological need to hurt for sexual 
satisfaction. Self-understanding and socialization were relevant but improving the 
offender’s social skills and mindset alone could not cure their black hearts. The field 
redirected its focus toward behavioral conditioning and individualized therapy to 
combat the impulses of the offender directly. The Washington Legislature expected 
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significant change from the program in line with these demands, but gave few resources 
to accomplish this. The Western State program’s application of this understanding 
would result in the program’s therapists being allocated more authority and control, 
inevitably reducing the role of the group in its own treatment. This process would not 
play out fully, as before it could be completed, further re-offense scandals would lead to 
a deafening public outcry and the abandonment of the program by the DSHS. The 
program was ultimately terminated on security concerns, rather than any of its concrete, 
separate issues. The change in professional opinion that rendered the program obsolete 
was made exponentially more powerful with the addition of public fear, soon 
invalidating not only Western State’s program, but the concept of sexual offender 
treatment itself. 
The changes in sex offender treatment came from new findings in a number of 
areas, including clinical efforts, criminology, crime statistics, as well as from a wave of 
public demand for harsher penalties for sex offenses. The changes in sex offender 
theory and clinical practice were the first to manifest. What had, as previously 
discussed, been a field dominated by theorization was suddenly awash in surveys of 
conditioning, tentatively harnessed to assorted group therapy approaches. The journal 
Criminal Justice and Behavior had a symposium on sex offender treatment in 
December 1978. The articles in the International Journal of Offender Therapy’s 1972 
symposium had focused on singular patients or offenders being analyzed, with varying 
Freudian psychoanalytical explanations given for the offenses. The new articles were 
almost the complete opposite. Becker et. al’s “Evaluating Social Skills of Sexual 
Aggressives” and Marshall and Barbaree’s “The Reduction of Deviant Arousal” went 
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over the clinic and recidivism-measured efficacy of new aversive conditioning and 
socialization interventions. These approaches, most of which were conditioning-centric, 
were new and largely untested. The researchers give clear goals and hypotheses for 
using their interventions with the particular offenders surveyed, and how a particular 
therapy might be applied in a clinical setting.700 Becker et al.’s research, for example, 
attempted to use timed shocks during deviant fantasies. First, the shocks would be 
placed near the end, to condition the offender to dislike the deviant behavior. Then, the 
shocks would be moved to the beginning of the fantasy, which the researchers hoped 
would associate pain with the offender even thinking about committing the act.701  One 
article, “Blame Models and Assailant Research”, stuck to evaluating theory, but even 
then it examined what clinical approaches were “linked” to what model of blame, and 
how programs could balance programs designed to repair the offender’s ability to 
socialize with offender- based introspective therapy.702 The actual form of the clinical 
work these experiments were undertaken in was still given minimal attention. Practical 
therapeutic approaches, at least, were at long last getting their time in the spotlight. 
The new therapies were accompanied by new theories. Nicholas Groth and Jean 
Birnbaum’s Men who Rape, published in 1979, was the landmark work that led this new 
wave. It articulated a new theory of sex offender motivation, based on individual case 
histories and clinical experience. Dr. Groth had run varied attempts at sex offender 
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treatment at the Bridgewater State Hospital in Massachusetts, an institution that would 
now be labelled a “forensic hospital”. Working with Birnbaum, he abstracted his 
experiences to a “model” of sexual offenders that emphasized the evidence found in 
individual case studies, which he presented with liberal quotation from the 
autobiographies of the offenders. He sought to demonstrate the psychic conflicts and 
personal qualities he believed he saw in offenders. He emphasized that his examples 
came from offenders he had worked with personally, and had seen throughout their 
court committed stay, rather than as a private analyst or in a more temporary evaluative 
setting.   
His conclusions greatly differed from those of Karpman, Gebhard, and other 
previous investigators of sexual offense. Sexual offenders were thought much more 
sadistic and entrenched in their habits due to a denial of the feelings of others.703 Groth 
found that the Western State program’s belief that the offender was “yearning” for a 
mutual, fulfilling relationship, but unable to achieve it, was less than accurate. Groth’s 
interviews with offenders suggested that their socialization problems varied greatly. 
Some had no desire to establish meaningful relationships with people, while others were 
socially “well-adjusted” but had little feeling or interest driving their actions.704 This 
left them with a motivational gap, as well as a behavioral problem. “Nurturing” 
motivation in them was thought by Groth to be a much greater challenge than helping 
someone get in touch with their feelings. Groth was, in short, proposing that the sexual 
desires of the sex offender held much more weight in their misbehavior than previously 
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thought. While these desires were still thought to be related to their emotional problems 
and socialization issues, and were triggered by problems handling stress, they were not 
solely extensions of these problems. The drives became self-sustaining and self-
reinforcing. They could not be reduced to a manageable level by targeting the 
offender’s psychological issues alone.705 
These new theories undermined Western State’s belief that group therapy and 
discipline alone could lead to significant changes in behavior.  Karpman, Gebhard, 
Roth, and the other theorists who had influenced Western State’s program considered 
the crimes of the offender misguided attempts to fulfill the same drives for sex or love 
and affection that the “average” person harbored. They became along paths that were 
bizarre, unacceptable or harmful to others because of assorted traumas, which resulted 
in a pattern of antisocial behavior. Restoration of “normal” means of satisfying these 
drives was the goal. The Western State Program did not fully subscribe to the 
theorizations of earlier psychologists, and it explicitly claimed to know little about the 
etiology of sexual offense.706 The offender’s conscious understanding of themselves and 
antisocial behavior had led to serious social maladjustment. The offender sought 
acceptance and affection as well as sexual pleasure when they raped others, and they 
had to be coached into understanding their needs and responsible means of meeting 
them. Letting offenders learn, through the group environment, how they could achieve 
acceptance properly in society would help meet the needs that drove them to offend. As 
Groth and others made offense-oriented inquiries in the 1970s, this “neurosis” 
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hypothesis was downplayed.707 Self-conception and sexual desires were increasingly 
disassociated. The sexual offender had issues with managing relationships, but they 
were not believed to be the primary motivation of their offenses. They did not seek love 
or acceptance with rape, but a fundamentally different fulfillment that no degree of 
interpersonal connection could supply.708  
Authors differed on what exactly the desire was, and where it came from. Groth, 
writing with Ann Burgess, used the labels “power” and “anger” as two subsets of rapes 
of dominance, in which the rapist sought raw power over the victim. The fantasy they 
employed was a potentiation of the pleasure of their assault, not an internal excuse for 
it.709 In Men Who Rape, he furthered his argument: the molestation of children was not 
fixation in a lower level of psychosexual development, but a desire to occupy a position 
of total control. Whether or not force was used was relevant, but that did not change the 
fact that all offenders wanted control, not traditional sexual desire.710 Feminists, most 
notably Susan Brownmiller, tended to finger a patriarchal, inherently violent 
formulation of society as the key instigator in sexual assault. Social expectations of 
men’s behavior and repeated undermining of the legitimacy of women’s actions and 
feelings led to some men putting themselves before others in every capacity.711  
The new theorizations strongly suggested that drastic changes were needed in 
preexisting treatment programs. The Western State SOTP’s major target in therapy had 
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been the offender’s self-conception. The offender was believed to harbor a crippling 
fear of opening oneself to others and a deep-seated sense of inferiority, and this led him 
to, “secret”, hurtful means of satisfaction. The new theorizations pointed to a much 
different approach. Sexual offense was now considered deeper-seated and more 
satisfying to the assailant than previously thought.  Rehabilitation could no longer 
solely target a conflict of character. The sexual offender’s negative self-image as a 
“criminal” and antisocial tendencies were relevant, but they were not the central factor. 
Creating a healthier self-conception would not stop their offenses. The professional 
community now believed they had to minimize in the offender a cruel pleasure he found 
in violating others, as well as condition them to recognize and avoid their cycle of 
offense. Group therapy alone would not moderate the behavior of most offenders.712 
They could not eliminate deviant arousal with conditioning, but they could make it less 
satisfying, and “interrupt” the offender’s reinforcement of the urge. The offender had to, 
from then on, manage by conscious effort what treatment professionals believed to be 
constant, intrusive deviant sexual fantasies and urges.713  
There was little delay in the acceptance of these new theorizations. The result of 
the acceptance of this characterization of offenders was a dramatic shift to behavioral 
interventions and individualized, cognitive-behavioral therapeutic methods in sex 
offender treatment. This new course of therapy was well-described in Anna C. Salter’s 
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Treating Child Sex Offenders and Victims: A Practical Guide, one of the most popular 
books of its day on child sexual abuse. Salter’s detailed description of therapy methods 
deemphasized analysis into the offender’s “motivation”. The theorization of sexual 
abuse as a cycle is described in some detail, but the offender’s character issues are given 
minimal play. For Salter, the motivation of the offender was irrelevant to their 
treatment. What makes an offender “aggressive” or “self-effacing” or any other kind of 
mood or mindset was not discussed.714 Instead, deviant sexual desire and a fundamental 
lack of empathy were considered the primary acting principles. These had to be 
eliminated at all costs. The pattern of offenses didn’t matter. Therapy remained as a 
series of confrontations. However, these confrontations didn’t come from other 
offenders. They came from a therapist, along with exercises assigned to individual 
offenders that focused on strategies to recognize denial, avoid temptations. Accepting 
responsibility for one’s past was underlined. Embracing responsibility for one’s future 
was not.715  
The Western State program had identified patterns of offense and typified some 
aspect of sexual offense, such as the use of an “outlet” for emotional stress and a 
generally antisocial lifestyle. The new wave of sexual offender rehabilitation took this 
much further. The offender was now a Sexual Predator, a role with a believed specific 
“track” of behavior. The term “predator” became increasingly common at this time, 
with explicit connotations of cruelty and an animalistic “need” that was not consciously 
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negotiable.716 Therapeutic interventions with sex offenders had to address every detail 
of a believed “cycle” of sexual offense common to all.717 An offender who claimed to 
have had a passing, inappropriate attraction that pushed them to offend, a situation 
Gebhard described as common in his survey, was thought a liar.718 The sexual 
offender’s wrongdoing was thought to preoccupy to the extent that repairing their lives 
would require non-stop effort and extreme measures of restraint by the offender.719  
Salter and other contemporary theorists did not entirely discard the principles behind di 
Furia’s approach. The day-to-day behavior of the offender was the central object of the 
therapy. Psychoanalytical theory was soft-pedaled. The sexual offense, however, was 
recast as the product of brutal desire, freed by weak empathy. It had to be targeted and 
destroyed by reconditioning the offender using the stimuli that excited them. The unmet 
social needs and maladaptation of the offender were not totally discarded, and group 
therapy was given some mention, but the text downplayed the ability or interest of the 
offender to engage with treatment, and suggested desires of such intense strength that it 
would take complete commitment to overcome them.720 In short, a profound change in 
mindset resulted in a profound change in the field’s “best practices” of treating the 
offender. Dr. Abel’s private-practice aversive conditioning went from a niche approach 
to an essential feature, and the offender was now expected to demand intensive, explicit 
attention.  
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The Pierce County Sheriff's Association Child Abuse Manual from 1983 spoke 
to the tenor of the times. It was created not for the police, but for the general public. 
Reporting and preventing child abuse was, according to the introduction, the public’s 
responsibility. The abuse a child was so damaging that waiting for police to detect it 
would help the child too late. All adults needed to know the warning signs and 
vigilantly watch for them in all children they came in contact with.721 Child sexual 
abuse was given heavy emphasis as the hardest to detect and the most important to 
watch for.722 In short, the response of the law enforcement to a believed “epidemic” of 
child abuse was appealing to the public to assist in their capture and prosecution. The 
public were no longer asked to make a welcoming community for the released offender, 
but to assist in finding and reporting rape and molestation to law enforcement. What the 
justice system will do with these offenders should not be their concern. 
Indirectly, the manual attested to the growth of private, outpatient treatment for 
sexual offenders in Washington State  In 1972, Seymour Halleck, evaluating the sex 
offender field, had complained that a lack of outpatient sex offender treatment was 
preventing therapy from reaching those who needed it.723 What treatment programs 
existed were almost exclusively inpatient, and many, including Western State, refused 
“volunteers” who had not been tried and convicted of a crime.724 These programs were 
challenged by a tide of anti-rehabilitation thought that was circulating in correctional 
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philosophy at the time, spearheaded by Robert Martinson’s 1974 essay “What Works? – 
Questions and Answers about Prison Reform”. His paper evaluated rehabilitation efforts 
conducted under Corrections departments nationwide. His goal was to determine, 
simply put, what methods and environments worked in criminal rehabilitation and what 
didn’t. Discouragingly, he found “nothing work[ed]” for rehabilitating prisoners, no 
matter the program’s nature, size, intensity, or location. 725 His findings were widely 
reported, and prompted a backlash against rehabilitative programs within prisons for 
convicts nationwide.726 Within Washington, there was never an in-prison rehabilitation 
program for sex offenders, but the results emboldened correctional authorities to refuse 
any responsibility for the impact of prisons on a released offender’s behavior.  
As rehabilitation was shooed away in corrections, it perched onto “community” 
treatment. Over the 1980’s, outpatient or “community” therapy for sex offenders 
became more popular nationally than the previously dominate inpatient, “residential” 
approach.727 This trend began early in Washington. These practices rarely saw patients 
seeking therapy of their own volition. Most often, a stint in therapy was assigned by 
parole boards or other court figures following a convict’s release as a parole condition. 
The programs grew with the growth of outpatient mental health and the growth of 
sexual offense convictions. Because of their “target audience”, these programs were 
strictly outpatient. They did not have inpatient facilities, and were, by and large, not 
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equipped for patients with severe mental health problems. These programs varied their 
length and technique, but the overwhelming majority were of the new, behavior 
modification oriented style. The justice system embraced this move to outpatient 
treatment. The Western State Program’s belief that prison would “harden” the offender 
and make treatment difficult was ignored.728    
As Western State’s program became increasingly crowded and the waiting list 
expanded, many offenders sentenced to short terms were directed to community 
programs instead. The priorities of these programs were, in a word, different than the 
Western State program. One of these programs was the Incest Treatment Program at the 
“Comprehensive Mental Health Center”.729 The advertisement was targeted to the 
offender’s wife – the offender was always described as male and a proviso stated that 
the program was best suited for married couples. The program offered comprehensive 
therapy, with individual sessions for the husband, the wife, and their child or children, 
alongside group sessions. Throughout the long-form advertisement, language better 
suited to customer service than medical advice was used: "We want to welcome 
you...We are pleased that you have made the commitment to deal with the sexual abuse 
within your family....You may want to remember [these signs that your partner is 
lying]..."730 This program was wholly paid for by the family in question. There was an 
$150 evaluation fee per adult and fees for each appointment thereafter. "Medical 
Coupons" could be used by needy families. The advertisement asked any reader who 
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could spare the money to consider a sponsorship for a “child” who could not afford 
treatment. 731 The program gave particular attention in the ad to its skill in calming 
children. Staff worked with law enforcement to develop a special room, decorated with 
a colorful mural, for child “interviews” about abuses. The staff claimed they had a set of 
techniques that made children feel comfortable giving testimony about their abuse, and 
promised they could ensure the information was complete enough to make it admissible 
in court.732 The program was quite large, and saw 387 people for treatment in 1982, just 
three years after its 1979 founding.733   
The tide of change was not only sweeping in new treatment modalities. Inpatient 
approaches were rapidly incorporating cognitive-behavioral approaches as well. Oregon 
State Hospital’s program in Salem, Oregon, was a pioneer in using aversive 
conditioning and Cognitive-Behavioral  “treatment modules”. The hospital had 
attempted treatment for sex offenders back in the 1960’s. According to Jenkins, in 1963, 
a “special facility” had been constructed for those “found to be sexually dangerous to 
children” at Oregon State Hospital. It was the “first of its kind” in the U.S.734 This effort 
appears to have fizzled, as  no further mentions were made of a program in Oregon in 
the secondary literature for two decades. Whether this silence was an accurate 
representation of the state of Oregon’s sex offender treatment is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  The story as it is generally described restarts in 1975. The Oregon 
Legislature mandated that the Oregon Department of Corrections and the Mental Health 
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division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources735 create mental health 
programs for criminals of all stripes. They developed a number of programs over the 
next few years, some residential at Oregon State Hospital, others outpatient. Their sex 
offender treatment program opened its doors in 1979.736 One of its first directors was 
Steve Jensen, a veteran volunteer coordinator from the Western State program. 737 By 
1981, it was already achieving national notice, including a writeup in the New York 
Times.738  
The Oregon program took a lot of inspiration from the latter-era Western State 
program, but its integration of behavioral therapy rendered it drastically different in 
practice. It was an intensive residential treatment program inside of Oregon State 
Hospital, a state mental hospital in Salem, Oregon.739 The offender’s outlet was here 
called the “deviant cycle”, and like at Western State, it was not simply the sexual 
offenses themselves, but a host of behaviors coupled with a negative mindset.740 The 
offense was an “active” process, reached by a series of “apparently irrelevant decisions” 
The other members of the therapeutic group had to learn the characteristics of the 
deviant cycles of the other group members. The group sessions emphasized “respectful” 
discussions in group. Offenders gave one another “feedback” rather than issuing 
confrontations.741 This was supplemented with a fantasy/behavior log, education 
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modules in subjects like “anger management” and “parenting”, and a number of book 
reports.742 Poor self-esteem and socialization were considered major precipitating 
factors in the offense, and were targeted with particular classes in interpersonal skills. 
Offenders who did well in the sessions were promoted through a series of six steps, 
through a work-release phase, then released.743 The program was much less “group-
led”, but it still relied on the ability of the group to correct its members behavior, and it 
operated entirely within a minimum-security environment in a mental hospital.744 
The Oregon program made two defining changes from Western State Hospital’s 
approach: the innovation of the use of the “penile plethysmograph” in behavioral 
condition and the establishment of a complex outpatient program run in the surrounding 
community. The “penile plethysmograph” measured the strength of an offender’s 
erection. A number of previous sex offender treatment programs had used aversive 
conditioning to attempt to reduce the arousal of the offender to deviant material.745 The 
most noteworthy practitioner in the U.S. was Gene Abel, who published a number of 
pioneering studies on the use of aversive conditioning through the early seventies.746 
The Oregon program tied the two together, the conditioning serving as therapy, the 
plethysmograph as its test. The offender took “baseline” plethysmograph tests. Program 
staff determined what deviant fantasies he had by consulting his case history and 
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measuring his response to certain images. When they had found what images in 
particular aroused him, they began forcing the offender to view the images over and 
over again, this time with a “putrid odor” piped through a tube into his nose. These 
sessions happened twice a week. The plethysmograph was used to track how much a 
particular stimulus was dulled over time, by hopefully showing weaker and weaker 
erections from the same pictures / types of pictures.747 The only other program that 
could be found which tracked the results of aversive conditioning with a 
plethysmograph was an effort in Wormwood Scrubs in England, which took place at 
around the same time.748 Otherwise, it had only been tested in experimental settings by 
researchers such as Abel. The staff had to build their own plethysmograph from 
scratch.749 The combination achieved rapid popularity within sexual offender treatment, 
and by 1987, it was used in almost every program that used conditioning, earning an 
entire chapter devoted to it in the defining work A Practitioner’s Guide to the Treatment 
of the Sex Offender.750 The machine was believed by staff and patients to be foolproof: 
“I knew there was no way to beat that machine. A man could fool the program, but 
there is no way to lie to your own body.”751  
The second major innovation was the gradual outpatient program, later labelled 
the “containment” model.752 The program ran on a minimum term of 15 months.753 
Oregon’s Sexual Psychopath statue was, surprisingly, still on the books until 1980, but 
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the program did not use it.754 The program instead screened volunteer offenders from 
corrections who had less than two years left before parole. The offender had to, among 
other things, assure staff he had no intention to leave the state upon completion of the 
program.755 Once accepted, the offender entered the program for at least the remainder 
of his sentence. His positive development in his treatment did not accelerate his 
release.756 The “steps” allowed for graduation to work release, but they did not 
supersede the inmate’s sentence. When the inmate had completed their sentence and 
reached work release in the program, they began working in the community while still 
living at the hospital. The phase was considered “crucial”, and they remained full-time 
participants in the program while their progress was tracked.757 When they reached the 
discharge stage, the offender was asked to live within a certain distance from the 
hospital.758 They had a complicated set of parole requirements and had to meet with a 
parole officer at least once a month. The courts and the hospital, therefore, were both 
kept aware of his activities, and were able to monitor his ability to return to society.759 
The program’s combination of cutting-edge treatment and a stepwise reintegration 
pleased both the program staff and Corrections, resulting in minimal escapes over the 
program’s lifespan, participation by the justice system, and a claimed ~14% recidivism 
rate.760 These advances were rewarded. Through the 1980’s, the program was 
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considered a success by the public, the legislature and the profession, for effectively 
combining security and later surveillance with treatment.761  
Oregon’s advances gained it national renown and wide public acceptance. In 
1983, a couple years after its founding, it appointed Robert Freeman-Longo as the 
program’s director. Under his tenure, the program maintained its forward momentum in 
pursuing new treatment modalities. He was one of the early adopters of the Relapse 
Prevention treatment philosophy, a group-centered approach that sought to define the 
offender’s cycle of violation and teach him strategies to leave it and avoid it for good.762 
His efforts to codify this and other behavioral interventions led to a series of impromptu 
meetings of the program clinicians and private practitioners from the area. This 
ultimately led to the creation of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, 
which remains to this day the preeminent association of sex offender treatment 
providers.763 In Barbara Schwartz’s defining survey of sex offender programs, 
conducted in 1987, it is mentioned again and again and described as an innovator in 
almost every capacity.  
Western State’s program, in comparison to it and to other programs nationwide, 
seemed outmoded. From 1970 to 1980, the actual therapy undertaken by the groups 
changed little. There were a number of program innovations, most notably the “buddy” 
system, but not therapeutic ones. Following the Kellogg report’s criticism on this fact, 
                                                        
761 ibid, 32, 37. 
762 A Practitioner’s Guide, ed. Schwartz, xiii; Freeman-Longo and Wall, "Changing a Lifetime of Sexual 
Crime” 58-62; Robert E Freeman-Longo and Fay Honey Knopp, "State-of-the-Art Sex Offender 
Treatment: Outcome and Issues", Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 5 no. 3 (1992), 
145; Schwartz, “Overview”, 364. 
763 Schwartz, “Overview”, 370. 
  
211 
 
the program worked to come into line with the field’s new findings. The program added 
masturbatory reconditioning to its therapeutic repertoire in 1982 and aversive 
conditioning ala Oregon in 1984.764 The masturbatory program was akin to others 
developing around the country. Offenders presented detailed description of an 
acceptable masturbatory fantasy. On staff approval, they masturbated alone in special 
on-clinic “lounges”, narrating the whole time into a cassette for later staff playback and 
analysis.765 The aversive conditioning program was functionally identical to Oregon’s. 
The offender was sat in a chair in front of a projector. Sexually explicit pictures of 
children and/or women in peril were projected, accompanied by a foul smell, to 
associate the stimulus with discomfort.766  Western State was only a few years behind 
the curve when it implemented therapies. Professional opinion on sex offender 
treatment had shifted so drastically in the last decade, however, that their absence was 
increasingly unacceptable. For some practitioners, a program without aversive 
conditioning may as well not exist.767 
The addition of these modalities brought the program closer in line with the 
mainstream of sex offender treatment. In the process, however, the authority of the 
residents in the treatment group was eroded. The nature of aversive conditioning and 
masturbatory reconditioning precluded meaningful group input and oversight, 
weakening its authority. As discussed earlier, the program had previously assigned a 
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“buddy” for almost any situation, including meetings with therapists. The goal of this 
practice was to ensure honest communication between the therapy supervisor, the 
resident and the leader, and to give the group leader the maximum degree of insight 
available into the resident’s behavior.768 For both masturbatory and aversive 
conditioning, the group leader’s presence in the session with the resident would not only 
be extremely uncomfortable, but it would not offer much insight. The new programs 
also demanded more frequent meetings with therapists, and the program began phasing 
out having the group leader or another “buddy” present for these sessions. The offender 
was expected to report back to their group about their behavioral sessions, but without 
the buddy as a “witness”, many were less than forthright.769  Alongside this, the 
therapies were hard to discuss on a meaningful level in group. They sought to modify 
the offender’s subconscious. Practitioners talked through the process with the offenders, 
but the actual mechanism of therapy was based on the offender’s response to negative 
stimulus, not on any conscious realization.  
The new therapies weakened the group’s authority, but these losses were an 
inadvertent casualty of implementing a new, non-group treatment modality in the 
program. One other major change, however, was an intentional and explicit deprivation 
of agency from the treatment groups unrelated to the rollout of behavioral thearpies. In 
1984, the program ended group voting on observation candidates. Groups could no 
longer choose, or get a say in choosing, what offenders would be kept beyond 
observation. The program switched to having a separate, 30-offender “observation” 
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group for new residents, which operated away from the others. This new group ran 
through sessions like the others, but the admittance of an offender was entirely on the 
decision of the program staff, and the group they were reassigned to once they were 
admitted had no say in the matter.770  One of the key facets of the group – evaluating the 
new offenders – was taken away. The group was increasingly reverting to an arena for 
therapy, with “membership” being granted at the discretion of outside authorities, and 
with the responsibility of treatment increasingly delegated to the program staff, rather 
than to the group members themselves. One of the few things that remained the same 
was the continued use of volunteers for psychodrama sessions, which remained much as 
before through 1985, albeit with a much lower public profile.771 
In a strange twist, the program was rapidly becoming the dominant population 
of Western State Hosptial. Deinstitutionalization in Washington had slashed Western 
State’s “civilian” patient population over the 1970’s. Meanwhile, Western State’s sex 
offender resident burden intensified. In 1977, the hospital’s average daily population 
was down to 821, about 400 less patients than 1972. Of these, 204 were sex offenders, 
and another 135 were mentally offenders, making a total offender population of 339. 
Only 482 of the 821 “average daily” patients were nonoffenders.772 What was once a 
program in the hospital was increasingly the primary function of it. The problem was 
worsened by a lengthening of inpatient treatment stay from an average of 15 to 20 
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months to an average of 24 months.773 Setting up the sister program in Eastern State had 
helped for a time, but at the rate offenders were being referred to the program, the 
population would soon surpass those levels regardless.  
As a stopgap to the increasing program population, the program instituted a 
waiting list for offenders who were referred to the program by sexual psychopath 
evaluations. The list began in 1980.774 By the end of the year, there were 59 offenders 
waiting for evaluation.  By the end of 1982, there were 145. While the offenders waited 
to be evaluated, they were held in county jails, worsening preexisting jail overcrowding 
and angering local law enforcement.775 The percentage of offenders that were declared 
sexual psychopaths and put on review by the program remained large. The program 
had, at the start of the 1970’s, evaluated over 80% of sex offenders convicted of a crime 
in Washington. As of 1983, the number they observed had been reduced to 38%, but the 
massive increase in reporting and imprisonment for sexual offenses meant the actual 
number of offenders observed was only slightly smaller.776  
Over the last five years, program expectations on the staff-to-patient ratio had 
significantly changed. The average group size in 1983 was twenty people. MacDonald 
had considered a perfect number of men in the group in 1969.777 Now, numerous 
observers and program staff claimed that groups of this size were overlarge, both for 
staff and residents. One article stated with alarm that the resident, evaluating members 
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of his group, was supposed to keep track of 19 other residents and their habits. The 
1983 McGovern report stated that new therapy supervisors were needed as soon as 
possible to maintain an effective therapy environment.778 On a more practical level, the 
program could no longer keep pace with the number of offenders seeking commitments 
for observation. The courts maintained a constant, heavy flow of offenders for 
observation, and the state kept the purse closed.  
Hiring new supervisors and keeping them was hampered by the positions’ 
extremely low wages. In 1971, the position of Therapy Supervisor I, a starting position 
for new staff, had a salary of around $800 a month.779 In 1983, the same position earned 
around $1,300 a month, >$600 below the previous salary adjusted for inflation.780 These 
proportional decreases held for all classes of Therapy Supervisors. The decline in wages 
made it difficult for the program to attract quality candidates. A number of old hands 
left for better pay and conditions elsewhere, and some of their replacements departed 
after just months with the program.781 For similar reasons, the lack of support from the 
state government severely hurt staff morale. Tim Smith, a therapy supervisor who 
became assistant program director, left the hospital in 1981 because he viewed the 
program’s relationship with the courts as “untenable”.782  
As conditions worsened, the problem worsened. Therapy supervisors were being 
assigned their own groups after only six months with the program and little outside 
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experience.783 The “disruption” of high turnover was thought especially disastrous on 
the rehabilitation of the “insecure” offenders, who took it as rejection.784 Training these 
new hires without a full complement of experienced personnel was something the 
program was totally unequipped to do. MacDonald had created a specific position for 
the program with few parallels in the Washington mental health system, yet neither he 
nor his successors create a manual or training protocol for therapy supervisors.785  
Further, there was no higher education program in sex offender education. All new hires 
effectively had to learn by experience and by the guidance of their colleagues. When the 
experienced staff began to leave, there were fewer and fewer old hands for the new 
arrivals to learn from.786 What this meant was a sharp decline in quality of care. In one 
horrible case, 01 remembered that two “young women therapists” became romantically 
involved with a resident in their group. The groups involved knew of the transgressions, 
but the members were afraid to approach other staff because the women controlled their 
future in the program.787 The relationships continued until one of the residents came 
forward. The therapists in question were let go. The residents were asked if they wanted 
to continue with the program, and one asked to be sent back to jail.788  
Costs continued to rise, following the program’s population. In 1980, the cost 
per patient per day of the program in direct costs – the costs of employing the staff for 
the program and securing equipment specific to it – was ~$11.50. The cost of the 
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program in toto – incorporating the cost of maintaining the ward, its prorated share of 
Western State’s general expenses on food and medicine and other supplies, and other 
vital but nonimmediate elements – was $43.20. In 1983, these costs began to spike, 
reaching $15.84 for direct costs and $58.66 in toto. The estimates for 1985, prepared for 
the December 1985 audit by the Legislative Budget Committee, were a staggering 
$30.58 in direct costs and $71.17 in toto.789  
Western State Hospital’s program limped along through 1982, with public 
interest fading in the absence of sensational news. In early 1983, the holding pattern 
was broken. James Lee O’ Neil, a resident, violently raped a number of women while 
out on work release the previous fall and winter. The Pierce County Sheriff suspected 
him in a total of a dozen cases, and he was ultimately charged and convicted of two 
counts of first-degree rape.790 The charges came as a shock to program staff. The 
offenses were committed within the short, supposedly fifteen-minute interval O’Neil 
had between leaving the hospital and the start of his work shift. Before entering work 
release, O’Neil had undergone “two batteries of intense interviews with therapists and 
appeared in Superior Court”, according to procedure.791 While the offenses were 
ongoing, his group, the last line of defense, did not notice a change in him that the 
program architecture believed they would.792  O’ Neil was able to continue his assaults 
until he was caught red-handed. The three women assaulted later sued the state, 
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claiming that the state and the Program were negligent in allowing him on work 
release.793 These lawsuits were given lots of press coverage and their results were front-
page news.794 Ultimately, the parties settled for a total of $485,000.795  
The program was promptly hit with another series of negative reports in the 
press. This time, however, the criticisms began to stick. To a large extent, however, it 
was for all the wrong reasons. The O’ Neil case was a failure of the program to perform 
as either treat an offender or understand and predict his offenses. He did not “escape” 
the program. The newspapers, however, focused overwhelmingly on security, and 
implied that all offenders were like O’ Neil – biding their time, waiting to violate 
others, and seeking the quickest route to do so. One piece asked rhetorically: “[This 
case] is leading the public to wonder once again whether it is too easy for a rapist or 
child molester to escape jail by going to Western State…” Ms. Saylor argued that the 
program was not a “cushy alternative” to jail. The author made it clear she was 
unconvinced.796  Much of the rest of the article expressed concern about the lack of 
evidence for, and research in, sexual offender treatment.797 The “success stories” that 
had run in the 70’s were gone, replaced by a flurry of articles and reports that sharply 
criticized the program. Sexual offenders were repeatedly intoned as untrustworthy, 
dangerous deviants who were barely kept in line by maximum-security prisons and who 
were one trigger away from a rape spree.  
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The Lakewood Press, the local paper that replaced the Suburban Times, was 
especially vitriolic. It claimed that the program, variously “infamous” or 
“controversial”, had been opposed for quite some time in the area. The program’s 
continued existence was insinuated to be the result of tone-deaf bureaucrats trying to 
protect other government employees, jeopardizing the community in the process. The 
paper’s single greatest concern was program security, with all other questions on sex 
offender treatment being lower-level points of interest. 798 The public was, in short, 
more concerned about the possibility of future escapes of sex offenders than of the 
program’s accomplishments and failures so far. The arrival of the theory of the habitual, 
difficult-to-cure, marauding sex offender made the program seem a time bomb, rather 
than an opportunity. For the next three years, public agitation over the program would 
remain constant, with a similarly angry press following beside. 
The state’s reaction was initially more muted. The program was tasked with 
performing an internal audit, again with the help of Dr. McGovern, and was ordered to 
maintain grounding for six weeks on the authority of the Head of the DSHS, Alan 
Gibbs.799 McGovern’s second investigation found that conditions had deteriorated 
significantly since the 1979 Kellogg Report and the First McGovern Evaluation. The 
program had remained much as it was, treatment-wise, despite explicit 
recommendations to change. However, McGovern argued this was not because of 
disinterest in implementing new methods. Instead, “untenable circumstances”, notably 
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very low salaries, had resulted in the program losing “key staff”. What staff were left 
had their hands full administering treatment, rather than researching up-to-date 
techniques.800 The report concluded by commenting that refocusing the program to 
lower-risk offenders was well-advised, but that nothing could fix its problems except 
better staffing and time for those staff to improve treatment.801  
The changes in therapy were accompanied by a significant increase in outside 
demands on program security. A special security staff now monitored the offenders at 
all times on the recreation fields and in the gymnasium.802 This increase in staff resulted 
in a mammoth spike in treatment cost. The program’s “direct treatment costs”, which 
was in the main staff salaries and pay, went from $889,756 in Fiscal Year 1982 to 
$1,139,000 in Fiscal Year 1983 then to $1,560,599 in Fiscal Year 1984.803 The same 
program that had rejected a perimeter fence just over a decade ago had installed cyclone 
fencing around its recreation area.804 
The hospital, pressured by the state to do something, expelled 28 residents who 
had made unsatisfactory progress.805 The state, however, chose again not to grant the 
program any assistance, financial or otherwise. Commitments continued to arrival at an 
unsustainable rate, even with the program’s negative publicity. As of October 1984, 
there were 217 offenders in the program, 27 on work release or outpatient and 190 
inpatient.806 The program continued course as best it could. 
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The concern was notably “local”. O’Neil’s assaults had occurred entirely within 
a short radius of the hospital.807 The public had shown intermittent resistance to the 
program since the Zuricka escape, most of which was concentrated in a few outspoken 
advocates. Shirley Winsley, later a Lakewood District Representative, was one of the 
first. She went before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1975 asking that the program 
be moved to Corrections.808 It was not until the early eighties, however, that opposition 
among a few developed into fervent rejection and materialized as political opposition. 
Unsurprisingly, it was the residents of Steilacoom and Lakewood, the two towns that 
surrounded Western State Hospital, which mounted the strongest opposition. The public 
outrage manifested itself in numerous town hall meetings with the program staff. These 
meetings began in the wake of the O’ Neil in      The tenor of these meetings became 
more hostile as the decade wore on.  In one noteworthy incident,  “…the wife of the late 
Larry Hendricks” came to a meeting in October 1984. She asked if program graduates 
were “no longer… employed in the program”.809  Lang Taylor, a therapy supervisor, 
assured her the program no longer believed that it took a sex offender to cure one, and 
that the initiative had ended.810 Another woman told reporters she had been assaulted by 
a released resident and wanted the program moved to a prison as soon as possible.811   
The program’s problems were exacerbated by the arrival of a new, drastically 
different sentencing procedure for all offenders. In 1981, the state legislature authorized 
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the creation of an independent body, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, to 
establish a system of standards regarding the sentencing of various crimes.812 The 
commission was established to create an entirely new protocol for sentencing offenders 
that would replace the parole board for most cases. The state believed long terms of 
post-sentence observation had proved ineffective and expensive. Crime had to curtailed 
by other means.813 It was three years before the committee unveiled its new defined-
sentence system. The system, in brief, weighed the criminal’s history and the 
seriousness of the current crime in a formula. After completing the formula and arriving 
at an “offender score”, the judge arrived at a range of sentence length and, if applicable, 
a set of acceptable alternatives to a jail term. For example, for possessing or distributing 
child pornography, the defendant “scored” a point in their “offender score” for all adult 
felony convictions before this trial and half a point for all juvenile felony convictions. 
For a “0” offender (no previous convictions), the sentencing range was 15 to 20 months. 
For a “5” offender, the sentence was 41-54 months, and for a “9 or more” offender, 87-
116 months.814 Most offenses had a similar scale that was “tight” for its minimum 
sentences and wider for “higher-scoring” offenders. The judge’s choice was limited to a 
sentence length within the suggested range or, if the guidelines permitted it, a prison 
alternative. In our example, the judge could choose a 90-day confinement followed by a 
maximum of two years community supervision if the defendant was a first-time 
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offender.815 The change significantly reduced a number of sentences for the majority of 
offenders, at the expense of possible early release on parole: “do the crime, do the 
time”.816   
The execution of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission's recommendations 
occurred in steps for the first half of the decade. House Bill 1247 was the step which 
amended the laws and sentencing provisions defining the sexual offender. It followed 
the recommendations of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission with only minor 
deviations. The “sexual psychopath” classification was eliminated, but the procedure 
was retained.817 There were a few modifications. The offender, the court or the state 
could make a motion for an evaluation to determinable their suitability for treatment. 
Both Western or Eastern State’s program were included as suitable programs.818 The 
judge sentenced the offender to a term of confinement. The evaluation period for the 
was shorted to thirty days. The offender did not have to be certified as insane or any 
other specific legal or medical classification.819 From that point on, the admission 
process was effective the same as before. The hospital was still unable to “permanently” 
reject an offender from participation.820 
The act itself stood to have little impact on the program’s continued operation in 
of itself. The new sentence lengths it commissioned, however, were a problem. For 
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more “minor” sexual offenses, such as indecent liberties and incest, it gave sentence 
lengths as low as twelve months. This was not enough time for an offender to enter the 
program, meaning that many of the low-risk, first time offenders the hospital thought 
were the best treatment candidates were now disqualified.821 The community at large 
was, of course, similarly upset about the short sentences, believing them inadequate 
punishment for sexual assaults.822 The state, regardless, maintained course. 
 
Figure 14: Two residents in the program play checkers. A bunk bed is seen left. From 
Cary Quan Gelernter, “Failures cast cloud on sex-offender program”, Seattle Times 
(March 7th 1983), C2. 
Opposition to the program was building in a number of corners. The larger 
Department of Health and Social Services distanced itself from the program. A 1984 
annotated literature review on sex offenders was drafted within the Division of Juvenile 
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Rehabilitation. Its paragraph on “psychological therapeutic techniques”, distinguished 
from drug therapy and behavioral modification therapies, gave a one-line description of 
group therapy, citing three one-off attempts. The program at Western State is not 
mentioned.823 In the legislature, the situation was worse. Sexual assault was a hot issue. 
Over thirty bills, resolutions and memorials about the topic were introduced in the 
1984-1985 legislative session seeking to modify the state’s procedures surrounding it.824 
The strongest opposition came from an increasingly unified Lakewood Chamber of 
Commerce. The business owners were convinced that, regardless of the efficacy of 
treatment, habitual criminals had to be handled away from populated areas. They were 
risking the health and safety of bystanders by maintaining the program in the Lakewood 
area, and it had to be ended.825 In spring of 1985, they adopted a resolution demanding 
the state move the program to a prison. With the help of District 28 Senator Stan 
Johnson, the group “arrang[ed] a private meeting” between the Chamber and state 
officials on May 8th, 1985, at the hospital. The participants included Karen Rahm, 
secretary of the DSHS, Lyle Quasim, director of the Mental Health Division of the 
DSHS, and Superintendent Hamilton.826  
The program’s last blow was dealt in February 1985, when its last newsmaking 
escape surged into the headlines. David Jay Sterling, known as the Hazel Dell Rapist, 
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had been tried and convicted of a string of violent rapes in October 1982 and sentenced 
to five consecutive life terms. The term was suspended while he was sent to be 
evaluated for SOTP eligibility at Western State Hospital.827 The staff rejected him as 
unfit for treatment, but the Clark County Superior Court judge, Thomas Lodge, 
overruled their rejection. He was sent back to court two more times by the program 
staff, who sought his move to prison on the grounds that he was a noncooperative 
escape risk. Sterling’s defense and the courts sided against the hospital, and he 
remained in the program despite the staff’s objections.828 He made little progress in his 
two years of commitment. On February 28th, 1985, Sterling ran away from his “buddy” 
in the hospital gymnasium and escaped the hospital.829 A national manhunt began. It 
took the authorities until January 1986 to find Sterling, following a four month stint on 
the FBI’s Most Wanted List.830  
The repercussions were severe. The Hazel Dell rapes had caused a local panic, 
and the escape of their perpetrator enraged the Washington public. The 218 residents of 
the program were grounded, and stayed grounded for months.831 Work release was 
halted, the wards were locked, and meals were brought to the residents.832 Two other 
program residents who had been committed to the program despite internal objection 
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were sent back to court.833 George Nagayama Hall, acting director of the program, 
resigned from that position later in the year and became the supervisor of the program’s 
“psychological services”.834 Saylor returned as director. 
Senator Phil Talmadge had been chairman of the Washington Senate’s Mental 
Health Subcommittee in 1979, when it ordered the Kellogg Report and oversaw a larger 
investigation of the hospital.835 In 1985, he had moved up in position, to Chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Sterling escape prompted him to look into the 
hospital once again. “Skeptical” of the hospital’s claims on reduced recidivism and 
sharing the security concerns of a number of his compatriots, he asked the Legislative 
Budget Committee for an audit of the program.836  In the meantime, a bill was 
introduced in the Legislature to allow the program staff to fully control who was 
admitted into the program. It also demanded that the hospital provide “complete 
security”. The bill passed the House, but Talmadge introduced a striking amendment 
which eliminated the security clause, and the bill died in dispute. The result was that 
any action on the program was delayed until after the audit came in.837 Why Talmadge 
did this is hard to figure, as he was one of the sharpest critics of Western State Hospital 
and the program in general.  
The new push to end the program had an ally in the standing Western State 
Hospital Superintendent, Dr. Darrell Hamilton. He sought the end of the program as it 
stood, and its replacement with a more rigorously controlled research program. He 
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believed that small-population investigation of treatment modalities was what the field 
needed. “If we’re going to keep [sex offender treatment] in a hospital, let’s study it 
clinically and hopefully come up with some answers”.838 However, he repeatedly stated 
that closure, especially in the wake of the Sterling escape, was a valid option. Talmadge 
and many others were not of the same mind. In their view, the time for experimentation 
in treatment method had come and gone, and the justice system did not need a program 
which tested each offender by trial and error. Superintendent Hamilton disagreed on 
that point, but he agreed with them that a program within a prison was preferable, 
especially if the audit showed poor results.839 Attorney General Ken Eikenberry argued 
that the offender’s frequent recidivism showed they were already “hardened” to the 
extent that mattered to the public. “Operational” security was more important that the 
concerns of “treatment professionals”.840 Talmadge surmised his position as, “If we find 
the program doesn’t do any good, why have it at all?”841 The Western State Program as 
it stood was openly on trial, but the entirety of sexual offender rehabilitation was being 
put to the question. The existence of meaningful sexual offender treatment in 
Washington in the near future was predicated on the legislature’s findings.  
While the legislature awaited the audit results, the program was hogtied by 
perpetual grounding. Grounding had been initiated by the staff “approximately one-half 
hour” after Sterling’s escape. After two weeks of meetings, the staff settled on a series 
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of changes to increase program security. Outdoor and off-ward recreation was limited to 
higher “step” offenders than previous. Outdoor recreation was moved to “a particular 
fenced area” for offenders below step four. Recreation staff would be given walkie-
talkies. Lastly, two “high-risk” cases were sent back to the courts.842 On March 14th, Dr. 
Gordon Hall, the Acting Program Director, implemented these changes and sent word 
of them to the Superintendent and to Lyle Quasim, the Director of the Mental Health 
Division of the DSHS. Dr. Hall asked for grounding to end for all but Sterling’s 
group.843 Hamilton and Quasim disagreed with Dr. Hall and ordered grounding to 
continue. The ground procedure was informal, but it appears to have followed some 
chain of command as Dr. Hall did not disobey Superintendent Hamilton.844 The 
program implemented their planned changes and successfully rid the program of all 
offenders the staff believed were not  Grounding continued, and the program’s 
offenders were confined to their ward 110 days.845 Superintendent Hamilton described 
the grounding to the press as an essential stopgap. It kept the community safe from a 
“failing” program whose residents were a serious threat to the community. He explicitly 
asked the public to agitate the legislature to reform or dismantle the program, to prevent 
the issue from being delayed any longer. “If [the public] wants something done, then 
let’s do it. Take those (sex offenders) [sic] away. Take the program away. Make the 
program different. Whatever.” In the same article, he “vowed” not to lift grounding 
until “the hospital staff [was] confident the community is safe”.846 In light of his 
                                                        
842 Krell, Sex Offender Programs at Western and Eastern State Hospitals, 40-41 
843 Krell, Sex Offender Programs at Western and Eastern State Hospitals, 41. 
844 ibid, 42. 
845 ibid, 41. 
846 Gordon, “Can all sex offenders be helped?”, C1. 
  
230 
 
rejection of Dr. Hall’s request to lift the grounding, he clearly was more interested in 
certain safety than what program staff thought appropriate. An editorial published in 
advance of the report thanked Hamilton for putting the community first and seeking 
more than “perfunctory” measures from the legislature on a serious issue.847  
As the legislature waited on the audit’s completion, the grounding continued. In 
late July, the first offenders were allowed outside, into an “approximately 50 by 150 
foot” enclosed space that had been approved by the DSHS. From then on, offenders got 
an average of 45 minutes outside a week.848 Therapy supervisors complained that 
offenders felt they were being punished for something they had no control over.849 In a 
more distressing trend, some offenders applied to transfer to community treatment 
placement. As only the “best” offenders would be accepted to a community program, 
the program was now bleeding its most engaged and most senior members.850 Dr. Hall 
appealed to the Superintendent and the DSHS for the grounding to stop, but he was 
again rejected.851 Meanwhile, the Mentally Ill Offender program, which was “nearly 
identical” in size to the SOTP program, was not grounded. About half the program 
residents judged ready for socialization regularly spent time outside, in the cafeteria and 
in other “public” hospital areas.852  
The auditor wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health 
Services to ask why the SOTP grounding was being continued for so long. The 
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secretary’s response to his letter made it abundantly clear that the Department of Social 
and Health Services was not interested in supporting the program any further, even once 
this incident was over. Krell’s primary questions inquired whether recreation time was a 
“patient’s right”. The secretary denied that it was. In the details of their response, 
however, the secretary veered into much different territory.853 He accused the program 
of leeching staff and resources from other wards in the hospital, resulting in a 
“diminution in the quality of care for the mentally ill”. The program had been budgeted 
for a .22 to 1 staff to patient ratio, but it operated at a .4 staff to patient ratio because the 
recent security concerns demanded more ward attendants and security personnel.854 It 
was, in his view, a parasite on the hospital’s general operations. Yet, when the auditor 
asked:   
“Q. Specifically, what must be accomplished in order to end the grounding?” 
 
The secretary replied: 
 
“Ending the grounding requires… staffing improved to… at least .7 to 1 staff-to-
patient ratio, [to be] accomplished by increasing the staff or reducing the 
population; and…[granting] statutory program authority to [accept and reject 
individuals]”.855 
This was a double bind. The program was obviously not going to get more 
funding from an underfunded Department that accused them of diverting resources from 
the “real” mentally ill. The problem could not be addressed by cutting back on 
commitments, either. They would have to begin intensely screening all referrals if the 
number ultimately admitted was cut in half. This would require the observation process 
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to last longer and would make the waiting list grow all the faster. Then, when the 
number of program residents dropped, the program would become less financially 
“efficient” and earn fresh legislative censure. The Department had made a standard the 
Program could not meet. Their second demand was more reasonable, but the auditor 
argued it made the program wait until the winter legislative session, prolonging the 
grounding for months, and did not address the program’s real issues.856  
In the meantime, staff waited. The increased staff that the grounding demanded, 
and the sudden deprivation of the hospital of its offender labor force, resulted in 
massive cost overruns for both the Program and Western State. The audit’s projected 
Direct Treatment Costs for the program in Fiscal Year 1985 was ~$2,434,000, an 
almost $900,000 increase from the year before. The cost of the new janitorial staff hired 
during the grounding resulted in a further ~$550,000 increase in the program’s share of 
general hospital cost. The program was hemorrhaging money on security initiatives that 
worked against its treatment plan and which deprived it of the program’s best means 
offsetting costs.857 In September, the auditor called a therapy supervisor to discuss 
affairs. The supervisor simply responded: “The morale is gone.”858  
The Legislative Budget Committee Audit was released in September 1985. It 
was the most comprehensive survey of the program in its history. The author, Robert 
Krell, analyzed its staff levels, cost, security protocols, and efficacy, noting when 
possible how it had changed in recent years. The audit listed a number of points of 
failure both within the program, and attempted to place their origin. Krell then triaged 
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his findings based on what was within the program’s capacity to fix, what was the 
responsibility of higher agencies, and what was a problem of the field at large that only 
time and treatment improvement could solve. It concluded with a decidedly mixed 
opinion of the success of the program’s methodology, the cause of its current problems, 
and the value of continuing its initiative.  
The audit conducted the first independently-sourced review of recidivism in the 
program’s history. Its findings were even worse than that the rising figure of recidivism 
that the program had volunteered. All other surveys of recidivism, including the 
“forgotten” 1976 survey, had been based solely upon data collected by the program 
itself. Robert Krell was the first to seek data from law enforcement, notably consulting 
the FBI for arrest data and outstanding warrants outside of Washington. He began by 
noting that "neither [Eastern or Western State] maintains or collects on a continuing 
basis data pertaining to client recidivism", despite being explicitly asked to do so by the 
Senate Committee on Social and Health Services in 1980.859 As a comparison, the 
chance of rearrests and conviction for sexual offenders leaving the Department of 
Corrections was put at 27.8%.860 The auditor began with the data used by the Director 
of the Division of Mental Health in creating his presentation.861 The survey was limited 
to "offenders successfully discharged" between 1970 and 1980, and was conducted by 
requesting criminal history information from the FBI and the State Patrol. Those whose 
records could not be located were excluded, leaving 210 cases as examples. The 
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Director stated that 25% were rearrested for a sexual offense, 18% convicted and 15% 
re-institutionalized.862  
Evaluating this data, Krell did not tabulate arrests, and instead focused on 
convictions and re-institutionalization. He found that the known low chance of a single 
graduate facing a new conviction for a sexual offense was 26.7% and that facing a 
conviction for any other offense ("other than minor offenses such as disorderly 
conduct") was a known low chance of ~8.5%. Re-institutionalization for those 
convicted of a sexual offense had a known low of 21.9%.863 The auditor consulted Dr. 
Hall to determine why the figures differed and discovered that the sex offender program 
only observed re-offenses committed in the first five years following the release. In the 
director’s figures, this eliminated eight new sexual re-offenses and eight new nonsexual 
offenses, dropping the proportions of each significantly.864 Even accounting for these 
changes, the recidivism rate reported by the Director was significantly lower than the 
auditor's. The auditor could not determine a methodological difference that accounted 
for it.865  The Department of Corrections data, which issued the "comparison" figure of 
27.8% for those released from a Washington State correctional facility, did not consult 
FBI documents or other national police agencies, meaning offenders who moved to 
another state and reoffended would not be included in their percentage.866 The auditor 
chastised the DSHS for this “baseless” misrepresentation of the program’s efficacy. 
Krell further noted that this concerningly high figure was from a program that was very 
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selective. Of the offenders who entered the observation, only just over 20% would 
successfully graduate the program.867 A program that was already very particular on 
who entered was seemingly unable to significantly improve on recidivism. Krell 
demanded the program, if continued, conduct more exacting and frequent surveys of 
recidivism in the future.868  
The remainder of the report, however, pointed to a program that had been in 
continuing crisis for years. One of the largest what had been the programs argument for 
years – that the program Krell found that contrasting of the Eastern State program to the 
Western State program revealed how much of Western State’s issues emerged due to 
outside demands, and structured his paper around contrasting the two programs on 
various issues. The two programs, on his analysis, were extremely similar in their 
treatment philosophy and clinical setting.869 In fact, Eastern State was behind in the 
field compared to Western State. Eastern State’s program staff had sought training in 
newer approaches, but did not receive any resources from the DSHS.870 Accordingly, 
the program was still wholly centered on the therapeutic group and had integrated none 
of the novel behavioral methods.871  
The defining difference, however, was that the Eastern State program was 
better-funded and better-staffed. The issue of funding was straightforward. Eastern State 
was budgeted ~$30,100 per year for each offender, while Western State only got 
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$25,976 per year.872 The staffing issue was more nuanced. Western State had seen a 
large increase in aides and security staff over the last half-decade, resulting in a staff-to-
patient ratio of ~.4 as reported earlier.873 The Eastern State program had fourteen full-
time staff and fifty-two residents, resulting in a staff -to-patient ratio of ~.29.874 
However, the audit argues vigorously that Western State is understaffed.875 The reason 
is because the program had a number of aides and nurses, but not sufficient therapeutic 
staff. As the offenders were not acutely mentally ill and could take care of themselves, 
nurses and aides contributed little to their treatment.876 There were instead being used as 
pseudo-security. Eastern State had 5 full-time therapeutic program staff for 52 people, 
resulting in a therapeutic staff-to-patient ratio of ~.09. The Western State program, 
meanwhile, had 13 full-time therapeutic staff for 218 people, making a therapeutic ratio 
of ~.06.877 Further, the therapeutic staff at Western State were burdened with 
administrative tasks, limiting the time they could interact with residents.878 Some 
therapy supervisors had to oversee two groups, making any kind of personal 
engagement impossible. The quality of the staff was also found to be lacking, for the 
same reasons discussed earlier: poor educational opportunities, little on-the-job training, 
and high turnover. 879 In contrast, four of the five staff at Eastern State had over five 
years experience in the program.880 In short, Western State had it bad both ways. It got 
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less money per resident, and its proportionally larger complement of support staff meant 
the lower funds were spread thinner without therapeutic benefit. 
The consequences of this were numerous. Since 1982, the Eastern State Program 
had seen only three escapes, and two of those offenders had returned to the program 
within a day.881 In the same span, Western State had seen nine escapes.882 Staff morale 
at Eastern State was “good”. In Western State, it was “extraordinarily low”.883 The 
program’s security was praised as “remarkably effective” for the majority of 
residents.884  Recent deterioration in the security climate was argued to be the result of 
the program’s internal decay and offender dissatisfaction and Eastern  The Western 
State program had been neglected and overburdened by the legislature, and it needed to 
make significant financial and personnel investments to bring it back to its previous 
excellence.885 If the programs were continued, Western State program was encouraged 
to look to and talk with the Eastern State program to guide its return to excellence.886  
Krell’s conclusions were, in fact, much the same as the second McGovern 
report, and to an extent, the Kellogg report.887 The program’s problems were not rooted 
in a fundamental issue with its treatment philosophy or the clinical setting. The 
problems were diffuse. Alongside this, a number of policy changes were recommended, 
most notably a lowering the population cap, redeveloping the treatment methodology in 
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line with current best practice, and enabling the hospital to reject certain offenders.888 
The audit insisted the program, if retained, be given a much larger budget.889 As a 
warning against a hasty decision to cut costs, Krell underlined that underlined that 
eliminating the program would not cut costs by much in the long run. Sex offenders 
were not compelled to stop offending by a jail sentence. Their future trials and 
incarcerations could be avoided with an effective rehabilitation program. Further, the 
escape rate from low-security facilities was high. Without improving jail security, they 
were as likely to escape from there as from Western State.890 However, he conceded 
that the program was running at serious cost with poor results, and “there [was] little 
justification for continuing the status quo”.891 The programs would disappoint until the 
legislature committed to major investment of time and money. The audit’s first seven 
recommendations suggested a number of possible actions for the legislature to take on 
the programs, with varying costs, but with the ultimate goal of wholesale program 
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overhaul. Recommendation 8, the last, suggested that if the legislature did not wish to 
intervene, it was best to cut their losses and end the programs entirely.892 
 
The audit’s results on recidivism were widely publicized within Washington. Its 
conclusion regarding the program’s overall efficacy was not. As the story saturated the 
local press, it became clear that both the Western and Eastern State programs would not 
survive the winter. Senator Talmadge, speaking to The News Tribune, remarked that 
October that “it seems the Western and Eastern State programs cannot be justified… it’s 
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time to move them out.”893 He promised to sponsor the needed legislation in January.894 
The News Tribune promptly followed in November with an editorial that praised his 
efforts and asked that any new treatment programs be founded within a prison.895 The 
Department of Corrections was not pleased with the idea of gaining custody of 
offenders if the State expected them to attempt treatment. As of 1986, there were no 
state-run programs for sex offender treatment within Washington prisons.896 Corrections 
was not of a mind to start one. “...[D]ifferent legal and philosophical expectations” 
prevented an effective treatment program within prison, according to Robert Trimble, 
the department’s Deputy Secretary.897 Corrections was designed for and equipped to 
handle the confinement of convicted criminals, not their rehabilitation. The Department 
“contend[ed]… [the] DSHS…can provide the necessary security at the two mental 
hospitals to continue the programs there”, and offered to advise the hospital on building 
a more effective security system and protocol.898 Correction’s “solution”, however, was 
not acceptable to Western State. It was already complaining that the restrictions on 
work release were disrupting the resident’s progression of responsibility. Increasing 
security more would challenge the fundamental principle that the group, not outside 
actors, were responsible for minding their behavior, and would discourage self-
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discipline and empathy by making it the security guard’s job the offender behaved. 
Superintendent Hamilton took the same point from another angle: “…there is no way to 
increase security here”. 899 Western State was still a mental hospital, and enforcing 
heavy restrictions on the entire patient population was not acceptable.  Besides, it was 
too little, too late.  
The DSHS’s dim view of the program as a parasite had been part of the reason 
the program was put on trial in the first place. They made no effort to defend it or its 
staff when the judgement fell. When the initial audit report was published in September, 
Director Quasim demurred on the program’s hardships, saying that community safety 
was more important.900 He did not address the auditor’s criticisms of the DSHS. A full 
reply by the DSHS was appended to the report before its December publication. It did 
not discuss the program’s grievances about its extended grounding, even in passing. It 
concentrated on the argument that their demand of drastically increasing the staff-to-
patient ratio reflected the reality of treating sex offenders. The Department argued that 
they had attempted to obtain major increases in staffing and funding for Western State 
Hospital writ large earlier in the year, but they had been rebuffed. Not only the SOTP 
was at risk of collapse because of threadbare budgets, but the whole state hospital 
system. It was not the only mental health program trying to make do with drastic 
underfunding, and it couldn’t expect special treatment.901 The author made no statement 
on what the Department would do, or try to do, going forward regarding the Program or 
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the Hospital. The author made no comment on why the Department made patently 
unfulfillable requirements on a program in crisis. The comments were little more than a 
defense of honor, made for their own benefit. They wanted the program gone. 
Once the legislative session began, the process moved quickly. Governor 
Gardner gave his approval to Talmadge’s proposal later that November, and Talmadge 
introduced the bill, State Senate Bill 4736, the second week of January. It was referred 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee for evaluation.902 A competing bill was introduced 
by the DSHS, which would have allowed the programs to continue with “non-violent” 
offenders only. It received little support or interest.903 A final public hearing on the bill 
took place before this committee on Friday, January 31st, 1986. Again, the Lakewood 
Chamber of Commerce as a unit came to testify the community’s desire to see the 
program ended. More significantly, Senator Johnson asked the DSHS and the DOC to 
provide fiscal estimates for the cost of handling their proportion of offenders over the 
coming year. The DSHS quoted $463,000; the DOC quoted $222,000. Johnson told the 
Lakewood Press that “[the savings] were not lost” on the committee.904 The Senate duly 
passed the bill and sent it to the House.  
There, some political games began between Talmadge and another Democrat, 
Representative Dennis Braddock, vice chairman of the Ways and Means Commission. 
Braddock opposed the post-release counseling requirement the bill included. He 
contended that post-release supervision was against the spirit of the recent Sentencing 
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Guidelines Act revisions and would add a great deal of unnecessary cost for little 
gain.905 Talmadge argued back that the Sentencing Guideline Commission had 
recommended post-release sentencing for sexual offenders, as a special exception. 
Senator Johnson and Representatives Winsley and Sally Walker of Lakewood’s District 
28, all Republicans, claimed the whole affair was interparty politicking, and begged 
their party to ignore it and pass the bill.906  
The debacle continued up until March 11th, 1986, the day of the first vote and 
the second-to last day of the legislative session.907 Democrat anger over the internecine 
conflict between Tallmadge and Braddock and the “general confusion” of the closing 
days of the legislative session resulted in this vote going against the bill, 67 to 27. The 
following day – the last of the session -  Tallmadge worked with the Senate to force the 
bill’s return to the House, and Johnson, Winsley, and Walker rallied their fellow 
Republicans to support the measure. Their efforts succeeded with a reversal of the 
original result, 72 to 26, and the bill was sent to Governor Gardner, with the post-
release supervision clause attached.908 Gardner signed the bill, but vetoed the much-
debated community supervision clause, on the grounds that the reason he supported the 
bill – keeping the community safe from possible escapees and premature releases – was 
rendered irrelevant by an “outpatient” clause.909  
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The program’s fate was sealed. All sexual offenders charged on or after July 1st, 
1987 were to be placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The 
Department of Corrections’ concerns about being made unduly responsible for 
“treatment” were, according to them, satisfied by the final bill. They were directed to 
develop a separate plan for offender rehabilitation, which eliminated their perceived 
liability to determine a “cure”.910 The Western State program was given license to 
maintain course with those offenders who were already in the program and those who 
were scheduled for observation. All residents were required to be out by July 1st, 
1993.911  
Washington State, however, was not finished with the concept of sex offender 
rehabilitation. The Western State principle of “self-guided” therapy, however, was 
something they preferred to leave behind permanently. The law transferring custody of 
offenders to Corrections demanded the Department of Corrections create "a treatment 
program in a correctional setting" to replace the previous one.912 A proposal to meet this 
end was issued by the Department of Corrections in January 1987. The program 
proposed a part “residential”, part “outpatient”913 program at Twin Rivers Correctional 
Center in Monroe. It cited a number of professionals and programs, in and out of state, 
it consulted while designing its program; of these, the only Western State SOTP staff 
member was Dr. Hall.914 The report text only mentions the Western State program once. 
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It is dismissed in passing in the “History” section at the beginning of the report as 
“ineffective”.915  
The program design shared a number of therapies with Western State, but it 
explicitly took a drastically different approach to the offender. The very first program 
objective is Security.916 All of its security measures come from without. The program 
did not attempt to make residents accountable for, or even cognizant of, their role in 
maintaining the program. The second objective is “Integration of Clinical Treatment 
Within a Corrections Environment”, which means the standardization of sentencing and 
resident classification. The “step” system is out, instead replaced by a clear duration of 
treatment that is determined by the offender’s sentence, not their conduct. The 
offender’s progress is effectively irrelevant: “Favorable treatment recommendations… 
will not override the authority of the classification process.”917  
In a familiar measure, the residential program population would be broken down 
into groups of about 14 men apiece, with a counselor and their aide directing therapy. 
This group would meet three days per week in a two hour session.918 The idea that the 
offender must possess the initiative to change was still present. However, the program 
underlined that this is not a “self-guided” treatment approach in any way: “There will be 
no inmate-directed or self-directed programming”.919 All evaluation of the offender 
came from a state authority. “Systematic behavioral assessment” with a penile 
plethysmograph, accompanied by orgasmic reconditioning and covert sensitization, was 
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given an equal share of time – six hours a week – to group therapy. The results of the 
conditioning efforts were discussed in one-on-one therapy, not in the group. An 
additional four hours a week would be devoted to “treatment modules”. These are 
“classes” on assorted topics, including emotional management, life skills, and relapse 
prevention. The resident’s modules were picked for them by the staff, although they 
could participate in more modules voluntarily, if they wished. 920 Similarly, the staff 
provide each resident a “individualized plan with measurable objectives” for their 
treatment. These changes were tracked by their individual therapist and by 
“assignments”, primarily written reflections. These assignments were submitted to the 
staff, and their fellows did not see them.921  
The Twin Rivers program was not a “sentencing alternative.” This program was 
a program within a correctional facility, and its duration was integrated into a sentence, 
not substituted for it.922 The program’s length is set at six months for the “educational” 
stage and twelve months for the “residential” stage.923 If a convict is given a sentence 
with a minimum of four years before release, they will go to prison for two and a half 
years before entering the program. Work release was a part of the program, and was 
proscribed to the last six months of “an inmate’s incarceration” with “close community 
monitoring” in a “Phase II or Phase III work release facility”.924 While the proposed 
program had some similarities to Western State’s SOTP, the two were wholly different 
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on a therapeutic level. The new program obviously different priorities and a much 
different understanding of the sexual offender than the Western State model. The 
“community of rebuilding” that Western State built is over. The offender was in no way 
answerable to his fellows. The individual entered and left at the pace and decision of 
overhead staff. The other participants were irrelevant to this process, and had no say 
who could join their therapeutic group. The classroom environment encouraged, if not 
demanded, that the offenders ignored one another and focused on a figure of authority 
before them. It was individual treatment from a genericized model. The group was little 
more than an audience to each other.  
The program took its fall right as the new wave of sexual offender treatment 
methodology and research began to bear fruit elsewhere. By the time of the 1985 audit, 
there were dedicated residential sex offender treatment programs in 15 states.925 
Outpatient treatment began to grow massively, with CBT / Relapse Prevention oriented 
clinics soon proliferating well beyond any previous high-water mark. A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender, published in 1988 and edited by 
renowned expert Barbara Schwartz, marked the crest of this new wave of sex offender 
treatment. It included contributions from a baker’s dozen authors, representing a variety 
of programs and practices.926 Among the numerous approaches described, the Western 
State program was lauded as an innovator in a nascent field and a landmark in the 
practice.927  The “self-guided group” approach was out-of-step with the field’s shift 
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toward behavioral reinforcement, and was accordingly little-discussed, but the 
program’s cultivation of group accountability was highly praised.928  
Its primary status in the work, however, was not as a clinical example of a 
treatment approach, but as a cautionary tale of the fundamental instability of sexual 
offender treatment. Between the three authors that discuss the program, a core narrative 
emerges which is an effective summary of the view of the program’s end from the 
outside. A handful of high-profile escapes of violent offenders had upset the public. 
They sought the program’s immediate termination in the interest of security. Western 
State had failed to meaningfully track the efficacy of its treatment for decades. It had 
few immediate successes to point to. The much greater than expected recidivism 
statistic revealed by the audit painted the program as wishful thinking, not meaningful 
treatment. The legislature sided with the public, and fear prevailed.929 Other programs 
were warned to maintain frequent contact with the media as prophylaxis against sudden 
changes in public opinion, and to keep detailed figures available about treatment results. 
The era of benevolent ignorance that had birthed Western State’s program was over. An 
outpatient, post-incarceration model had become the dominate mode. Inpatient sex 
offender programs nationwide were now fighting an uphill battle to justify their 
existence to the state and the public.930 The authors reminded the reader that their 
program could be next without the proper precautions. 
The conclusion of those authors and practitioners was a fairly precise 
summation of the circumstances that felled the Western State program. There was more 
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going on, however, that showed serious disturbances inside the program, both practical 
and theoretical, which were threatening to end meaningful treatment. The program 
became increasingly overburdened after the turn of the decade, pushed beyond its 
already strained population limit. Lengthening terms of commitment only exacerbated 
this problem. The program lost many of its most experienced staff due to dissatisfaction 
and low pay, and no meaningful training program existed for new arrivals. The 
program’s central principle of resident leadership was being displaced by the cognitive-
behavioral advancements pioneered elsewhere. The integration of these elements 
violated the principle of group-therapy and resident leadership.  The program was not, 
however, in total disarray. The twin drives of behavioral intervention and “guided self-
help” could yet have been reconciled. However, the program did not get the time to 
accomplish this goal. The Western State Hospital Treatment Program for the Sexual 
Offender was ended for the same reason it was begun: a wave of public fear about 
sexual offense led to a demand for long-term incarceration of sexual offenders, in the 
interest of snuffing out the crimes as soon as they begun.  
 
Postscript: Sexual Offender Rehabilitation / Commitment in Washington Today 
  
CORRECTION: Sexual predators--A headline in Thursday's editions erred in 
saying that a new law in Washington state would mean that so-called sexual 
predators could be kept in jail indefinitely. They would be confined in locked 
treatment centers.  
 
-    Editor, The Los Angeles Times (May 11th 1990), A3. 
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The new wave of fear about sexual offenses was not a short-lived backlash. The 
public became quite committed to the rejection of sexual assault on principle. All 
treatment from here on in was heavily predicated on Washington did not look back from 
its elimination of the program. Following two shocking cases, Washington’s policies on 
sex crime became some of the strictest in the nation. The state drafted a new indefinite 
commitment statue, but this time around, the state explicitly prevented even the veneer 
of care from garnering its “commitment centers”. Sex offender treatment in Washington 
today is wholly predicated on outpatient care, conducted as a condition of release on 
parole. Its “inpatient” approaches within its correctional facilities receive little notice or 
discussion, and are obscure to the extent that almost no information could be located 
discussing their operation. 
As of February 1986, the Western State program was “holding until relieved”. 
The law gave the program a long half-life. Offenders who were charged after July 1st, 
1987 were to be referred to corrections; offenders charged or referred to the program for 
observation before then were to be evaluated and, if eligible, integrated into the 
program as before. Those that the program accepted were entitled to go through a full 
course of treatment within the program. Offenders that were on the waiting list for 
observation as of July 1987 were still eligible to enter the program. The waiting list that 
had been a serious problem for the program now became its lifeline.931 Saylor decided 
to remain the clinical director until the program’s end.932 At the same time, Corrections’ 
attempts to transfer members of the Western State population to their facilities were 
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frustrated by internal delays. W.L. Kautzky, deputy secretary of the Department of 
Corrections, sought approval from the legislature to transfer 120 of the “sex criminals” 
that remained at Western State in February 1988. Those offenders were not moved, 
however, as the Twin River center was not yet complete. It would not be ready until 
October of 1990.933 In early 1990, the program was still carrying a triple-digit 
population figure because of this deferred termination. Saylor, reinstated as director, 
and Dr. Mark Weinrott analyzed sex offender reticence by surveying the remaining 
Western State Treatment Program population.934 Their demographic data was of a great 
deal of interest.  168 residents at the time of the survey. The proportion of rapists had 
risen to around 40% of program members. The program now accepted “approximately 
two-thirds” of offenders who underwent observation. had risen to "approximately two-
thirds". The majority of this figure, however, were nearing the end of treatment. By 
1991, the vast majority of remaining residents graduated to work release or had been 
kicked back to corrections. By 1992, all of the program members had reached outpatient 
status.  
The fadeout of Western State’s program was masked by a massive upheaval in 
Washington State’s handling of sexual offenders. Without the Western State program, 
the options available to judges were limited to the specific sentences dictated by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Act or the use of a community, outpatient Sentencing Alternative 
program. The latter was intended for low-risk, first-time offenders, and had very limited 
security measures. It was available for only a small group of qualified offenders, 
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meaning that most offenders ended up going to Corrections via the sentences imposed 
by the Guidelines. The sentences for first time convicts of some violent sexual offenses 
were as short as a year. With the elimination of parole for the vast majority of cases, 
even chronic recidivists were released with little community supervision or 
reintegration. Two back-to-back cases in the same year resulted in the rapid reversal of 
this situation. Earl Shriner was an intellectually disabled man with a 24-year criminal 
background, primarily including child molestation and property crime. Close to the end 
of his current ten-year prison sentence, he told his cellmate about his plans to molest 
and kill children when released. He drew diary entries detailing his plans and described 
a fantastic vehicle equipped with cages that would hold the children he kidnapped. 
Prison officials heard of his plan and sought to have him civilly committed for mental 
illness. The court rejected their argument, as Shriner had not committed a “recent overt 
act” against another inmate or in any other way committed a detainable crime. He was 
released as scheduled in 1987. In May 1989, he raped and castrated a seven-year old 
boy, leaving him for dead in the woods.935  
Shriner’s case was greeted with a wave of public anger, but in November, it was 
dwarfed by three child murders which enraged the public. Westley Allan Dodd was 
caught attempting to kidnap a child in a Camas, Washington movie theater. Under 
interrogation, he almost immediately confessed to the brutal murders of three young 
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boys in the area.936 Police investigating his home found a diary filled with repeated 
appeals to Satan, asking for “a long, happy life as a pedophile, with plenty of action” 
and other, more specific assistance in carrying out his crimes.937 Dodd had been before 
court for indecent exposure and molestation throughout adolescence and convicted 
twice of serious offenses in five years prior to his murders, included a count of 
“attempted indecent liberties” when he had kidnapped a child. He was repeatedly given 
minimal sentences and released on the condition that he seek therapy, with little 
monitoring of his progress by authorities and no communication between law 
enforcement agencies when he moved across state lines.938 The story became a cause 
célèbre for the indefinite commitment of sexual offenders. Numerous legislators calling 
for reform of the Sentencing Guidelines for sexual assault were soon joined by Dodd 
himself. After a short period of vacillation, he abandoned any effort to defend himself, 
pled guilty, and openly sought his own death. He went to court to block appeal 
proceedings against his own death sentence filed by various civil liberties groups. From 
his jail cell, became an active advocate for punitive, security-oriented sexual offender 
policy and sentencing.939 He repeatedly stated that he was incorrigible in his desires and 
his cruelty. In his final court brief, he stated that “If I do escape, I promise you I will kill 
and rape again, and I will enjoy every minute of it.” Reporters from across the country 
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gave him headline coverage, making his case national news.940 Ultimately, he was 
successful in pursuing his own death by the noose. On the 5th of January, 1993, he was 
hung in Washington State Penitentiary as a crowd cheered outside.941  
 
Figure 16: People standing outside Washington State Penitentiary, cheering the 
execution of Westley Allen Dodd on the night he was hung. Source: Therese Frare, AP 
Wire (January 5th, 1993). 
In the face of overwhelming public pressure, the Washington State Legislature 
moved quickly. With the approval of Governor Gardner, it created a Task Force to 
evaluate the standing law and to hold a number of public hearings on what course to 
take. The Task Force was staffed almost entirely with representatives from Corrections 
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and victim advocacy organizations, with a handful of representatives of sex offender 
treatment also present. No members of the defense bar and no academics were on the 
Task Force. After hearings that focused overwhelmingly on community anger, the Task 
Force submitted its proposal to the  legislature. The bill was passed in days, without 
review, and was signed into law as the 1990 Community Protection Act.942  
The 1990 Community Protection Act, slightly modified, is still in effect today. It 
allows civil commitment of persons following their prison term. Under the law, 
prosecutors or the Attorney General can initiate civil proceedings "for" any person who 
has been convicted of a "sexually violent" crime and is nearing the end of their 
sentence, who was declared not guilty by reason of insanity, or who was declared unfit 
to stand trial for a sex offense. If a probable cause hearing agrees with the prosecutor, a 
judge can obtain a 45-day confinement for the "purpose of an evaluation", which then 
leads to a jury trial predicated on the belief that the person in question will reoffend 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" if not confined. The underpinning demand for this civil 
commitment is that the person in question have some sort of “mental abnormality” that 
predisposes them to these crimes, and makes it unlikely that any sort of community 
rehabilitation would suffice to render them fit to reenter society.943 A person does not 
need to be diagnosed with any particular mental illness, or any illness at all, to be 
confined under this act; they must only be asserted to have this undefined “abnormality” 
to such an extent as to be unmanageable in the community.944 A unanimous jury ruling 
                                                        
942 La Fond, “Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law”, 673-676, 682-683; Jenkins, Moral Panic, 
192, 194; Stuart Scheingold, Toska Olson and Jana Pershing, “The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy”, 
University of Puget Sound Law Review 15 (1992), 816-818. 
943 Office of the Attorney General, "Sexually Violent Predators”. 
944 “The Predators of McNeil Island”, Here Be Monsters, Podcast audio, April 20th, 2016. 
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is ostensibly the final requirement to go ahead with confinement, but as a hung jury 
allows for indefinite confinement regardless, it is effectively a "guilty until proven 
innocent" trial. Despite a number of constitutional challenges on its fairly patent 
conflation of criminal and civil confinement it has survived as the groundwork of a now 
fine-tuned program to hold "Sexually Violent Predators".945 The legislation also created 
the first publicly accessible sex offender registry in the nation.946 The constitutionality 
of civil commitment programs for sex offenders was upheld in the 1997 Supreme Court 
case Kansas V. Hendricks, and the program has continued with minimal oversight 
since.947  
From 1980 to 1990, Washington’s outlook on sex offenders flipped outright. 
The troubled “sexual psychopath” who was believed curable by a mindful group of his 
fellows was replaced by the marauding “sexually violent predator”.948 The laws and 
programs of the state changed in accordance with this new mindset. Inpatient sex 
offender treatment was dramatically amended as per the Riveland plan, creating a 
tentative, control-oriented therapy environment that restricts freedom as much as is 
possible. The Community Protection Act was, in some ways, a “mild” form of what the 
community demanded. The State Senate passed a bill that same year which legalized 
mandatory castration for sex offenders, stating their constituents had demanded it.949 
                                                        
945 Lieb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law, 1-2; Office of the Attorney General, "Sexually 
Violent Predators”. 
946 Lieb, Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law, 3. 
947 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
948 La Fond, “Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law”, 663-664. 
949 Scheingold et. al., “The Politics of Sexual Psychopathy”, 817. 
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Not only was the Western State program gone, but any attempt at a program like it was 
doomed to immediate public outrage and closure.  
The era of the SOTP was over. What has replaced it is, instead, a Special 
Sentencing Alternative. Like the SOTP, it is a court-assigned treatment protocol that 
enrolls the offender in a treatment program as a condition on their suspended sentence. 
In general, the offender still spends a year in prison, rather than the full length of their 
sentence, before entering treatment.  All the actual treatment is outsourced to 
independent therapists, who receive a special license from the State of Washington.950 
The programs are overwhelmingly behavioral, conditioning-approach therapies run by 
private practitioners. Steven Silver’s Northwest Treatment Associates remain in 
business, and remain attached to their behavioral model. The offenders also have to 
accept certain restrictions on lifestyle, meet with a probation officer, and perform any 
acts of atonement the court decides is necessary.951 
The continued existence of even this drastically reduced mandate of treatment is 
in jeopardy. The state has added increasing restrictions on the use of the SSOAA 
throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s.  Most notably, in 2004, the SSOAA was restricted 
only for offenders who “[had] an established relationship or connection to the victim”, 
dramatically reducing the number eligible.952 Accordingly, courts have significantly 
reduced their use of the statue. “Between 1986 and 2004, as a portion of all sex 
offenders sentenced, SSOSA… declined from approximately 40% to 15%”.953 Sex 
                                                        
950 Ted Dale, “Sex Offender Treatment Provider Directory – June 2018”, Washington State Department of 
Health, DOH 695-021. 
951 State of Washington Sex Offender Policy Board, “Review”, 19-20. 
952 ibid, 17. 
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offender treatment in any form is losing ground in Washington public policy. What it is 
today is nothing like what Western State pioneered forty years ago.  
As of 2014, 294 offenders are civilly committed under Washington’s Sexually 
Violent Predator Law for an indefinite term. The majority are committed to the Special 
Commitment Center on McNeil Island.954 More recent data on confinement numbers 
could not be obtained, as the state releases a bare minimum of information on the 
program. The facility is classified as a civil confinement center of “medium-level 
security” but was built and outfitted as a Supermax-level prison. The only difference in 
its operation at present is a reduced number of staff.955 Its water supply is brown enough 
to stain clothes.956 As of March 2016, only 97 offenders designated as Sexually Violent 
Predators and sentenced to the confinement facility have been released. Releases have 
accelerated in recent years, but only because “newer” Class Three predators have begun 
to pile up in less secure facilities.957  
The Special Confinement Center is overseen by an offshoot of the main 
Department of Social and Health Services, the Rehabilitation Administration. The 
primary form of rehabilitation that the facility offers is optional sessions of group 
therapy, which amount to around 5-8 hours per week.958 In 2008, only 51% of 
committed offenders attended these sessions, because previous offenders who had 
                                                        
954 Office of the Attorney General, "Sexually Violent Predators”. 
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completed the full course of the therapy were denied release anyway.959 A 2016 
midpoint evaluation of a Rehabilitation Administration-wide mission plan proposes the 
supposedly novel option of seeking a psychologist from Western State Hospital to visit 
for therapy sessions.960 There is a minimum of treatment personnel, as the majority of 
the center’s budget goes toward security.961 Washington, using an incredibly similar 
indefinite commitment statue, has created the opposite of the Western State program. 
Western State Hospital housed offenders in a minimal-security environment with high 
demands on treatment participation under threat of expulsion. The McNeil Special 
Commitment Center houses offenders in a maximum-security environment, makes 
minimal efforts to provide treatment, and no effort to see offenders participate. The 
offender that doctors once hypothesized was “maladjusted” has been removed from 
society outright for the longest stretch of time the state can manage. The Sexual 
Psychopath has returned. 
                                                        
959 John Q. La Fond, “Sexually Violent Predator Laws and the Liberal State: An Ominous 
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960  John Clayton, “Rehabilitation Administration Strategic Plan 2015-2017 – October 2016 Midpoint 
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Conclusion 
The end of the Sexual Offender Treatment Program at Western State Hospital 
was the fall of one of the largest residential treatment program for sexual offenders in 
the nation. Its closure precipitated from factors outside of its control as much as 
particular events within the hospital. It marked the end of a unique approach to sexual 
offender treatment, and the end of one of the last prison alternative programs of its size 
for sex offenders. Its termination came as sex offender treatment nationwide took off, 
but in a drastically different form and in a drastically different treatment environment. 
Sex offender treatment today is predicated on behavioral modification of individuals 
through aversive conditioning and CBT approaches. Its policies and principles are gone. 
The program had two histories, as it had two lives. Its first history was its 
history in the eye of the public and the state, and its second was its internal theoretical 
and practical development. Its political history showed a vacillating degree of state 
support and public acceptance, with the operating principle being how much attention 
was given to it at any given time. Washington’s creation of a psycho/legal classification 
was part of a national trend of legislation that sought to soothe the public’s fears of 
child molesters by promising indefinite detention. The justice system, for unclear 
reasons, used the statue to a much greater degree than most states, resulting in a large 
number of sexual psychopath commitments to Western State hospital. di Furia and 
Mees created the program in response. Their initial perceived success was accompanied 
by a generally optimistic view of the possibilities of psychiatric care for criminals. A 
new director, MacDonald, arrived just after a child murder in Spokane left Western 
State’s program the designated “center” for all treatment efforts in Washington. The 
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program’s population grew massively under his tenure, and it achieved significant 
public renown in Washington. The staff were able to manage the growth until his death 
in 1977.  
The next two directors, Nichols and Saylor, saw a declining budget and 
departing staff. The state still expected highly of the program and committed large 
numbers of offenders accordingly. However, conditions were deteriorating. The 
program’s previously good rapport with the public was rapidly displaced by fears about 
security. Further, a general pessimism about sex offender treatment became pervasive in 
legal policy circles. State investigations became more frequent following the 1979 re-
offenses of Larry Hendricks, a program graduate and longtime therapy supervisor. The 
investigation’s calls for better funding and staffing were not heeded by the state. 
Meanwhile, the national trends in sex offender treatment had shifted decisively away 
from group therapy toward CBT and conditioning-derived approaches. A number of 
less-than-flattering portraits of the program emerged in the course of their investigation, 
but legislative consternation was not followed by action. A changing current of public 
opinion on sexual offense resulted in escalating demands for highly-punitive and 
highly-secure responses to sex offenders. Exaggerated concerns about the program’s 
security were inflamed by politicians riding on a wave of “law and order” rhetoric, 
backed by punishment-oriented sentencing reform. The foundation of any government 
program is the public’s belief and interest in its outcome. By 1985, the Washington 
public did not believe that sex offenders could be treated, and had long been doubtful 
they deserved the opportunity. The state now prized security over rehabilitation. The 
continued risk of keeping offenders in a low-security facility, however slight, conflicted 
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with the state’s goal of community protection. Therefore, despite advice in numerous 
reports, the program was closed and replaced by strictly outpatient sex offender 
treatment modalities. 
The program’s “internal” history took a much different route. Under the 
leadership of di Furia and Mees, the program was established as a means to an end. 
Inpatient group therapy was the new prescription for a number of psychic ailments, and 
the sexual offender was thought to be dealing with problems of adjustment common to 
most non-psychotic mental illness cases. The maladjusted sexual deviant could learn 
how to socialize, deal with stress, and form attachments properly by talking about his 
feelings in a group. By giving the offender leadership of the agenda, they would take 
the line of inquiry to the subjects of interest. Further, the residents dramatically 
increased the intensity of the group, resulting in a “confrontive” atmosphere that gave 
the offender “no place to hide” his emotions. The arrival of MacDonald resulted in a 
significant reevaluation of what it meant for an offender to lead his own treatment. 
MacDonald saw the group as a key element in fostering a positive self-image in the 
offender. The group corrected him, often viscerally, but it also gave him a receptive 
audience to his changes. Along with Williams, made a massive overhaul of almost 
every element of the program, seeking to potentiate the offender’s exploration of a new, 
“responsible” mindset and lifestyle. When the population dramatically increased, the 
program simply expanded laterally The program staff emphasized continuing treatment 
over documenting and researching it, making the program’s method difficult to follow. 
Only when the program had been challenged by dramatically worsening estimates of 
recidivism and by the horrific “relapse” of one of its most visible graduates did it begin 
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modifying the program. New theories of sexual offense and the behavioral revolution in 
sex offender treatment challenged the principles the program operated under. The 
program sought to integrate its recommendations in stages, which by and large resulted 
in a “hybrid” of behavioral conditioning and the “self-guided group” which proved 
internally divided and ineffective. When the program was shuttered, it was given a brief 
memorial as a pioneer, then buried in a lead coffin by a profession which had 
abandoned its understanding and approach. 
The program’s single greatest failing was its failure to document itself. 
MacDonald in his 1968 historical survey stated that “[a]lthough the program has earned 
a reputation for getting good results among judges, prosecutors and parole officers, it 
had sooner or later to begin collecting and evaluating data systematically and 
objectively.”962 The program never fulfilled this goal, a point that MacDonald by and 
large was responsible for. Its self-evaluation was sporadic and spotty until the very end. 
The best internal survey of recidivism, taken at the program’s height, was quietly 
tucked away, possibly because its figures suggested a much higher rate of reoffense 
than the program previously advertised. Western State was not a research institution, 
but even by the standards of a clinic, its follow-through on treatment efficacy and 
communication with outside parties was poor. Much clearer evaluations of treatment 
practice and how treatment proved effective, if it did at all, was sorely needed for the 
field. The program failed to provide them, even as pressure from the state mounted. Its 
thin staff resources made accomplishing this demand difficult, but even considering the 
difficulties, the task should have been given a higher priority. 
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The establishment of the incurable predator and the end of the program was 
accompanied by the deletion of sex offender treatment from popular discussion. 
Throughout the 1960’s and 70’s, the Sexual Offender Treatment Program at Western 
State Hospital had a significant presence in local newspapers, and the coverage was 
largely positive. Particular offenders, given pseudonyms, described their time in the 
program for the reader.  Photos of groups meeting concluded by noting the possibilities 
of reintegration into everyday life, as changed people. This included both rapists and 
child molesters. Prominent failures got significant attention, and the program’s efficacy 
was broadly questioned, but the principle of engagement and treatment seemed to have 
sound support. In the early 80’s, the press became increasingly critical, but it 
maintained an active interest in the program’s activities. When commitments ended, 
sexual offender rehabilitation in Washington disappeared from view. The Twin Rivers 
program received almost no press coverage before the Shriner case. The Sexual Violent 
Predator commitments at McNeil have been covered a handful of times in recent years, 
but it has not had anywhere near the attention Western State’s program received. Child 
sexual abusers no longer received any press coverage beyond their arrest, on the 
ideological grounds that there was nothing to discuss.  
A major issue in retrospect was the absence of any degree of treatment for the 
program’s “rejects”. The intensity of a full-time, residential therapeutic group centered 
on confrontation was too much for many, and they either dropped out or failed to 
qualify. The State of Washington did not meaningfully investigate treatment 
possibilities for non-qualifying criminals in the program’s lifespan. This lack of interest 
received occasional comment. Charles Morris, writing in the largely positive April 1974 
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evaluation, noted that ~250 offenders were not amenable to the program’s method of 
treatment. “[These offenders] comprise a group with serious sexual pathology who 
probably should be receiving some form of special attention in a program 
somewhere”.963 The legislature was not ignorant of the “gap”. Staff pointed to the 
program’s selectivity frequently in reports, and the rising prison population of sexual 
offenders was noticed by policy advisors. Only a handful of programs, such as the 
outpatient program at the Eastside Community Mental Health Center, were put in place 
before the program ended. They were strictly post-release outpatient programs. Some 
prisons allowed informal efforts by volunteers, such as psychotherapist James 
Patterson’s sessions at Monroe Reformatory in Fall and Winter of 1985-1986.964 
However, these efforts received no funding or support from the government, and doing 
much more than a group meeting and some written assignments was almost impossible 
due to limitations on inmate participation. 965 In Washington, while the Western State 
program ran, failing out was the end of the line.  
As a field, sex offender treatment has made little effort to seriously analyze its 
past. Western State Hospital’s program and program philosophy is absent from the 
modern sexual assault literature. Only a handful of programs – Atascadero, New 
Jersey’s ROARE – have escaped this fate. The self-guided group has been discarded as 
a practical approach to sex offender treatment. In the majority of accounts it is 
dismissed with all other treatment approaches conducted before the rise of cognitive 
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behavioral therapy. Often they only get, collectively, one sentence.966 The lack of 
inquiry into the Western State approach is because of two major points: two very poor 
recidivism percentages found at the end of the program, and because of the program’s 
lack of a clear cognitive-behavioral element. One of the major studies of recidivism, 
conducted by seven of the biggest names in the field, stated flatly that all programs 
before 1980 “would not meet current standards”.967  This deserves reconsideration. No 
program can function when it is given a maximum number of “patients” and a minimum 
of funds. Western State’s method allowed for a degree of resident involvement few 
programs can match. The recent call in the sex offender treatment literature for a more 
emphatic, “listening” therapist suggests that this program, if in that capacity alone, has 
something to offer the modern therapist working with this difficult population.968 The 
Western State Program cannot and should not be revived outright. Its emphasis on 
group accountability, group belonging, and offender participation, however, should be 
reexamined.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: James Ruzicka Confrontation, in Denenberg, “Sex Offenders 
Treat Themselves”, 62. 
This excerpt narrates a group session confrontation of James Ruzicka, referred 
to within the article as “Bill”. It has been included in the interest of showing what a 
confrontation looked like, and to suggest the difficulty of gauging an offender’s 
honesty. 
 
“While the meeting broke up for coffee refills, the two co-leaders worriedly 
discussed a man who had been behaving peculiarly in recent weeks. They decided to 
confront him.  
 When the group reconvened, a leader asked: “Bill, why do you think no one 
likes you?” Taken aback, Bill denied that he felt that way. But several members began 
berating him loudly: “Come on, Bill. Cut the crap. What’s up?” For twenty minutes, 
Bill held out against the verbal assault. Suddenly, his face red and his voice choked with 
angry sobs, he blurted out accusations of mistreatment by other members. He had gotten 
the worst work assignments, he said, and unfair blame for messy conditions in the 
dormitory. He felt the others were being cold toward him.  
The room was quiet. Then one of those who had aimed the verbal barrage at Bill 
said soothingly: “How can we better understand you from now on?”… Although the 
group had recognized danger signs in Bill’s case, it turned out that therapy was not 
enough. It was he who was apprehended…” 
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Appendix B: A Psychodrama Session with “Al”, quoted from Laurel Butler’s 
"The Role of the Citizen Female Volunteer…", 8-9, in Handbook for Volunteers. 
This excerpt describes a psychodrama session between a program volunteer and 
a program resident.  
 "...Al sat quietly in the group. His grayish hair, protruding stomach, and 
downcast eyes gave the feeling of despair to the onlookers. Al felt that he could no 
longer appeal to women because of his appearance and age and as a result had turned to 
little boys for his sexual satisfaction. A role play situation began as the woman 
volunteer began to approach Al as a woman and began to tell him that she was 
interested in him as a man. This evolved into a scene where she played the part of a 
woman that Al had previously been interested in. A general conversation continued but 
almost came to a standstill when the woman mentioned she had two little boys. This 
really put Al into a fluster because this brought back all of Al's fears and all the hurt he 
had caused in the past. At this point the role play almost fell apart, but the volunteer 
persisted and Al continued. During the situation Al hugged the volunteer and began to 
realize that he was still attracted to women and could be accepted by them. It became 
clear that Al still had heterosexual inclinations. This was a positive step for Al because 
he could now improve his self-image and begin the move away from relations with little 
boys. He now had the realization that this was possible." 
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Appendix C: Interview with “01”, conducted on June 26th, 2018. The 
interview has been edited to remove identifying names; otherwise it has been left 
wholly intact. JG is John Giacoppe, the author of this paper. 
 
 JG: How long have you lived in the Washington area? 
01: My entire life. I was born in Seattle. 
JG: Okay. What was your experience in the healthcare profession before 
Western State? 
01: My undergraduate work is in nursing, I have a bachelor’s of science degree 
in nursing. I achieved that in 1962. I went into the Army Nurse Corps six months after 
graduation in 1962, uh, and served on active duty in the Nurse Corps from 1962 to 
1965. After that, I worked as a public health nurse in Tacoma / Pierce County Public 
Health, and then from there I went to work at Western State Hospital and worked as a 
psychiatric supervisor, a psychiatric nursing supervisor, from September of 1970 to 
June of 1973, I think that’s right. After that, in June of 1973, at Western State, I became 
what was then called a “therapy supervisor” and was responsible for providing 
treatment for a group of sex offenders at the hospital. I continued to work in that 
capacity till the program, till I finished my work with the program in 1994, I don’t know 
if you want more after that or not. 
JG: We’ll get there in a moment. 
01: Okay. 
JG: You just stated how long you worked for Western State, it was, uhh, about - 
01: 25 years. 
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JG: 25 years. 
01: Almost 30. It was, what was available in retirement at that time. I have 
PERS 1 retirement. I have five years in the military, including my student nurse time, 
and so I have twenty-five years of actual duty at Western State and five years of 
military counted for five, so it was thirty. 
JG: Okay, so during your time as a psychiatric nurse supervisor, umm, what did 
you know about the sex offender treatment program? Was there much overlap, or? 
01: Well, that’s an interesting question, because when I first went to the hospital 
in September of ’70, my first position was in Geriatric Admissions, it was a head nurse 
on the admissions ward, and, oversaw the patients and providing treatment planning, 
etcetera. Interestingly, at that time the sex offender program placed with the consent of 
the hospital and the units, sex offenders who were in treatment in work positions around 
the hospital. One young man worked on our ward, I think, three or four days a week 
from eight in the morning ‘til noon every day. So, I became familiar with the program 
through him, and talking with him. And then, I went from that unit in… let’s see… it 
was September of ’71, I believe September…. date’s not really important,  
JG: Mhmmm. 
01: but ’71, I went to what was called South Unit and was a Psychiatric Nurse 
Supervisor, and was also responsible for supervising what nursing staff were on the sex 
offender program. So I regularly sat into program meetings, sex offender program 
meetings, staff meetings, what have you, so that I became very interested in the 
program. In conjunction with that, I was also working on my master’s degree at Pacific 
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Lutheran, with a major in psychology and the, the sort of… what’s the word I want to 
use…. and the direction of that degree was learning theory. 
JG: Mhmmm. 
01: And what impressed me about the sex offender program is that, their way of 
doing business, if you will, really was learning theory based. And so, uh, I was almost 
finished with my, with the requirements for my master’s degree, when a position for a 
Therapy Supervisor III opened up, and I filed for it, met the criteria, and was appointed, 
and kind of as an aside, I was the first woman therapist that was ever hired by the 
program. In fact, there weren’t very many women therapists throughout the country that 
were working with sex offenders at that time. That was right after the ERA, the Equal 
Rights Amendment, passed in Washington State, so that changed what state programs 
could and couldn’t do, and prior to that they had always said well, it’s not a good place 
for women, it’s too threatening, blah blah blah, so that changed with the E.R.A. 
JG: So when did the E.R.A. pass in Washington? 
01: Okay, let me think… maybe ’72, I’m not sure. But probably the fall, the 
legislative session of ’72… unfortunately in never really passed, 
JG: yeah, nationally… 
01: the national Congress… 
JG: Well, it did the job in this case. 
01: Yes, it did, it did. Opened up some doors. I was the first but not the last. 
JG: That’s good. Glad to hear that. 
01: So that’s how I got into working with sex offenders. It was not what I 
planned to do. In fact, in that period of time, actually even through the eighties, very 
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few people went into…. there were no programs in school, in that regard, so most 
people kind of fell into it, or got interested or learned about it, and decided to get 
involved. That certainly was the case with a lot of my colleagues, both locally and 
nationally. 
JG: That brings me to my next question about that. When you joined the 
program proper, you said as a Therapy Supervisor III? 
01: Yes. 
JG: Was there a training program for you, upon entry, or did they… 
01: No, there wasn’t. There was no training program per se. They were one of 
the few programs in the country at that time that was doing… inpatient sex-offender 
treatment in a hospital facility. The only other one that I believe I’m aware of at that 
time was a program in Hollywood, Florida that was run by a woman named Jerry 
Boozer [Dr. Geraldine Boozer], and I can’t remember how to spell that name,  
JG: Mhmmm, 
01: but there weren’t that many programs. 
JG: Did the Bridgewater program exist at that time, or? 
01: It may very well have but that was in prison. 
JG: It was a correctional facility, yes. 
01: Mhmm. 
JG: Umm, You were on this program for a fairly long time, so I imagine you 
went through changes in the ward, but, what was the general size of the ward and what 
did the ward look like during your tenure? 
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01: Well, the ward, the size of the ward depended which ward we were on, 
because since the program grew over time. The ward we started on had three groups, 
and the groups were about fifteen to seventeen offenders, they lived on the ward, their 
group room was on the ward, as was the same thing for the two other groups, and each 
group had a person that was called a therapy supervisor that was involved with the 
program. The program’s title at that time was at “Guided Self-Help Treatment”. 
JG: And that would have been in ’73, it would have been “Guided Self-Help 
Treatment”. 
01: Well, it was even before then, but it was in ’73, definitely. 
JG: And, I know at some point the population reached over 100 people, would 
that have been… 
01: Well, at the time…. in 1983 there were 200 sex offenders in treatment in the 
various wards at Western State. And, there were… I think the 200 included the work 
release population which went out during the day to work or go to school and was 
involved with their group at night. And there were also about thirty, maybe more, 
outpatients that were back living in the community that came in once a week, meeting 
with their group and therapist. 
JG: So the 200, then, would have lived, effectively, in the hospital…. 
01: Within the hospital, within the program. But it was… in…. I’m trying to 
remember…. One of the buildings no longer exists. The program actually, I think, it 
started in a ward, in a building called North Hall, which has subsequently been torn 
down as I understand it. It was an old building, and then it was on the top floor, W-1, of 
one of the general psych buildings that was sort of “across the street” from the other 
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one. And as I said, we started with a ward… no. There were three wards on the first 
floor of North Hall, then a big ward at the top of the psych building across the way. We 
eventually took over another full psychiatric ward during my tenure at the hospital, and 
that ward was larger, so I think there may have been as many as… (counts under her 
breath)… as many as six groups on that unit…. ‘cause it stretched forever…. 
JG: So that would be six groups of fifteen to seventeen people. 
01: Yes, but, well, there were… (counts again)… six one place, uh, three… So 
we’re talking, we probably had at one time about twelve groups. That would be nice if I 
could find that bloody… I can’t copy some of – this was an old publication, 1983… 
uhh, and I don’t remember who did this, whether it was our research people, or 
whoever, but…. oh!... I guess I did this…. [hands JG a pamphlet] 
JG: Oh, woah! 
01: Somebody did it, my name it is on it as… 
JG: A participant. 
01: Well… uh …. yeah, I dictated it, so I guess I did it. 
JG: I see. 
01: And this is one in ’79 that I put together, I was invited to the Propwood 
conference in Cambridge, England, so this is another I could also copy for you… 
JG: I’d be very much interested, yes. 
01: Alright, we can do that when we’re done. 
JG: Excellent. Alright. 
[Pause.] 
01: Go ahead. 
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JG: So, so yes. To ask again, did these wards have any… 
01: You can just have one of those [handed me a study.] M_ ** that’s in 
Oregon, he and L_ ** got a grant to do research at the program, and I assisted them so 
they’d put my name on it, too, they were generous enough to do that. 
JG: Yes. Could you move a little bit closer to the microphone? 
01: Yes, that better? 
JG: Yes, that’s fine. Ok, so, um, were the wards any more “secure”, so to speak, 
did they have more security precautions than most of the remainder of the wards on 
[sic] the hospital? 
01: That changed over time. The doors were locked, uhh, when I first started 
working the program. The doors were locked. There were very few nursing staff, there 
was maybe a nursing staff, licensed practical nurse who went between various wards to 
give out whatever medication might be ordered, and then, there was a group charge on 
the ward for each group. This was a member who had reached a point in treatment 
where he oversaw the resident’s work on the unit, was responsible for some of the job 
placement in, in the hospital per se, and sorta, he kinda, the three group charges, if there 
were three groups, were sort of responsible for what happened during the day on the 
unit when there little or no nursing staff… 
JG: When I’ve been reading the literature, I’ve heard them refer to patient 
leaders, would that be the charge you’re speaking of, or something different? 
01: It would have been resident leaders. We didn’t call ‘em patients. 
JG: Resident leaders, okay. You called them residents. 
01: They were called residents. 
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JG: So they were not referred to as patients. 
01: No they were not. 
JG: Noted. Residents. 
01: That was done on purpose, I think, by Dr. diFuria, who started the program 
in ’65… God, what did I do with this… I had, actually, a journal article that was in one 
of the psychiatric journals about the program and I had that somewhere, uh, and all of 
that stuff was in there [points to file] and I don’t know where it’s gone. 
JG: He wrote, he wrote a handful of them that I saw, because there was one he 
wrote with Hayden Mees… 
01: That’s the one. 
JG: Yeah, and they had one describing their critiques of the law, then one about 
the program itself. 
01: The program itself, I think, is the one that I’m talking about. 
JG: And then diFuria wrote another one with MacDonald. Is it [Mack] or 
[Mick]Donald? 
01: [Mick]Donald. It’s M-A-C. 
JG: Yes. In 1970 or ’71. 
01: Dr. MacDonald came to the program in ’68, or some – ’68, ’69, is that right? 
Yeah… 
JG: He must have been there somewhat earlier, because I saw, there was a 
television documentary, or some sort of documentary made about the program that was 
filmed in 7[6] – not seventy, ’66. And he’s on the ward, he’s in it. 
  
277 
 
01: Okay, he came… He and Dr. diFuria had known each other in times past, 
and he was brought to the program to more… to further develop it…. what was his first 
name? I don’t remember… 
JG: George, I believe. 
01: George, yes, George MacDonald. And he was the clinical director until he 
died… ’78, ’79…. somewhere in there, I think. Probably earlier than that, yeah. But 
anyway, around that time. 
JG: Umm, would you say, was diFuria ever effectively clinical director of the 
program or was he primarily a higher-level administrator? 
01: At one point, he was kinda the clinical director or developer of the program, 
and then I believe, in concert or later, he was appointed superintendent, and that’s why 
he, the program was starting to grow, and that’s why he brought in Dr. Mac from 
elsewhere to take over the program. 
JG: Umm, would you say that diFuria and MacDonald had effectively the same 
vision for the program, or was there some difference? 
01: It’s hard to say, but I think they both were interested in a non-psychiatric 
approach, because a lot of other places, and even the hospital itself at one point, prior to 
the advent of the guided self-help model, had been because they had to, sex, quote “sex 
psychopaths”, were committed to the hospital, first for ninety-day evaluation, then for 
treatment, but there was really no treatment…. they stashed them, they placed them in a 
locked ward, and they all were there… somebody once told me they had more nursing 
staff or more staff on that ward than anyplace else, because they were kinda afraid of 
the sex offenders. I’m not, you know ... and as a general rule, uhh, in the time that I 
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worked for the program, and we had, uhh, what we would now call “low risk” people 
and “high risk” people… I never, uhh, I never feared for myself; most people that 
worked there did not… they [the sex offenders] were not overtly aggressive, violent 
people. It wasn’t like the civil – the mentally ill offender program, where they did the 
NGR, the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Evals, 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: when you had people that had pretty severe mental illnesses, and until they 
got them under control, there might be some behavorial acting out. Rarely, rarely, there 
was one report about the time I was involved, maybe a little before, of a guy walking to 
the nurse’s station and exposing himself. And her response was, “Put that thing back in 
your pants and go back and do you work!” And so that’s what he did. And that was the 
end of it. He didn’t do it again, and that’s the only time I can recall… any sex offending 
in the unit occurring. So… 
JG: So, by and large the patients kept… 
01: The residents, yes. 
JG: The residents, forgive me, I’m… 
01: Part of what made it work was that they really did have responsibility for 
one another. They went together as buddies, they left the ward in a small group to go to 
the jobs, there was always a more senior member, step four and above, who was with 
them, until they earned step four themselves, and I really believe they felt a 
responsibility, and it was expected they would confront behavior if they saw [it], and if 
somebody was doing something they weren’t supposed to be doing, then they’d have a 
special group. You could hear that ring out over the ward: “East Group, Special Group.” 
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And, they’d all come in, they’d have a meeting, and talk about what went on. And they 
genuinely, genuinely had a sense that they were responsible for each other and for each 
other’s success. And so, with that in mind, that kind of changes the dynamic. And 
whereas, you know, in prison, if you told about somebody else’s behavior, you’d be a 
snitch, 
JG: Yeah, 
01: Uhh, we kind of crossed out all those words, you didn’t use them. It was 
being a responsible group member if you thought enough of somebody else to point out 
their behavior to them. 
JG: Mhmm. Could you go over the steps, of, not of advancement for the 
residents, but the steps of responsibility, you just made mention to it?... 
01: I think I actually have, somewhere in here… ‘cause I was lookin’ at it this 
morning, and I don’t know where I saw it…. 
JG: It’s quite fine. 
[Pause] 
01: It must be in… It’s somewhere, I just am not finding them. 
JG: I see. 
01: Well, we’ve got “Step of Progress for Work Release” – yeah, this goes back 
to ’79, yeah, and they were modified over time, but… and they were changed as well, 
when things got more secure, because the community got concerned about them, the 
legislature got concerned about them. When I first came to work in the prog ram, the 
group charge carried the key to lock and unlock the door during the day. And, there 
were two guys that sat “CQ” at night, uhh, in order to make sure they stayed up, 
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JG: Yeah. 
01: to make sure that everything was okay, and so they were really in charge of 
the ward. There might be a nursing staff, LPN… 
JG: When you say “guys that sat CQ”, you mean, residents. 
01: Yes, 
JG: Residents. 
01: Residents that sat “CQ”. Usually, well, they had to be step four, but usually 
they were more advanced, step six of seven. And they stayed up and did head check, 
and made sure everything was going well.  
JG: Yeah. 
01:  After there were…. like four guys escaped together one night; they over, 
they overcame the guys, and went out the back door, and were taken away by people 
they’d set up to be there with cars, and after that, uhh, the division of Mental Health, the 
Public, the Legislature said “No no no, we can’t be having this going on, to…” 
JG: To monitor. 
01: Not that the staff couldn’t be hit over the head as well, but… 
JG: Do you know what year that was? 
01: [pause.] Post… I wasn’t director yet. It would have been sometime between 
’75 and ’77, I think, that happened.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: So… things gradually whittled away as the program became more 
prominently known, ended up in the paper more frequently, etcetera.  
JG: I’ll ask you a few more questions about that in a little bit. 
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01: Okay. 
JG: Umm, so we’ve already discussed, hmm... Can you walk me through an 
average day on the ward, at the beginning of the program, then closer to the end of the 
program, in its phase-out period? 
01: Okay, sure. At least, from the time that I came there, they would get up… 
five or six o’clock. Uh, there - There was a definite time. I think they had to be up by 
5:30, but I wouldn’t swear to that. Let’s see… 
JG: I have a schedule, and I believe it’s five-thirty, because they have to be, um, 
they have to eat breakfast before their work shift starts at seven, and breakfast only 
started being served at six-thirty, if I remember correctly… 
01: Yeah, over at – they went over to the main hospital dining hall, as a group, 
escorted by other residents. 
JG: So they ate in the main dining hall. 
01: They ate in the main dining hall, yes. And, then, when that was done, uhh, 
they would come back to the ward, and then the men that were going to other wards to 
do janitorial work would be escorted by two members that were at least step four and 
above and dropped off at the various groups and then they’d come – the men who often 
were group charge – would come back to the ward themselves. So then, the men that 
were usually in observation, the early stages before when they first came in for 
treatment, or first came in for observation, then they would stay on the ward all day, 
uhh, or all morning. They’d do some of the work on the ward, the janitorial work, the 
cleaning, the whatever. And then when lunchtime came along, whenever that was – 
11:00, 11:30, whatever – then the, uh, the men who were on other wards were brought 
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back to the ward and then they went as a group again the lunch, and then after lunch 
they came back to the ward, and I should add that any time they were in or out, they had 
a book that they signed their name in and out, the date, the time, etcetera. And then, the 
guys that were gonna be on the ward, …. I’m trying to remember this - they might go 
back to their job in the early afternoon, but then would be brought back. The guys that 
stayed on the ward stayed on the ward. And then there was a group [session] every 
afternoon from… from two… to five? 
JG: Mhmmm. 
01: …uhh, and dealing with whatever they needed to, some of it was reading a 
guy giving his autobiography, sometimes it would be a step of progress - 
JG: And this would have been the group therapy session? 
01: Yes, it was group, it was a group therapy session. They took the notes for 
their group. They had a secretary appointed, and that guy took notes. And they taped… 
JG: The session, yes. 
01: Each session as well. Someone else was assigned… The therapist was not 
necessarily in the group all afternoon. We did, we may have stepped in, we may have 
monitored if we needed to be there, but a lot of it really was guided self-help. Then, late 
afternoon, the dinner…. They’d come back to the ward after dinner… then, then they’d 
have group, from seven ‘til they were done. So that could be ten o’ clock, eleven o’ 
clock, depending on what they had to deal with. Sometimes they had more stuff to do. 
Umm, Tuesdays nights they did not have regular group. People that were married, or 
part of a couple, would be involved in couple’s therapy with a therapist, and the other 
guys had that night off. That was Monday, Wednesday Thursday and Friday, uhh, was 
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that pretty – was that afternoon group, evening group. Except on Tuesdays. Saturday 
there was no group. Sunday, evening, there was a group, but there was also - visitors 
could come on Sundays. That, that was visiting days, people who were approved 
visitors. 
JG: Okay. Did residents have their own rooms, or were they two to a room, or 
three to a room? 
01: They… sometimes more than that, there was a large dormitory, uhh, and, 
you might have as many as… maybe eight guys, in the dorms. Six to eight, it depended 
on the size of the room, and at one time… we were using, uh, bunk beds. But, uh, when 
they divided it up, then guys could have kind of some, you know, like a sheet or 
something, down, so have some privacy. But, there was – candidly, there wasn’t a lot 
of… fuss for privacy. Being open like you are in military barracks, so that people know 
what other people are doing so they can help ‘em out if they need to, uh, what have you. 
So, yeah. The only people that really had individual rooms in what we call the “short 
hall” were work release. And they did have a small individual room, that was probably 
smaller than this office, but all that was in it was…. a small chest of drawers, it might 
have been, maybe… from here to there [pointing to walls]. 
JG: So about, 8 feet by 12 feet? 
01: Maybe, if that. Anyway, they had a bed, chest of drawers, a place to put 
their clothes, any personal things, a bedside table, and that was it. 
JG: Okay. Um. What was your uniform, or did you have one? 
01: No uniform. 
JG: No uniform. 
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01: No, the sex offender program did not wear… uhh, I didn’t have – well, even 
in the psychiatric hospital, when I was a part – when I was in geriatrics, I had to wear, 
white. 
JG: Mhmmm. 
01: But when I went to the psych uniform nobody wore uniforms, in the psych 
unit. You just dressed in street clothes. And that was the same thing at, in the sex 
offender program. 
JG: Mhmm. Did the residents have a dress code, or? 
01: They had, you know, most of them during the day wore jeans, or khakis, but 
mostly jeans and t-shirts, or jeans and long-sleeve shirts – it just depended on what they 
had. 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: They generally brought clothes from home. Uhh, there was also, a kind of a 
clothes shop that was, you could go in and pick clothes out at another part of the 
hospital. Or folks could bring stuff in to them, etcetera.  
JG: Mhmm. Okay. 
01: So there was nothing to designate this as the sex offender program. There 
are some places where sex offenders wear particular color jumpsuit, so it got 
everybody, including the other convicts, know who you are.  
JG: Yeah. 
01: This is - they were treated like the rest of the hospital, there was no uniform 
for anybody else in the rest of the hospital,  
JG: So why them? 
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01: Including the staff, you can tell who was who.  [Meaning unclear in-context, 
but did not have time to clarify.] 
JG: Okay. Umm, we just described how there were generally, not always but 
generally, two umm, therapy sessions a day, or two group meetings.  
01: Yeah. 
JG: One in the afternoon, and one in the evening. 
01: Yeah. 
JG: Did those differ in content in any way, or… 
01: Well, the evening session was longer, but there was also – that was where 
requests for a new staff, for a greater… am I close enough? 
JG: Yeah, you’re fine, I just wanted to check the battery on my laptop.  
01: Uhh… closer to, … what was the question again?  
JG: Oh, um, How did the afternoon and therapy - evening therapy sessions… 
[differ?] 
01: Okay. Afternoon dealt with… sometimes reading the autobiography, any 
confrontations, any therapy that somebody would ask for… “I’m having a trouble” - 
they’d tell the leader of the group, there were two leaders, two resident leaders in each 
group, uh, and then they, the guys were supposed to let them know at the beginning if 
they needed to talk about something. Other residents could bring in something, a 
confrontation, what have you. Uhh… 
JG: And what, precisely, was a confrontation? 
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01: Well, it would be, you know… let’s see if I can think of one… “You’re not 
doing a very good job keeping your area clean. You’re not helping out.” Somebody 
might have thought somebody was fantasizing just by the way they were behaving… 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: Uhh, you know, somebody maybe on the ward that they worked on might 
have been over associating with a staff person.   
JG: Mhmm. 
01: The ward – there were more women who worked on the ward than man, 
although there were some. But most of the nurse’s aides, and, uhh – of course, nurses 
were women, and these guys, they were not mentally ill, they, in comparison to some of 
the patients that people were dealing with on their ward, they just seemed like 
everybody else. So we really had to keep track of what was going on, because there 
were a couple of incidents, more than a couple, were somebody got involved with the 
staff. So one of the rules was, very definitely, you cannot be involved in a personal, 
intimate relationship with any staff. It was technically against the hospital rules, but – 
JG: More importantly, it was against their treatment. 
01: Yes, it absolutely, absolutely was. Not appropriate. 
JG: Yes. 
01: So kind of, that sort of stuff, and sometimes if the therapist had something 
they wanted to talk about or deal with, they’d go into group and address, address that as 
well. 
JG: And so, as you were describing, the therapy supervisors were not, were not 
in on every session. 
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01: That’s correct. 
JG: They were not asking questions. So patients – sorry, I apologize – residents 
would be asking each other questions? [unintelligible movement] 
01: Yes. There’d be the group leader, and then somebody else could ask a 
question, or they used to talk about “running a line of therapy” on somebody they 
thought needed help. And so someone would bring it up. Or the leader would say 
“Okay, Joe, so what is it you want to talk about in regard to Frank?” And so he’d bring 
it up, and other leader- other group members, if they felt like they wanted to say 
something – it’s kind of like a group therapy session, when you’re in a regular, 
“outside” - 
JG: Yeah. 
01: You know, you talk to each other, you point stuff out, you offer help, that 
kind of thing.  
JG: Yeah. 
01: At one point, about the time that I started there, some of the groups were still 
operating in a really pretty heavy duty “confrontation” manner, you known, sort of like 
the old –  
JG: Like Sysanon, [Synanon]   or?  
01:  ?Sedranar??? I think was the drug program here, and then there was one 
down in California that was sort of the basis for, for, a lot of self-help stuff, and theirs 
really was self help, they didn’t have a… 
JG: A program. 
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01: A treatment person that would be in there monitoring them. So it was pretty 
confrontive, and several of us that were new to the program over time started doing 
something differently. So we modified the really “attack” stuff and modified the 
definition, ‘cause if you look at the definition of confrontation in the dictionary, it does 
not say screaming and yelling at somebody.  
JG: Was there  - was there a lot of raised voices? 
01: And so pointing out – Oh yeah, screaming sometimes. Rah-rah-rah-rah… 
JG: Because I heard it described at confrontational,  
01: Yeah. 
JG: and then in the documentary they’re all very soft-spoken. So, it’s a bit of an 
incongruity but you’re saying it definitely was. 
01: At one point it got- particularly if somebody wanted somebody to tell the 
truth, you know – “don’t lie to me, tell me the truth, I saw you”, blah blah blah blah.  
JG: Yeah. 
01: But that kind of stopped … probably in late ’73, early ’74, that was sort of, 
the end of that. And it didn’t mean that was going on in all groups. But there were some 
groups that, uh, that did that. [Pause]. Stopped, though. 
JG: Yes. Okay - 
01: And we started, as time went along, were it could be allowed, we started 
spending more time in group. It was easier to be there most of the afternoon, ‘cause that 
was, working hours, uh, some of us would come back in the evening, 
JG: Mhmm. 
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01: to see how things were going, and I lived within a little over a mile from the 
hospital, so it was very easy for me to drop in and see what’s going on. And again, we 
have the, the tapes. 
JG: Yeah. 
01: And you know, from time to time, you’d track the tapes to see, okay, well, - 
and it didn’t happen very often, where there might be some gap, uhh, not often, I don’t 
ever remember having to confront that but somebody else I remember did,  
JG: That there was a gap in the tape. 
01: Yes, gap in the tape. 
JG: Like, where they would have erased it – 
01: Like the Nixon tape. 
JG: Yes. Oh, I see. That is, that is surprising. 
01: But the thing was, there was the…written, the written - 
JG: Written minutes. 
01: minutes. So you could very easily… but sometimes the tape recorder didn’t 
work as well as it should. But that was rarely, rarely a thing I can remember, remember 
having to deal with. But that’s why the minutes were there, and it was only on special 
occasions that I would pull the tape off, er, tape in to listen to it to see, uh, if the 
minutes… were - 
JG: Were accurate. 
01: were accurate, and the minutes were often more detailed than the, the tape. 
JG: Um, so you did not listen to the tapes that often, you merely – or rather, you 
did it to confirm the minutes. 
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01: Pretty much. It was depending on time, because the group leaders would 
bring the minutes of the meeting into me, first thing in the morning, and I would take 
time to go through ‘em and write comments, and that was one thing I would address 
when I went into the afternoon, was, you know, comments on the good stuff, the not so 
good stuff, whatever. And, uh, so the minutes really did give us decent information on 
what was happening when we weren’t there. 
JG: Ok. Excellent. Umm, how often were you in contact with the Eastern State 
Program, upon its re-foundation? 
01: Well they didn’t refound, they never had one. They, we had - 
JG: Well, they had a commitment process in the early fifties, because it - 
01: Well, but that’s what everyone had. It’s just like Western had. That was 
when… 
JG: It was not a program, it was merely… 
01: No, they, and - they might go into the same ward as the NGRI [Not Guilty 
by Reason of Insanity] people. Uhh, they might be distributed to different wards, but 
there was no program.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: That was kind of what happened, uh, at Western, uh, before the program 
started, but in reality they had a lot of people being supervised without much of a 
program. It was more medication induced, and… It was the minority of people that got 
medication, during, uh in Sex Offender Program during the time when I was there. They 
weren’t psychotic. Somebody was depressed, really depressed, then they might get an 
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antidepressant, but medication use, other than for medical stuff prescribed by the 
medical doctor, was really pretty min- 
JG: Very minimal. 
01: Very minimal, yeah. 
JG: Mmkay. Ummm. 
01: So, Eastern State may have done that other thing, but, we were so big, and 
we got people from Eastern Washington once the Sex Offender Program started up in 
the late sixties, uh, and we were getting so large that between our hospital and the 
division of Mental Health, ah, there was a decision made to develop at least two groups 
over at Eastern State at that time, and two people, the people that we had from Eastern 
State, they didn’t - weren’t forced to but many opted to go over to Eastern State because 
their families and friends were closer, and we got, trying to remember -  I think we 
hired two people a little before all of that, I think six months before, so they got used to 
the program and what was happening, uh, and then, those two people went over to 
Eastern State as the directors for, - or is it the leaders, or the therapists for those two 
groups. 
JG: Uhuh. 
01: During that time, after it opened, the first year, I think, several of us, and by 
that time I was director of the sex offender program, we went over two or three times, 
they might come back and talk, uh, so it was about a year, sometimes maybe, maybe 
once a year for a couple of years after that at their request. 
JG: Yes. How did you responsibilities change from therapy supervisor to 
director? I imagine there was, obviously, some steps in the middle of that… 
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01: Well, princip-… as a therapy supervisor, I was principally responsible for 
the intake, evaluation and treatment of the people in my group. Because I was a 
Therapy Supervisor III, I was the supervisor for the ward, where there were three other, 
er, two other therapists. But, then, when I was appointed Director, uhh, initially I tried 
to keep my group, but it became ridiculous. 
JG: Yes. 
01: Because I was responsible for, uh, overseeing the whole program, uh, 
making sure that stuff was happening as it needed to be, I was, I headed up the staff 
meeting, I was also required to go to senior staff, uh, where a lot of the final decisions 
got made about the sex offender program,  and residents, and then at one point the 
mentally ill offender, and I had more responsibility for communicating with the 
Division of Mental Health. If they wanted a report, I was usually the guy they came to. I 
was hiring, and monitoring evaluations for the therapists, etcetera. 
JG: Yes. 
01: I far preferred being a therapist to an administrator. 
JG: Mhmm. Was there ever a program for the mentally ill offender at Western 
State? 
01: Yes. Yes. 
JG: When was that, uh, founded? 
01: [thinks, clicks tongue] Uh, ’74? ’75? And that’s the program that took over a 
goodly part of North Hall. Dr. MacDonald was the clinical director for that as well. 
They adopted our model, so there was a therapy supervisor in charge of a group, but 
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because we were, because they were dealing with mentally ill people, there was a ward 
psychiatrist, there was more nursing staff,  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: They had [a] psychologist attached to the program, um, and the, uh… 
competency and NGRI program became part of that unit as well   . 
JG: Mhmm. So, there was a significant degree of, not control but more 
monitoring, for the mentally ill offender unit, but it’s still predicated on the same 
principle of - 
01: But not so much self-help, because there was a therapist in their group all 
the time.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: They didn’t have so much group hours as we did, and they really had 
difficult - they didn’t have group leaders the way we did. They’d appoint somebody, the 
staff would appoint somebody, and their level of functioning would really kind of 
determine what went on. The professional that came into the group that would sort of 
lead the group and direct it.  
JG: Mhmm. Uh, was there a significant difference between the way you 
approached treatment for offenders against children and offenders against adults? 
01: No.  
JG: Okay. Just that question, um –  
01: Not any more than I do now in private practice. But although, not for adults, 
no. There’s a difference between how one provides treatment for adolescents in private 
practice, and adults – 
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JG: But in terms of the target of their offenses, no. 
01: No. 
JG: As we previously stated, there were some escapes under your tenure.  
01: While I was there, yes, 
JG: Yes, what was it like being on the ward while a patient was at large? 
01: You mean, gone somewhere? 
JG: Yes, gone somewhere. What happened, what was the protocol? 
01: Well, um… initially, um… when I first started there, ‘cause sometimes 
people left the grounds and came back again. 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: And that was apparently a function that happened in the early days of the 
program and it was still kind of in effect in middle ’73, when I went to work there there. 
But, umm, the first really huge, I say big escape was a rapist, and he was a level four. 
He had taken a group of residents to their jobs at the noontime, and then never came 
back to the ward. And… we started looking for him, went out on the grounds, and he 
wasn’t there, but there was no policy in those days, you would notify the superintendent 
-     
JG: And what year was this? 
01: [pause] Early ’74. But no policy to notify Mental Health, DSHS or the 
public, because there was still a sense, because nine out of ten times, someone came 
back.  
JG: So it was better to avoid – 
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01: But this was also a group - there was a group of people that the Associate 
Director under MacDonald had made arrangements with Department of Corrections to 
take a select group of people that had been sent to the Department of Corrections 
because the prosecutor refused to file on them. In those days, the sex psychopath law 
said that, the, it was the responsibility, or purview, of the deputy prosecutor to file on 
and say, “Alright, we’re gonna put this guy up for an evaluation period or observation 
period” – 
JG: [unintelligible] responsibility of the deputy prosecutor?  
01: The deputy prosecutor was the only one who could file a sex psychopath 
petition. The judge couldn’t do it, the defense consul couldn’t do it. And so, one of the 
criteria seemed to be that the guy had to more or less admit what he’d done and be 
willing to engage in treatment. Now we had guys that came and said, “Well yes I did it, 
but I had…” they hedged things. And, so there were a group of more …  hardened 
criminals, and more rapists. Now I remember having a couple rapists in the group when 
I first started, but there were fewer rapists and part of was prosecutorial discretion. And 
so, uhh, the guy that escaped was a rapist. 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: And he had committed some rapes in West Seattle, and part of King County 
but then was sent to prison. So, he and some other guys that were rapists were sent to us 
by Department of Corrections, and at that time, DOC was part of a DSHS agency. So 
there was Division of Mental Health, Department of Corrections, etcetera, so they were 
all part of DS- 
JG: Under the umbrella. 
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01: Yes, under the umbrella of DSHS. So it was easier, you didn’t have to go 
back to court to switch somebody. So this guy happened to be one of those people, 
and… he just didn’t come back. 
JG: And he had a, so-to-speak, a company car?  
01: No, no – 
JG: Or what was it? He was on foot? 
01: We don’t, I, I -   I honestly don’t remember now, but he was on foot. I think, 
he took a bus?  I don’t know how far he went, he took a-  he ended up in Seattle. And it 
was after that, he committed – I think two new rapes, up in Seattle. I hate to swear to it, 
but I think he may have murdered one of the younger girls. They were preteen, teen 
girls. They found their bodies… a while, not a long time, but they found their bodies, 
they were missing. Then there was manhunt put out for him, I don’t remember where 
they caught him, but he was readjudicated in King County, and then went to Walla 
Walla. 
JG: Mhmm. Noted. So, that was - 
01: That was the first one. And so that took away some of the privileges. Guys 
were not allowed to be out on, even level four, they changed what they could and 
couldn’t do, so they had to be in twos as well, uh, etcetera.  
JG: Mhmm.  
01: So that was the first big change. And there were a couple, and of course that 
made a major paper, 
JG: Yeah. 
01: you know. That was the proverbial doo-doo hit the fan. 
  
297 
 
JG: Yes. Umm, and how did the other patients react to – 
01: Other clients or other residents? 
JG: Other clients or other residents, my apologies. 
01: Well, they were very upset. And of course we grounded the entire program, 
which meant nobody got out of the place.  
JG: So no work release. 
01: No – well… maybe work release could go, it depended at that time. But, the 
ward, the whole program was grounded, and then sometimes the program may have 
come off of grounding but not the group.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: Because we were doing work within the group structure to see “how did that 
happen”, “what did you know”, “what had you seen”, all of the above. 
JG: Yes. 
01: And he was just, he was just slick. The only thing I remember about him is 
that you could look him directly in the eyes and you didn’t feel like there was anything 
there. 
JG: I see. 
01: Kind of like that psychopathic…  
JG: A Lack of… feeling. 
01: Yeah. Not much feeling or certainly not much empathy for… anything. 
JG: And, I imagine that the residents would process this in their group sessions, 
you know.  
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01: Yeah, well, yes. And well this whole thing, of course - when the group was 
grounded, they’d be in group from after breakfast – they didn’t leave the ward, 
breakfast was brought to the ward, and from the time they finished breakfast and 
cleanup in the morning till noon, and then again in the afternoon and in the evening 
until the therapist, the therapist felt they had… adequately addressed the issues and 
maybe came up with some proposals about “what now”, and then in order for them to 
come off group completely, that [coming off group] would have to be approved in a 
program staff meeting. 
JG: Okay. So they, they would, would offer proposals, in terms of – 
01: Well, they would say “this is what we want to do”, and then in my group I 
would approve it, then we’d even talk about putting that into place, uh, and then I’d 
review, there was a… what did they call that? – there was a meeting once a week on 
Wednesday morning, that was all the therapists, the - the clinical director, the 
psychologist, and the group leaders, met to discuss the program, to discuss issues, and 
the leaders would then present their positions, 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: because they were asking to come off grounding and they had to present 
their positions of why they’d thought, why they’d solved the problem.  
JG: I see. 
01: And they might get told “No, you’re not done, go back.” 
JG: So, so they’d, they would have to argue, in a sense, and present themselves. 
Um, what would be parts of their proposal, as to why? Would it be in terms of “This is 
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the way the sessions are going, I’m seeing a marked improvement in, um, resident 
involvement”, or - 
01: Well, what it might be with him, what I’d remembered is that people had 
seen things they didn’t know they’d seen. It wasn’t like he was trying to throw a - 
JG: A chair through the window. 
01: A chair through the window, or go down the building in sheets or something 
like that. It was that they just kinda recognized that he wasn’t with it as much. And I, I 
actually don’t remember, I don’t recall anyone actually disclosing something that they 
might have come forward with. It was sort of, everybody was surprised. The whole 
program was devastated because they knew, particularly after the bodies were found 
and it was, you know, it was a statewide hunt for him… 
JG: Yeah. 
01:  I think, I don’t remember, but I think he even went into Oregon and did 
something as well. But, uh … in fact he may have gotten caught in Oregon and then 
was brought back to, uh… adjudicated there, went back to Washington, came back to 
Washington, but he’s probably locked up for the rest of his life. He’s, I think he’s still at 
Walla Walla. 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: And he was probably in his mid-to-late twenties when all of this happened in 
’74. So he’s probably  kind of an old man now. 
JG: But there was a bit of a media circus about it. 
01: [Pause] Yes there was, but not as bad a circus as happened later on. 
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J: And that actually does bring me to something I wanted to ask about. I 
understand if you do not want to talk about this, but, umm…  what can you tell me 
about Larry Hendricks? 
01: Oh ho ho!  
JG: Because… 
01: That’s okay, I don’t mind talking about it. 
JG: That was… 
01: I have certainly talked about it to any number of people.  
JG: Yes. 
01: But, Larry Hendricks was a graduate of the sex offender program. 
JG: When did he, when did he come into the program, if I may ask? 
01: That was before my time, and in fact, I think he was probably on work 
release or outpatient by the time I was working there. 
JG: So he would have been in the program for quite some time before your 
arrival? 
01: Several years, I think so. I, I’m trying, I can’t remember who his therapist 
was, but that’s irrelevant. So, um. He was… a good program member, he was a good 
group leader, he was… intelligent, articulate, and…. my recollection is that his offenses 
had involved minor males, boys, like teens between… eleven to fifteen males.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: I’m not aware that any of his offenses involved adult males, but we didn’t do 
polygraphs in those days, and so he could have gotten away with stuff that never came 
to light, 
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JG: That never was disclosed. 
01: … because when we was caught, he had been raping and assaulting adult 
males up and down the West Coast. But he… was fine. And then, he went to work, he 
got out, he went to work for a while, and at that time the sex offender program was 
hiring… ex-residents, or people who had graduated, uh, that had… the academic, who, 
they didn’t have master’s degrees, but they.. 
JG: They had an academic background. 
01: They had that, psychology, sociology, whatever… and had gotten a 
reference. But, I don’t know why that started, but I suppose it was similar to a mistaken 
belief about alcoholics as well… it takes one to know one.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: And, umm… Was it then, that… [unintelligible].  I’m trying to remember 
when Larry was arrested, because he was a therapist for a while… 
JG: Was he, was he arrested before? Because what I - 
01: He was arrested about five years after he’d had anything to do with the 
program. 
JG: Well, because, from what I know, he was involved with the Lifeboat 
program, then he was – 
01: What’s the Lifeboat program? 
JG: The Lifeboat program was a program at Western State which treated drug 
offenders on a similar –  
01: Oh, oh oh, yeah, he was, I see, I don’t remember it being called Lifeboat. 
JG: That’s the only name I know. 
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01: I never heard that name, but anyway, he was = 
JG: Just a short point, in ’79, he tried to kidnap someone and took them to a 
wooded area - 
01: That was when he got arrested. 
JG: Well, he was shot. 
01: Well, I know.     
JG: Oh. 
01: I know. Well, I don’t remember. He didn’t stay with the drug offense – he 
went from us, and then they were looking for therapists for the drug offense program, it 
was another unit of the  legal offender unit, and they took Larry, and another man who 
was a sex offender treatment person, I mean he was a professional - 
JG: A graduate? 
01: No, no, a professional. Don’t know if they had two, or -  I can’t remember. I 
remember Larry and the other guy, and, um… There was a lot of con behavior, because 
everybody that was in the drug program was from prison. 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: That’s where they got ‘em. 
JG: Yeah. 
01: So there was a lot of con behavior. I think there was probably drug 
smuggling. There was a bunch of garbage in the program. That’s what ended that. I’m 
trying to remember, Larry may have come back to the main hospital, but I think he was 
working on an adult psych ward, and then he just left the hospital altogether. He owned, 
he and another guy owned an antique shop in Downtown Tacoma, and, uh, we didn’t 
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see him anymore. I mean he would once in a while, drop by. And I didn’t know him, I 
didn’t know his background as well as some of the therapists that were there before. Uh, 
and I know one of them got  concerned when he came one day just to visit and he was 
dressed all in leather, black leather and was riding a black motorcycle, and so I can 
remember that particular person, it wasn’t his therapist but had known him through 
treatment because he was one of the top three clinical people, and he said “something’s 
going on there, I don’t know what it is, I’m concerned.” 
JG: Yes. 
01: And then of course, I don’t know how long after that, but all of this… 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: But he had been graduated from the program at least five or six years by the 
time he had… 
JG: Reoffended.  
01: This happened, yeah. But he didn’t come around anymore, and actually 
that’s one of the things that was… there was an open invitation, that if you had 
successfully completed the program, you could come back to the program, your group, 
whenever you were experiencing problems, and every so often one of the group 
members, some of them had even been in that group, East Group, before I took it over, 
would show back up, and they’d want to talk about what was going on, they’d just come 
to help out, because they thought there were some issues they could help with. So… the 
invitation to come back was well known, and many guys did take advantage of that 
when they felt themselves slipping or what have you. 
JG: Mmkay. 
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01: So, Larry was a disgrace to us, I think it was the Larry situation that forced – 
no longer having ex-sex offenders or… graduates… Those of us that came after that 
practice had been initiated were kind of “uhhh”, but for a long time it was fine. There 
was two guys, there was Larry and another guy, but there had been…. one, two, three, 
four…. four or five guys, no, I’m forgetting… five or six guys, that had been sex 
offenders that became therapists at one time or another, either already were or were 
therapists after I had started there.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: Of that group, one of the guys was, was a therapist… Very good guy, liked 
him a lot, he had some advanced school stuff, he went to the director, he said “Look. I 
don’t want to do this stuff, it’s too much, I don’t want to hear all this garbage, you 
know, I need to keep myself together, it’s not helping my rehabilitation”, and so he 
became part of the research department, because he had a flair - he knew mathematics 
and what have you, 
JG: Yeah. 
01: And so - But he, he’s fine. He still is. He never did anything. He was, never 
did anything - Never reoffended, never did anything 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: …to cause problems for the program. There was one other guy, who had 
been before I had started who was caught for… exposing himself. And that had been his 
original offense. But he’d gone a good ten years with nothing going on. But exposers 
are very difficult people to treat, particularly if they have done a lot of it. It’s kind of a 
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compulsion, or obsessive-compulsive kind of behavior, not in the sense of 
handwashing,  
JG: But… 
01: so he, he did… he got arrested, we didn’t know about it, but he came to the 
guy who had been his therapist, told him right away, and I think he got a misdemeanor, 
but he said “No, I’m gone.” You know, and he wouldn’t have been back. 
JG: Yeah. 
01: And we had, after that, there was another guy who came to work, but he 
decided it wasn’t his cup of tea, and he moved to eastern Washington, started a business 
that had nothing to do with sex offenders or treatment. And then there were two other 
guys… (another one?) reoffended after he had left the program. He didn’t want to 
operate the way we were operating.  
JG: Yeah.  
01: We’re not so, confro-, we were not so confrontive.  
JG: Oh. 
01: Also, he didn’t feel that people were being really held accountable for their 
behavior. And so, he left, and then the last guy… quit. [Pause] But he had also… stupid, 
stupid stuff. He didn’t offend in the classic sense… Do you know who Gene Enerson 
was, who used to work King - 
JG: [shakes head] 
01: – she was one of the nighttime people on King TV for many, many years. I 
think she, she lived on the waterfront somewhere in Seattle, I can’t remember whether it 
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was Elliot Bay, Puget Sound, Lake Union, wherever it was… and she saw this guy 
lurking, you know, because 
JG: Yeah. 
01: there is no private waterfront in Washington, per se, and thought it was kind 
of weird, and he had sent her a weird letter, it wasn’t “I love you, I want to be with 
you”, but, I don’t remember what it was in regard to now. So she called the cops, and 
they arrested him, and he had to go get mental health treatment, ‘cause I remember 
when that happened. But… at the point of Hendricks, we didn’t get rid of the guys that 
were already there. 
JG: But you stopped hiring. 
01: We stopped hiring. It became a, um…  hospital policy, a DSHS policy.  
JG: Mhmm. 
01: And, uh, as the people were left, we did not fill them with somebody new. 
JG: Mhmm. Alright. Thank you for covering that.  
01: Yes, that’s one of the wilder times – the Hendricks stuff. 
JG: Yeah, I can imagine. Did you think you could tell a patient who was 
recovering from a patient who still harbored an intent to reoffend? [pause] I imagine it’s 
difficult. 
01: Well not by looking at them! 
JG: [chuckles] 
01: They were the extreme… One of the things that I really liked with the 
program is that… people went with a buddy, and it was usually, somebody that might 
be a group leader, a group charge, or whatever -  to sit in… when I needed to do like a 
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history or an intake with a guy, one of the group leaders would come in, and somebody 
else. The group leader would come in with a guy, uh, and that was true of talking to any 
staff. If they wanted to get their medication from the nursing staff, they had to take a 
buddy in with them, uh simply to combat that whole thing of: “01 said I could do this”. 
Because the guy that was a group leader that in there, was kind of writing stuff down as 
we were talking. And then that was one of the afternoon things.  So and so went in to 
see 01 today. She did his social history, blah blah blah. He asked her about blah blah 
blah. Then you might ask the guy, they might ask the guy to tell them what she said. 
But with the leader in there, it was real hard for the guy to say, “01 told me I could do 
that.”  
JG: Yeah. 
01: And that was something that was part of the program from before. And that 
continued almost as long as, uh, as it was running. It altered a little bit when there were 
more psychologists floating around, uh, because they didn’t like the idea of another 
group member being in there. I was one of the people that protested, I said “You’re 
undermining the program rules and values”. And so some of those guys did, Some of 
them did then say, “Oh, well, Dr. So-And-So said.” And the if it was my group, I would 
always go in and say, “Tell me, did you tell So-And-So this happened? “Oh, well, no!” 
Well this is again another reason why we like to have somebody else in the room, but 
things that were important or things that had existed for a long time… Toward the end, 
changes occurred because the program was shrinking in size, we weren’t getting new 
people,  
JG: Yes. 
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01: people got discharged, or not discharged… [pause] they did get discharged, 
but they were, not with, not positive. They’d be, what we used to say, they’d get kicked 
out and sent back to court, because they all had these sentences, they had their – part of 
their sentence was that they’d enter and successfully complete the program, all phases, 
and if they didn’t – 
JG: They would face the sentence. 
01: then they would go back to court, they had to go back to the judge, and see 
the judge. That often meant they went to prison. So, anyway… 
JG: Yes. To get to the questions about the later years of the program… What do 
you think was the public of the program, uh, throughout? You’ve made mention that 
there was changing public opinion, it seems, in the eighties, or was there kind of a 
heightened awareness of the program, and the public, for whatever reason – 
01: A little bit of both, I think, because the program was highly regarded when I 
started work there, and was highly regarded through the seventies… 
JG: Amongst the professionals or amongst the public? 
01: Well, the, most of the press that got in really talked about the positives of 
what had gone on.  We actually got… somebody who had been a therapist working as 
kind of the PR person, and he would seek out and get interviews for people to learn 
about what had happened, uh, with the program. Then in the early 80’s, uh… we had a 
few more problems, it wasn’t all re-offenses, uh, maybe somebody that was on work 
release that was out in the community, didn’t come back, an occasional person, on 
outpatient, may have reoffended, at one point, when I had all that data, I could show 
you how… in relationship…. to prison people, how few escapees we actually had and 
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even how few offenders. But, you know, as the whole business gained popularity, then 
[pause]… I gotta be outta here at noon.    
JG: Oh. 
01: Um, gained pop - It’s ten to twelve. Gained popularity, or, interest in the 
whole sex offenders, sex of f- Well, Ted Bundy, that. 
JG: Yes.  
01: That was in the eighties, well he was actually active in the seventies, up in 
Seattle, in Issaquah, that’s when he did a lot of his stuff up there but he was arrested in 
the early eighties, so that came out. And so once it was a part of the public 
consciousness, then everything we did, the newsmedia wanted. 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: And we got to the point, aside - then it would be filtered through DSHS, and 
if somebody wanted to talk to me, they had to go through the higher-ups in order to get 
in with a camera. In the early days, we could… 
JG: It was much more open in terms of - 
01: Well it was, and, uh, the superintendent… at the time, in the seventies, after 
the Ru- well, it’s public knowledge, the Ruzicka thing, that was the guy that ran in ’74.   
JG: Yeah. 
01: Uh, Dr. diFuria put my nose in front of the camera, and I think there was 
some politics involved, ‘cause I was the first and only woman working there at the time,  
perhaps it would go down a little easier from a woman, etcetera, and I don’t know that 
that was the case, but that certainly would have been the -  
JG: So you were speaking to the press about it, was it on television or -?  
  
310 
 
01: Yeah, television. Oh yeah, yeah. On television. You know, and once, 
particularly during that phase, I remember talking to KING- 
JG: Pardon me, you said you spoke to which television stations? 
01: KING, KIRO, KOMO, those were the main ones, there were no other ones 
that came beating on the door then, those were the main three.  
[Long pause]. 
JG: In the interest of time, I will cut that there. 
01: If you, if you’d like to do this over the phone, I’d be willing to do that, too, 
to finish up, if that helps you. 
JG: That will probably work out – I’ll letcha know. Let me see if there’s 
anything else I need to discuss right here.  
[long pause.] 
JG: What – what was – what were the conditions of the hospital in terms of 
cleanliness, upkeep and staffing levels across the program’s history? 
01: I think the…. At one point, we were getting too may referrals. It’s one of the 
things about being a, quote, “successful” program. The judges, from the 70’s on, used 
the program as a better alternative for sex offenders than prison, 
JG: Mhmm. 
01: uh, so, if at all possible, they would send them to us… and then in addit- so 
in addition to that, it just seemed like, you know, “new group here”, “new group there”, 
and in fact one time I remember saying we don’t want to add more people, we’ve gotta 
get therapists in here and get them trained before we add new groups, etcetera. And my 
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opinion is that at one time, we started new groups and added new therapists before they 
were properly trained.  
JG: When would you say about that started? 
01: ’83 on. ’82, ’83 on… 
JG: Insufficient training before… 
01: Well, they were - 
JG: Experience… 
01: There wasn’t. People were brought in. They had to have a certain degree of 
education and experience. We preferred they had at least a year of group therapy 
experience, etcetera. But usually somebody in the past had been brought in and would 
have six months with another senior therapist, with that person’s group, learning the 
process, etcetera. And so, we ended up – that didn’t work as much – and while it wasn’t 
so much reoffending, things were looser, 
JG: Yes. 
01: in those groups. We had a couple situations where younger women 
therapists actually got involved with a group member. I’m not sure that there was any 
sex… 
JG: Involvement. 
01: …in the classic sense, I mean, there may have been… 
JG: Light petting. 
01: Kissing, petting, what have you. And the group members knew it was going 
on, but people got, you know, what -  
JG: A regime of silence. 
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01: It came, it came, well not so much, I think, they were – well, if it was your 
therapist that was doing it, and the person had the power over you, would you go to the 
other therapist on the ward and say “Hey, by the way, so-and-so is involved with so-
and-so”? Well, it came out, and…. there was letters going back and forth… in one 
occasion someone escaped because they had help from a nursing staff or a therapist. 
You know, there were those kind of funny things. And these two young women, we did 
find out what was going on, because we did some investigating, and… eventually the 
guy confessed, the guys confessed, what was happening, and, uh…. the two therapists 
were let go, and, uh, in different, at different spaces… but I think it really made life 
difficult for those two guy- two guys involved, that I can remember, and when offered 
the opportunity to stay, the one guy said “No, I’m not going to deal with this anymore, 
JG: Yeah. 
01: “I wanna go back to jail.” What have you. So, would he have done that, had 
this not happened? But, boundaries with people, particularly – Well, I don’t, I don’t 
experience it as much, because I’ve been used to working with this population, but for 
young women I think, that don’t have a lot of training, I think that, perhaps, the 
tendency to want to fall into that might be a greater possibility, but learning boundaries 
and what you should and shouldn’t do is a really important thing. 
JG: Alright. Yeah, in the interest of time I’ll have to close it out here, but thank 
you so much for your time today. 
01: Sure. 
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Appendix C: Interview with “02” and “03”, conducted on July 28th, 2018. 
The interview has been edited to remove identifying names and a large tangent 
describing personal matters. JG is John Giacoppe, the author of this paper. 
 
 
02 and 03 Interview Transcript 
JG: When and for how long did you live in the Washington area? 
02: I have lived in the Washington area for fifty years of my life. 
JG: When did you begin working for Western State Hospital? 
02: March 11th of 1989. 
JG: Did you work for the Department of Social and Health Services in any other 
capacity before that point? 
02: No, that was my first job for DSHS. 
JG: Okay. How long did or have you worked for Western State? 
02: 29 years, in March it will be my 30th year at Western State Hospital. 
JG: Mmkay. What positions did you occupy during your tenure at- there? 
02: I started there as a custodian, then I worked my way up to a Mental Health 
Technician I, and then I went to a Mental Health Technician III, then I went to a Mental 
Health Technician V, and now I’m a Program Specialist IV. 
JG: Program Specialist IV. 
02: Yes. 
JG: What was your experience in the healthcare profession before Western 
State, if any? 
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02: I had no experience in the healthcare field before I started working at 
Western State Hospital. 
JG: Okay. Have any of your duties at any point brought you in contact with the 
Sexual Offender Program?  
02: Yes it has.  
Could you walk me through an average day during your days as a custodian, 
during the, during your early time at Western State Hospital? 
02: My first part of the morning would be there for, uh, debriefing, for what 
wards we had to clean. 
JG: Uhuh. 
02: Once we were assigned the wards we had to go clean, we would go fill up 
mop buckets, prepare our mops, we would grab dust mops, they were called, ahead of 
times, then we would sweep the floors, then we would mop the floors, we cleaned 
bathrooms, we picked up trash, umm, we vacuumed offices, and we got rid of trash.  
JG: And then, how long did you work as a custodian before you progressed to a 
Mental Health Technician I, was that it? 
02: Yes. Approximately three years. 
JG: Okay. Did you generally work in a particular area of the hospital, or were 
you effectively roving, and kind of changed your assignments from day to day - 
02: I was roving, but the first experience was on a sexual predator ward. 
JG: Oh, as a custodian? 
02: As a custodian. Yes. 
JG: How would you describe that ward when you visited it? 
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02: It was intimidating when I’d first got there, and within the first fifteen 
minutes I’d seen something that was quite disturbing to me, and, uh, thought about 
quitting in the first fifteen minutes. 
JG: Um, would you like to describe that at all, or would you prefer to… 
02: Uh, we were going to, uh, I went to go fill up my mop bucket, and at the 
time when you filled up your mop buckets, they were in the same area as the restrooms 
of the residents there, and there was a… sexual… thing going on between an older man 
and a younger patient, when I first walked in the first fifteen minutes there. The first 
fifteen minutes I’d worked on the ward ever, I’d seen something that no one should 
really see, right there in the first fifteen minutes. 
JG: And this was, this was the first fifteen minutes of your first shift. 
02: Correct. 
JG: Okay. And that would have been – was that… that was within the sexual 
offender unit, 
02: Yes. 
JG: I’m trying to remember where that was at that time.  Do you know where 
that was at that time? 
02: It was on C-8… Central – Eight campus.  
03: Oh. 
JG: Yes, yes. And that was before the transition to the, kind of, the complex 
behind the hospital… umm, [unintelligible], to the forensic unit. 
02: Yes. We had our forensic unit at the time, they were considered North Hall, 
which, that building is no longer there. They tore that building down after the 
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earthquake that we had [the February 28th, 2001 Nisqually earthquake]. But that was, 
outside of the forensic unit, they had a sexual predator unit outside of the forensic unit. 
JG: Mhmm. Um, while you were working as a custodian, and through kind of 
your early years, were there any escapes from that program, from the sexual offender 
program? 
02: No, no escapes. 
JG: Alright. 
03: [Unintelligible] Mentally, mentally – 
02: Mentally ill offenders. But even then, we weren’t even called that on that 
ward. 
03: [Unintelligible]. 
JG: What did that ward look like? 
02: It was pretty much one long hallway, with a dining room off to the side, um, 
with a layer of probably sixteen to seventeen bedrooms, a large bathroom at one end of 
the hallway, and another large bathroom at the other end of the hallway. 
JG: Were those bedrooms single occupancy? 
02: They were double occupancy. 
JG: Double occupancy. And, um, the cafeteria, was this a reserved meal space 
for that ward - 
02: For that ward specifically, yes. 
JG: Were you ever told about the program by your supervisors. Did they ever 
talk to you about it in any way, besides “This is a ward, go clean there”? 
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02: They, they didn’t give me any heads up, no. “Just go to the ward and start 
cleanin’.” 
JG: Did you go back to that ward often, or was it – did you only clean it every 
once in a while? 
02: Um, when I was first hired on at the hospital, I was what they called an 
“intermittent employee”. So, I intermittently worked on that ward, and on a lot of 
different wards in the hospital. It was wherever somebody called in sick, or they needed 
help, that’s where I’d go work. So I’d work that ward. I go work on, in geriatric setting 
wards. I’d go work on all-female wards, there’s several different style of ward that I 
worked on, but I never worked on the same ward twice, in a week, unless somebody 
was on vacation and I needed to cover them. So. 
JG: Okay. Throughout most of the program, the program at least before, before 
1986, they had the offenders clean their own ward, and work within a custodial 
capacity, with the intent of being, effectively, a self-contained kind of unit. Um, did you 
notice any um, offenders working within, whenever you visited there, was there anyone 
ever doing custodial tasks who was a patient, was there any kind of – 
02: Yes. Actually. When I started there, we were assigned one to two patients to 
assist us in cleaning the ward. 
JG: Okay, alright. Did you at that time think that that program was effective in 
any way? 
02: Ummm… not, not that I saw, not that I saw. Now I did have a resident leave 
there and go to a regular psych ward after that, left that ward, and I never really 
understood why the person was in the sexual predator ward at the beginning. 
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JG: Yeah. 
02:  Um, but by the time he was on the regular ward, I did the Cardinal Rule and 
asked him actually what he had done, to get put into there, and after that happened it 
kind of upset me and I no longer had that patient helping me work on the ward 
anymore. Which caused a lot of problems, because part of the work that I didn’t like 
doing, that person liked to do.  
JG: Yeah. 
02: And also I found that later on I found, later on, that person had kind of 
enjoyed working with me, and when I told him I no longer wanted to work with him, he 
got himself into a lot of other mischief, and, uh, started a lot of violence with other 
patients, and I kind of regret asking the question, what he did, and I also kind of regret 
knowing the answer because some other people were injured on the ward later because 
… idle, idle hands, devil’s workshop type deal. 
JG: Yeah. 
02: He had nothing to keep him busy anymore. 
JG: How do you think that… obviously there was the Westley Allen Dodd case 
in 1989, and that was the big media affair, and that set the stage for the Sexually Violent 
Predator Act in 1990. And then all the various changes that went on… really within 
corrections, but within sexual offender treatment through that decade of the 90’s. What 
did, what was your kind of impression, of what the interest of the public and the interest 
of the government was in dealing with sexual offenders at that time…. [A rambling 
tangent embedded in the question has been omitted.] So what’s your impression of 
where that was going and why? 
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02: Um… You know, I wasn’t really too much involved in politics at that time, 
but… I really feel that… I have a preconceived notion that people that do that, do not 
get better. And that’s kind of the way I feel. I feel that they were abused when they were 
younger, and it’s something that’s part of their life now, and the struggles they have 
with it, I don’t feel will never go away. I feel they may be able to control it with 
therapy, I believe, but I feel they need constant monitoring and checking in, and once 
someone’s had that happened to them, it’s hard for them to establish what is right and 
what is wrong. 
JG: We’ll be just five more minutes, dawg [to his grandchild, in the living 
room.] I have just a few more questions. What was… resident dress? 
02: Resident dress. They wore regular clothes. They dressed similar to how you 
and I are, right now. Jeans, collared shirts, some of them wore sweatpants. We didn’t 
have a uniform, per se, for the residents. They just dressed in regular clothes. On the 
wards, we, the workers, wore the same style of clothes as they did. We didn’t have 
badges at the time, nor did we have the white coats that you see on TV, and at times it 
was really tough to establish who was the resident and who was the patient, there at that 
time. 
JG: I see. Um, what was the condition of the hospital, um in the, in your early 
years? How was it doing… you described that North Hall has been torn down and 
replaced… 
02: It was more, more of a… more cavernous, less choppy. It consisted of big 
day rooms, littler bedrooms. Some of the wards were different from other ones. Some of 
the wards had barracks style bedrooms in it, where you have five patients at one time. A 
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big push now is to get rid of all ligature risks, for patients who want to hang themselves.  
Back when I started, there were a lot of exposed pipes. We had radiator systems with 
turn-on, turn-off knobs. It was a lot less… we had glass windows, we didn’t have 
plexiglass windows. Yeah, it was a lot different then what it is now. 
JG: Within the sexual offender program, at an earlier time, there was a major 
emphasis on having volunteers assist with kind of psychodrama sessions. 
Understandably, I don’t know if you don’t have much knowledge of this, but do you 
know what role volunteers had in the wider hospital at the time you started at Western 
State. Were volunteers around at all?  
02: I do not recall, I do not recall ever having volunteers ever at the hospital. At 
Christmastime, we would have volunteers bring gifts for the patients, but that was just 
for the whole hospital. I believe that the, uh, the sexual predators were more segregated.  
JG: Mhmm. 
02: My, my mother-in-law, my former mother-in-law worked in the unit for five 
years, when it was on Central, it was on C-14. She used to tell me about how they 
would do the therapy with watching movies, and they would have, have different sexual 
things happen in the movie, and they would have different sensors hooked up to the 
resident to check their stimuli, and what have you, that goes on during that time. She 
later was, um… not fired from the hospital, but fired from that unit, because she had 
some really bad interactions in her six years that she worked there with some of her 
patients, and also felt there was not much… getting better, as they say, there. And she 
voiced her opinion, and was let go. 
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[We proceeded to discuss possibly meeting with her, which has been deleted 
from the interview to delete personal information.] 
JG: I’ll conclude the interview here, and then we’ll speak about that more, but, 
umm. I don’t any more questions to ask you… you… Were, were there volunteers at all 
in the hospital? 
02: There’s volunteers, but there weren’t so much in that unit. They - 
JG: Where were they in the hospital, then? 
02: They would, they would be more into our volunteer services, which, I didn’t 
really see them working with the patients so much as… ancillary staff, providing stuff 
for the patients. 
JG: So, like, would that mean they were working, say… What do you mean by 
ancillary staff? I’m sorry. 
02: So they were more like, you know, providing meals, they’re providing the 
gifts around Christmas time… They were setting up programs, but I didn’t never really 
saw one-to-one interactions with them. Also, I also worked for a company called Life 
Force. Life Force is still in existence today. I worked there for a year, and that was 
when patients were taken out of the hospital setting and put into housing settings, but 
under a, uh, stringent watch of what they do. We’d take them to the grocery store, go to 
the grocery store at nighttime, twenty-four hour grocery stores. We’d leave about nine-
o-clock, so there was no children there at that time. We would get the newspaper, and 
magazines, and all children were removed – pictures were removed from the books and 
magazines that they read. Umm.. yeah, that was kind of a different type of experience 
working for them. 
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JG: I can imagine. Yeah, and you worked with them for a year. 
02: I worked with them for a year. It was probably about fifteen years ago.  
JG: Yes. Fifteen years ago. 
02: Yes.  
JG: Okay. 
02: So while I worked at Western State Hospital, I had a part time job and I 
worked at Life Force. Which is still going now. 
JG: Yeah, okay. Alright. Well, do you have any questions to ask me at all? 
02: No. 
[The following is not relevant to the thesis topic, but has been included in the 
interest of total disclosure.] 
03: I did volunteer at Western, before I started working there, and I worked in 
the, a group setting. So, I was, just - There was another like a permanent staff there, a 
paid staff, and I would just help out with the group. 
JG: Like a group therapy setting, you mean, or - 
03: Yeah, yeah. 
JG: And what did you - what ward was this on? 
03: It was, central, central ward, uh, one of the central wards. 
JG: And what sort of patients would that have been, then, in that group therapy? 
03: Adult psych. 
JG: Adult psych, okay. And so, did you just do, general – were you a part, 
effectively of the group therapy, or were you merely involved with, kind of… behind-
the-scenes work, assisting? 
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03: I believe we were playing a game, and I was involved in playing with the 
game. 
JG: Okay. When, when was this? 
03: This must have been… 1990. 
JG: 1990. Okay. Do you have anything, any other thoughts? 
03: No! I just wanted to add the volunteer piece. 
JG: Noted. Well, thank you both so much for your time. 
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